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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the opposition mounted by anarchists to the policy of state 
collaboration, which was adopted by the principal organisations of the Spanish 
libertarian movement at the outset of the civil war. Collaboration is understood in broad 
terms as the involvement of libertarian individuals and organisations in the 
reconstruction of the Republican state following its near collapse in July 1936, a process 
that implied not only participation in the organs of governance, but also in the 
ideological reconstitution of the Republic as a patriarchal and national entity. Using 
original sources, the thesis shows that the opposition to this process was both broader 
and more ideologically consistent than has hitherto been assumed, and that, in spite of 
its heterogeneity, it united around a common revolutionary programme. Focusing on the 
strategies adopted by oppositional anarchists over the course of 1937, from the radical 
interpretation of the CNT’s socialisation campaign to the insurrectionary mobilisation 
of May and finally to the defence of federalism within the libertarian organisations, the 
thesis also sheds light on the turbulent relationship between the responsible committees 
of the libertarian movement and its ‘mid-level’ union and affinity group delegates.  
The ‘conscience’ of the Spanish revolution, like its Russian precursor, both recognised 
and struggled against the role that the principal revolutionary organisation in the 
country had assumed in the reconstruction of the state. In the Spanish case, the 
resistance to state reconstruction was informed by the essential insight of anarchism: 
that the function and purpose of the modern state cannot be transformed from within. 
By situating the struggles of the radical anarchists within the contested process of state 
reconstruction, the thesis affirms the continued relevance of this insight to the study of 
the Spanish revolution.  
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Notes 
 
Regions and cities within Spain are given their Spanish spelling, with the exception of 
the Basque Country, presented in its English form, and the areas and institutions within 
Cataluña, which are rendered in the Catalan spelling. All translations are the author’s. 
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Preface 
 
The revolution that accompanied the outbreak of the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) was 
one of few occasions in world history when a conscious attempt to change the 
fundamental relations of a society has been undertaken by masses of people. At the 
forefront of this process were the organisations that, in several Spanish cities, had taken 
the lead in opposing the attempted coup launched on 17 July 1936 by officers in the 
Spanish army: the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National 
Confederation of Labour – CNT) and the anarchist Federación Anarquista Ibérica 
(Iberian Anarchist Federation – FAI). Such was the prominence of these organisations 
in suppressing the Nationalist mutineers that, with the smell of gunpowder still lingering 
in the air, several of the CNT and the FAI’s most prominent members met at the Casa 
Cambó, an imposing building in the heart of Barcelona soon to be renamed the ‘Casa 
CNT-FAI’, to discuss the question of whether it would be possible to proceed 
immediately to their shared objective of libertarian communism.1 There it was decided, 
on a provisional basis, that no such attempt would be made, and that the Spanish 
libertarian movement would collaborate with other political tendencies, such as 
communists, socialists, liberals and Catalan and Basque nationalists, in fighting the 
common fascist threat. 
These were days of euphoria for the anarchists of Spain. As the activist José 
Peirats, then an organiser in the brick-makers’ union in Barcelona, put it: ‘It is 
impossible to describe the joy registered by a people that feels itself sovereign and sees 
                                                 
1 The Casa Cambó had been expropriated along with the adjoining building, belonging to an employers’ 
association, the Foment Nacional del Treball. According to José Peirats, this expropriation was carried 
out in the name of the CNT Construction Workers’ Union: José Peirats, The CNT in the Spanish 
Revolution, Vol. 1, trans. by Chris Ealham (Hastings: PM Press, 2011), p. 144. However, according to her 
own account, Concha Liaño, at nineteen already a veteran activist of the CNT and a founder member of 
the Mujeres Libres (Free Women) grouping, had entered the building on her own initiative at the head of 
her equally youthful action group during the streetfighting. See her recollections in Eulàlia Vega, 
Pioneras y revolucionarias. Mujeres libertarias durante la República, la Guerra Civil y el Franquismo 
(Barcelona: Icaria, 2010), pp. 135-6. 
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its feared enemy defeated at our feet’.2 CNT members were at the forefront of 
organisational efforts that saw militia columns established, workplaces taken over and 
land collectivised in the summer of 1936. The state, reduced to a phantasm by the 
upheaval of July, was marginal to these developments. However, in the absence of any 
attempt to dissolve governmental and administrative bodies, and in a spirit of co-
operation that was variously described by anarchists as pragmatic, magnanimous and 
indicative of a new era of social harmony, many revolutionary phenomena were, from 
the first, formally subordinate to the national or regional organs of state, in spite of 
being self-managed or union-controlled in their day-to-day functioning. Consequently, 
within months of the outbreak of the civil war, scores of Spanish anarchists found 
themselves working in what would come to be considered ‘official’ positions of 
responsibility, but which at the time appeared to be temporary or ad-hoc postings 
corresponding to the urgent organisational requirements of the moment.  
Few voices of disquiet were raised at this juncture because, during the first 
months of the conflict, the limits of state power were far more apparent than was the 
subsistence of the institutions that would form the basis of its reconstruction. The novel 
and highly visible working-class hegemony on the streets familiar from eye-witness 
accounts was considered a sufficient safeguard against a return of hierarchical social 
relations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the first signs of radical anarchists opposing 
the process of collaboration were in response to challenges to that hegemony, as moves 
were undertaken to disarm workers’ militia in the rearguard. That regional governments 
were, by the autumn of 1936, in a position to dispute the monopoly of violence with the 
conquerors of July, was at least partly due to the legitimacy that had been ceded state 
bodies by the CNT even in the revolution’s first, ‘heroic’ phase.  
                                                 
2 Chris Ealham, Living Anarchism: José Peirats and the Spanish Anarcho-Syndicalist Movement 
(Edinburgh: AK Press, 2015), p. 88. 
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In spite of its prominent role in the developing revolution, therefore, the 
collaboration of the libertarian movement in Spain with the state can be understood to 
have begun months before this process was accelerated and formally consummated in 
late October 1936 by the unprecedented acceptance of ministerial roles in the central 
Republican government by four Spanish anarchists. Consequently, this thesis 
understands collaboration in a broad sense, incorporating not only the participation of 
anarchists in government, but also the legitimacy accorded state power by the 
organising committees of the libertarian organisations – the so-called comités 
superiores – and their acquiescence to the everyday violence of state reformation, such 
as the disarmament of workers and the re-appropriation of buildings. Further, it 
considers collaboration to incorporate anarchist involvement in the ideological aspects 
of state reconstruction, most notably the reassertion of patriarchal, militaristic and 
nationalist values.  
The focus of this thesis is on the equally multi-layered opposition that many 
anarchists mounted to this process of state collaboration, whether this was undertaken 
from within the CNT and the FAI, or in the name of organisations whose relationship to 
the internal discipline of these organisations was more ambiguous, such as the 
Barcelona defence committees, the libertarian women’s organisation Mujeres Libres 
(Free Women - MMLL), the Catalan and Aragonese Juventudes Libertarias (Libertarian 
Youth – JJLL) or the Agrupación Amigos de Durruti (Friends of Durruti Grouping – 
AAD). The thesis therefore examines the attempts by anarchists in Spain to demonstrate 
their hostility to the state in theory and in practice during the period in which the CNT 
and the FAI participated in its reconstruction and consolidation. Through a focus on 
anarchist opposition to this policy over the course of a single year, 1937, when state 
collaboration was already an established fact, the thesis attempts to answer the 
historiographical questions of how anarchists resisted the reconstitution of the 
4 
 
Republican state, and what alternative strategies to that of collaboration were envisaged 
or attempted by anarchist opponents of the policy. To that end I have examined 
anarchist activity, publications and meetings to discover: how anarchists attempted to 
push the revolution beyond the control of the state, how contributors to the oppositional 
anarchist press argued against state collaboration, and how an anti-state position was 
defended at assemblies and meetings of the libertarian movement. I assess the historical 
significance of this oppositional current, and the extent and limits of its appeal in the 
wider libertarian movement.  
A revolution, as James C. Scott has pointed out, is an interregnum. Between the 
collapse of one regime and the consolidation of another there is a period in which the 
experience of the state - the experience of being governed - is no longer a feature of 
daily life.3 In Spain, the interregnum of 1936 has been termed the ‘short summer of 
anarchy’.4 During this period, relations of production in the town and country, gender 
relations, and the physical and cultural expressions of a class-bound and Catholic 
country were fundamentally, if only temporarily, altered for a great many of the 
millions of people caught up in the revolutionary experience in the Republican zone. 
The way people dressed, spoke and carried themselves changed, apparently overnight. 
By studying the ways in which a re-imposition of governance was resisted over the 
following months this thesis will therefore shed light on the perennial question of how 
states are (re)constituted. It will also affirm the importance of the Spanish revolution 
and the ideas and programme that animated it, which were defended and expanded upon 
by those sectors of radical anarchism resistant to the reconstitution of the state, an 
importance that several historians of the Spanish civil war have sought to diminish.     
                                                 
3 James C. Scott, ‘Foreword’, in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of 
Rule in Modern Mexico, ed. by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1994), p. ix. 
4 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, El corto verano de la anarquía. Vida y muerte de Durruti, trans. by Julio 
Forcat and Ulrike Hartmann (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 2010). 
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‘State reconstruction/reconstitution’ is used in preference to ‘counterrevolution’ in 
this thesis, although not out of a reluctance to describe the agents of this reconstitution 
as counterrevolutionaries.5 Such reluctance may be due in part to an interpretation of the 
Spanish revolution as an essentially minor event in the context of the civil war, and one 
which, to all intents and purposes, had ended by the autumn of 1936.6 A further 
complication in this regard is the reticence among historians sympathetic to the Spanish 
Republic to describe anti-fascists as counterrevolutionaries.7 In the work of other 
academics, there is a suggestion of distaste for such apparently dated and ‘sterile’ 
language.8 For the purposes of this thesis, ‘reconstruction of the state’ is used to refer to 
the broad process by which the ‘interregnum’ of the Spanish revolution was brought to 
an end, a process in which many anarchists participated. When the term 
‘counterrevolution/aries’ is referred to, it is in reference to the contemporary conception 
among anarchists of a threat to the revolution, perceived for the most part as external to 
the libertarian organisations.9     
The rich libertarian historiography on the revolution and civil war has generally 
persisted in this emphasis on the external opposition to the revolutionary process, 
particularly that mounted by the Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of 
Spain – PCE). By contrast, the recent, influential work of Helen Graham has been 
important in establishing the reconstruction of the Spanish Republican state as a cross-
class, multi-party process that was not driven primarily by the ideological priorities of 
                                                 
5 For examples of this reluctance see Ferran Gallego, La crisis del antifascismo. Barcelona, mayo de 1937 
(Barcelona: Random House, 2008), p. 307; Manuel Aguilera Povedano, ‘Los hechos de mayo de 1937: 
efectivos y bajas de cada bando’, Hispania, 73. 245 (2013), 789-816 (pp. 790-1). According to this 
perspective, the term counterrevolution can only be usefully applied to the Francoist destruction of the 
Second Republic. An example of a work which does not share this reluctance is Ferran Aisa, 
Contrarevolució. Els fets de Maig de 1937 (Barcelona: Edicions de 1984, 2007). 
6 See, for example, Julián Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain: 1931-1939, trans. 
by Andrew Dowling and Graham Pollok (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 150-1.    
7 This concern is expressed in the works cited above by Ferran Gallego and Aguilera Povedano. 
8 Susanna Tavera, ‘Anarchism or Anarchisms? The history of a heterogeneous revolutionary deployment, 
1930-1938’, Catalan Historical Review, 5 (2012), 101-16 (p. 109). 
9 On the complicated response of radical anarchists to a ‘counterrevolution’ that was at once an external 
threat to the libertarian organisations and a process of state reconstitution in which these organisations 
participated, see Chapter Two. 
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the PCE.10 The participation of the Stalinist organisations in this process undoubtedly 
gave it peculiar and bloody characteristics, yet it has also served to obscure the broader 
and more complex question of state reconstruction in the Spanish Republic and 
anarchist participation in this process.11 In his consideration of the libertarian 
contribution to historiography on the Russian revolution, Edward Acton suggests that, 
in spite of being largely vindicated by later research in regard to its understanding of the 
nature and achievements of the initial revolutionary period, libertarian histories have 
failed to adequately explain the defeat of those revolutionary achievements, relying on a 
caricature of the Bolshevik party that recent research has comprehensively refuted.12 As 
a consequence, libertarian historians have failed to address the question of how a mass 
democratic and revolutionary organisation became a hierarchically organised opponent 
of the revolution’s achievements.13 It is my opinion that this question has relevance to 
the Spanish as well as the Russian experience, and that attempts to answer it might be 
enriched by what is perhaps the essential historical insight of anarchism: that those who 
control the administration of a nation state are unable to prevent it from fulfilling its 
repressive function in human affairs.14 While the twentieth century revolutionary 
experiences of Russia and Spain seem to confirm this prognosis insofar as the depth and 
                                                 
10 See Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 
158-64. The success of the PCE in this context is explained primarily in terms of its organisational 
capabilities, its willingness to ‘think as republicans’ and the cross-class appeal of its uncomplicated and 
patriotic slogans: ibid., pp. 180-4. 
11 I do not share Graham’s scepticism as to the role of Soviet agents and Spanish communists in the 
respective murders of Andreu Nin and Camillo Berneri. On the former case, see Pelai Pagès i Blanch, ‘El 
asesinato de Andreu Nin, más datos para la polémica’, Ebre 58, 4 (2010), 57-76. On the latter, see 
Francisco Madrid Santos, ‘Camillo Berneri, un anarquista italiano (1897-1937)’, (Unpublished PhD 
thesis: Universidad de Barcelona, 1979), pp. 501-13, and Chapter Three of the present work. 
12 Edward Acton, ‘The libertarians vindicated? The libertarian view of the revolution in the light of recent 
Western research’, in Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917, ed. by Edith Rogovin Frankel, 
Jonathan Frankel, Baruch Knei-Paz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 388-405. 
13 This is the principal research question addressed in Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power: 
The First Year of Soviet Rule in Petrograd (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). 
14 For influential anarchist expositions of this point see P. A. Kropotkin, ‘The State: Its Historic Role’, in 
P. A. Kropotkin, Selected Writings on Anarchism and Revolution, ed. by Martin A. Miller (London: The 
MIT Press, 1970), pp. 259-62; M. Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism, 
ed. by G. P. Maximoff (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 210-6. This was also the 
substance of an 1872 letter from Mikhail Bakunin to one of the earliest and best known Spanish 
anarchists, Anselmo Lorenzo. Cited in Frank Mintz, ‘Las influencias de Bakunin y Kropotkin sobre el 
movimiento libertario español’, Historia Actual Online, no. 21 (2010) <http://www.historia-
actual.org/Publicaciones/index.php/haol/article/viewArticle/415> [accessed 28 October 2015].  
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extension of social transformation in both cases grew and declined in inverse proportion 
to the power and reach of the state, traditional anarchist hostility to Marxism and 
Marxist organisations, whether justifiable or not, appears to have militated against the 
emergence of a libertarian historiography of these revolutions animated by this insight. 
By focusing on the question of state reconstruction, and more particularly on resistance 
to this process, this thesis is intended as a contribution to just such a libertarian 
historiography. 
To that end, the thesis expands on historical research conducted by Josep Antoni 
Pozo González, Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, Juan Manuel Fernández Soria, Martha 
Ackelsberg, Chris Ealham, François Godicheau, Miquel Amorós, Frank Mintz and 
Agustín Guillamón. Pozo González has provided a rigorous account of the 
revolutionary process in Cataluña that has shed a great deal of light on the regional CNT 
and the untenable nature of an anti-fascism that contained both defenders and opponents 
of the revolutionary process.15 Monjo and Vega had already contributed greatly to our 
understanding of this latter problem through a focus on the socialisation campaign as a 
cause of division within the workplace and wider Catalan society.16 Fernández Soria has 
provided us with a detailed and richly sourced monograph on the anarchist youth 
organisations during the civil war, while Ackelsberg’s study of the Mujeres Libres 
grouping is both illuminating and analytically innovative.17 Ealham’s work on the pre-
civil war CNT is fundamental to understanding the internal divisions within the 
organisation and the social and cultural universe of Spanish anarchism, while this thesis 
also builds on his suggestive article regarding the fall-out in the libertarian movement 
                                                 
15 Josep Antoni Pozo González, Poder legal y poder real en la Cataluña revolucionaria de 1936 (Sevilla: 
Espuela de Plata, 2012); La Catalunya antifeixista, El govern Tarradellas enfront de la crisi política i el 
conflicte social (setembre de 1936 – abril de 1937) (Barcelona: Edicions DAU, 2012). 
16 Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, Els treballadors i la Guerra civil (Barcelona: Editorial Empúries, 1986). 
17 Juan Manuel Fernández Soria, Cultura y libertad. La educación en las Juventudes Libertarias (1936-
1939) (Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 1996); Martha A. Ackelsberg, Free Women of Spain: 
Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005). 
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after the uprising in Barcelona in May 1937.18 This latter subject has also been treated 
by Godicheau and Amorós.19 While the present work is more detailed in its discussion 
of the post-May crisis in the libertarian movement, the work of these two authors has 
been indispensable in bringing this period into focus, and both have provided additional 
monographs on little-studied figures and phenomena.20 The final two chapters of this 
thesis also take up the suggestion in an article by Godicheau on the underground 
anarchist press of including a more detailed discussion of the content of these underused 
sources.21 The tireless and militant commitment of Mintz and Guillamón to deepening 
our understanding of the Spanish revolution has resulted in a prodigious output that has 
shed light on the organisational and intellectual life of the libertarian movement, on the 
achievements of the Spanish revolution, and on little recorded events and personages.22  
This brief and not exhaustive survey suggests that Stanley Payne’s observation 
that ‘there has been little effort to account for Spanish anarchosyndicalism in analytic 
and theoretical terms’ in the last forty years is somewhat misplaced.23 Payne’s 
suggestion, accompanied by the claim that the same is also true ‘on the broadly 
comparative level’ is countered by a recent article by Barry Pateman, in which the state 
of anarchist historiography, in qualitative and quantative terms, is shown to have 
                                                 
18 Chris Ealham, Anarchism and the City: Revolution and Counter-revolution in Barcelona, 1898-1937 
(Edinburgh: AK Press, 2010); ‘De la unidad antifascista a la desunión libertaria’, in La España del Frente 
Popular, coord. by Àngel Bahamonde Magro (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2011), pp. 121-42. 
19 François Godicheau, La Guerre d’Espagne. République et révolution en Catalogne (1936-1939) (Paris: 
Odile Jacob, 2004) ; Miquel Amorós, La Revolución Traicionada: La verdadera historia de Balius y Los 
Amigos de Durruti (Barcelona: Virus, 2003). 
20 François Godicheau, No callaron: las voces de los presos antifascistas de la República, 1937-1939 
(Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 2012); Miquel Amorós, José Pellicer: El Anarquista Integro 
(Barcelona: Virus, 2009); Maroto, el héroe: Una biografía del anarquismo andaluz (Barcelona: Virus, 
2011). 
21 François Godicheau, ‘Periódicos clandestinos anarquistas en 1937-1938: ¿las voces de la base 
militante?’, Ayer, 55 (2004), 175-205 (p. 179). 
22 Frank Mintz, Anarchism and Workers’ Self-Management in Revolutionary Spain, trans. by Paul 
Sharkey (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2013); Agustín Guillamón, Barricadas en Barcelona. La CNT de la 
victoria de Julio de 1936 a la necesaria derrota de Mayo de 1937 (Barcelona: Ediciones Espartaco 
Internacional, 2007); Los Amigos de Durruti. Historia y antología de textos (Barcelona: Aldarull and 
Dskntrl-ed, 2013); La Guerra del pan. Hambre y violencia en la Barcelona revolucionaria. De diciembre 
de 1936 a mayo de 1937 (Barcelona: Aldarull and Dskntrl-ed, 2014). 
23 Stanley G. Payne, ‘A Critical Overview of the Second Spanish Republic’ in The Spanish Second 
Republic Revisited. From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931-1936), ed. by Manuel Álvarez Tardío 
and Fernando Del Rey Reguillo (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2013), p. 18. 
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‘changed beyond recognition’ in the last twenty years.24 Pateman cites as particularly 
noteworthy what has perhaps been Agustín Guillamón’s greatest achievement: placing 
the defence committees at the heart of the revolutionary process in Barcelona, and 
explaining the causes and consequences of their central role.25 This thesis expands on 
Guillamón’s work and attempts to draw out and give context to the internal complexity 
of the defence committees and their relationship to the CNT and the FAI. In so doing, it 
aims to provide a more general account of the libertarian movement’s radical currents 
than has been offered hitherto, and to explain the complex affinities that linked their 
different manifestations. 
The works cited above have demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that there was 
in Spain, to paraphrase Christopher Hill’s observation on the English revolution, ‘an 
intellectually significant and numerically not insignificant congeries of radical ideas’, 
put forward in defence of the revolution of July 1936 and its legacy.26 What they do not 
do, when looked at in isolation, is establish the breadth, consistency and intellectual 
probity of both the radical anarchist critique and anarchist activity as they developed 
prior to and after the May events of 1937. Understandably, works on the defence 
committees suggest their ‘hibernation’ in the first part of 1937, those on the youth 
organisations stress their disorganisation and incoherence and those on the Mujeres 
Libres their isolation from the CNT and the FAI, while in general there is a tendency to 
depict radical anarchist thought and activity in this period as characterised by picaresque 
quixotism. None of these conclusions are unsupported by the literature, but they present 
a partial picture. By examining the radical currents of Spanish anarchism as they cut 
across these different formations, we can perceive how opposition to collaboration and 
                                                 
24 Barry Pateman, ‘Anarchist History: Confessions of an awkward pupil’, Bulletin of the Kate Sharpley 
Library, 84 (2015), 1-3 (p. 1). 
25 Ibid., p. 3; Agustín Guillamón, La Revolución de los Comités. Hambre y Violencia en la Barcelona 
Revolucionaria. De junio a diciembre de 1936 (Barcelona: Aldarull Edicions, 2012); Los Comités de 
Defensa de la CNT en Barcelona, 1933-1938 (Barcelona: Aldarull, 2013). 
26 Christopher Hill, The Experience of Defeat: Milton and Some Contemporaries (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1984), p. 17. 
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state reconstruction coalesced around specific positions that for the most part remained 
consistent with pre-war anarchist traditions, that these positions formed a programmatic 
alternative to state reconstruction and that, once awareness of defeat became more 
widespread, radical anarchists produced sophisticated reflections and analysis in 
response.    
Following Godicheau and Ealham, and inspired by recent Anglophone research 
into the Russian revolution, this thesis focuses on the mid-level activists who remained 
outside of both the official positions of state administration and also what were known 
in such circles as the comités superiores of the Spanish libertarian organisations, but 
who nevertheless retained influence among wider sectors of the movement as union and 
affinity group delegates and prolific contributors to the anarchist press.27 This focus has 
led to the unearthing of important interventions by, amongst others, Lucía Sánchez 
Saornil, Amador Franco, Juan Santana Calero and Julián Merino, the latter of whom is 
here afforded the centrality his highly significant activity and role in the revolutionary 
rearguard deserves. It is in homage to another historian of Russia, Robert V. Daniels, 
that I term such anarchists, those who maintained their hostility to the state, the 
‘conscience’ of the Spanish revolution.28 Since hostility to the state and to formal 
politics has traditionally been taken to be the one unifying thread to be found in a belief 
system of notorious heterogeneity, I consider its use as a criterion for establishing the 
conscience of Spanish anarchism to be justified.29  
                                                 
27 On mid-level anarchist activists in Spain, see Godicheau, ‘Periódicos clandestinos’, p. 204 and Ealham, 
Anarchism and the City, p. 96. Works on Russia with a focus on middle ranking worker-activists include: 
Simon Pirani, The Russian Revolution in Retreat, 1920-24. Soviet workers and the new communist elite 
(London: Routledge, 2008); S. A. Smith, Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories 1917-1918 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Rex A. Wade, Red Guards and Workers’ Militias in the 
Russian Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). 
28 Robert Vincent Daniels, The Conscience of The Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960). 
29 On anti-statism as a common feature of all varieties of anarchism, see George Woodcock, Anarchism 
(Plymouth: Broadview Press, 2004), p. 28; José Álvarez Junco, La ideología política del anarquismo 
español (1868-1910) (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1991), pp. 222-4, and more recent discussions in Saul 
Newman, ‘The Horizon of Anarchy: Anarchism and Contemporary Radical Thought’, Theory & Event, 
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Daniels has also aided in my understanding of the different tactical and 
ideological emphases of the radical anarchists in Spain. Both the historiography and 
anarchist memoirs point to a three-way division of the Spanish anarchist movement into 
gradualist, voluntarist and purist currents. Put simply, gradualists tended to emphasise 
the importance of building and strengthening an organisation capable of remoulding 
society, voluntarists emphasised the revolutionary possibilities that could be brought 
about by insurrectionary activity, and purists prioritised propagandistic and cultural 
work in favour of the anarchist ideal. With the exception of ‘voluntarist’, these labels 
were not ordinarily self-applied by libertarian activists, but they provide a descriptively 
accurate complement to the analogous contemporary terms which were deployed in the 
polemical context of faction fights, such as ‘reformist’, ‘anarcho-Bolshevik’ and 
‘redskin’.30 The principal limitation of this taxonomy is that it does little to explain the 
more fundamental question of state collaboration and its anarchist proponents and 
discontents. Indeed, representative figures of each current were capable of justifying a 
conciliatory attitude to the state at various times. Gradualists, who tended to be more 
united in this regard, wished to avoid the disruption to organisation occasioned by state 
repression, while some voluntarists participated alongside future state actors in 
insurrectionary essays against dictatorships, and certain purists were mindful that the 
propagandistic and educational work they prioritised was easier to undertake under a 
democracy than a dictatorship.  
It has been suggested that, in light of such realignments, this ‘triangular’ division 
loses its analytical value when applied to the civil war period.31 However, the co-
                                                                                                                                               
13. 2 (2010), n. pag., and Carl Levy, ‘Social Histories of Anarchism’, Journal for the Study of 
Radicalism, 4. 2 (2010), 1-44 (pp. 4-7). 
30 While the use of ‘syndicalist’ rather than gradualist would have some merit in stressing the priority 
placed by this tendency on the union organisation in both day-to-day practice and its vision of the future, 
it is less useful as a broad category, implying a commitment to ‘pure’ syndicalism that would exclude 
several gradualist anarchists. 
31 See Pere Gabriel, ‘Un sindicalismo de Guerra: sindicatos y colectivizaciones industrials y agrarias en 
Cataluña, 1936-1939’, Actes II Seminari sobre la guerra cvil i el franquisme a Catalunya,  Barberà del 
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existence of a fundamental difference of principle alongside secondary divisions of 
strategy and temperament was at least as evident in the anarchist movement during the 
civil war as in the years preceding it. Although posed more urgently in the war years, 
the question of anarchist relations with the state was in no sense new in 1936. The fact 
that anarchists shared ideas relating to rational education and human progress with 
liberal and progressive state-oriented republicans, and socialised in shared spaces such 
as the ateneo, has led historians to include anarchists within a broad definition of 
Spanish republicanism.32 In Spain as elsewhere, a common belief in ‘progress, 
education, science, and the need to overcome a tradition that stood in the way of both 
personal and collective liberation’ gave rise to alliances of convenience between 
revolutionary, socialist, working-class movements and liberal, bourgeois republicans.33 
The birth of the Second Republic in 1931 provides an example of when elements of the 
three strategic tendencies of Spanish anarchism contributed to a broadly conciliatory 
attitude towards the state and the moderates at its helm. On this occasion and again 
during the war, however, the conciliators were opposed by a tactical convergence 
among purists and voluntarists from the middle ranks of the Spanish libertarian 
movement, determined to reanimate their organisations with an anti-state purpose. 
These purists and voluntarists of anti-collaborationist anarchism correspond to the 
subdivisions of the left-wing opposition in Russia identified by Daniels (who uses the 
terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’): the former more utopian, doctrinaire and democratic, the latter 
                                                                                                                                               
Vallès 14 i 15 de març de 1997 (Barberà del Vallès: Ajuntament de Barberà del Vallès, 1997), p. 59, and 
Pozo González, Poder Legal y Poder Real, p. 271.  
32 See José Álvarez Junco, ‘Los “amantes de la libertad”: la cultura republicana española a principios del 
siglo xx’, in El republicanismo en España (1830-1977), ed. by Nigel Townson (Madrid: Alianza, 1994), 
p. 270, and the discussion in Álvaro Girón Sierra, ‘Una historia contada de otra manera: librepensamiento 
y “darwinismos” anarquistas en Barcelona, 1869-1910’, in Cultura y política del anarquismo en España e 
Iberoamérica, coord. by Clara E. Lida and Pablo Yankelevich (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 
2012), pp. 95-133. The question is also discussed by a contemporary French anarchist: Gaston Leval, 
Collectives in the Spanish Revolution (London: Freedom Press, 1975), pp. 327-8. 
33 E. J. Hobsbawm, ‘Religion and the Rise of Socialism’, in E. J. Hobsbawm, Worlds of Labour: Further 
Studies in the History of Labour (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), p. 43. 
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‘less carried away by enthusiasm’ and ‘more prepared to resort to force’.34 We might 
add that, in the Spanish case, the former were inclined to stress fidelity to anarchist 
ideas over immediate, material class interests.  
These divisions and how they related to the attitudes adopted with regard to the 
Republican state in the years preceding and in the first months of the civil war are 
analysed in the first chapter. I also examine the meaning and impact of state 
collaboration and outline the emergence of the conscience of the Spanish revolution 
within the Barcelona defence committees, the JJLL and the anarchist press. The second 
chapter discusses the CNT’s socialisation campaign and the limits to the unity of 
purpose that this engendered in the ranks of the libertarian movement. The 
organisational expressions of fidelity to the revolution that emerged in the first four 
months of 1937 are analysed and the widely felt desire for a ‘second July’ in defence of 
the revolution is discussed. Chapter Three examines the May events in Barcelona and 
their immediate consequences, offering a novel interpretation of why and how both the 
mobilisation and demobilisation took place. The means by which the revolutionary 
mobilisation was effected and the organisational affinities of those who participated in it 
also provide a unique opportunity to examine the nature and composition of the 
conscience of the revolution. The renewed critique of state collaboration that followed 
the May days and the near success of radicals within the Barcelona FAI in advocating a 
withdrawal from official positions is the subject of the fourth chapter. The methods 
adopted by the leading cadres of the libertarian movement in combatting this opposition 
are also examined. Having failed to force a change in the trajectory of the CNT and the 
FAI, the radicals turned their attention in the late summer and autumn of 1937 to 
preserving the integrity of anarchism itself. Chapter Five discusses the defence of 
federalism within the Spanish libertarian movement and the attempts of voluntarists to 
                                                 
34 Daniels, The Conscience of The Revolution, pp. 4-7. 
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mobilise in defence of the revolutionary spaces conquered in July 1936, concluding 
with a discussion of the December 1937 Congress of the International Working Men’s 
Association (IWMA), at which the international critics of state collaboration made their 
voices heard. The Conclusion of the thesis discusses the historical import of the 
conscience of the Spanish revolution, evaluates its strengths and weaknesses and posits 
the reasons for its ultimate failure. I draw some concluding comparisons between the 
‘consciences’ of Russia and Spain and suggest possible future lines of research. 
From Chapter Three onward, the focus of the thesis is predominantly on Cataluña. 
This is primarily due to the relative strength of anti-collaborationist anarchists in the 
region, demonstrated by the Barcelona uprising of May 1937, and the oppositional 
mandates that delegates of the JJLL and the FAI took to National Plenums that same 
year. Although the historiography of the Spanish revolution is already imbalanced in 
favour of Cataluña, when I began work on this thesis it soon became clear that this 
imbalance has not exhausted the possibility of new critical evaluations or new sources 
adding to our understanding of anarchism in the region. The discussion of the May 
events in this thesis became chapter-length when a close analysis of underused sources 
led me to a new and historiographically significant interpretation of this revolutionary 
mobilisation. Although in Chapters Four and Five I highlight the international 
dimensions of the critique of state collaboration and discuss national developments, the 
greater part of the analysis is centred on the publications, meetings and activities of 
oppositional anarchists in Cataluña. On the one hand this was necessary in order to 
demonstrate the breadth and strength of radical anarchism, and on the other it was 
dictated by the richness of the little-studied sources related to the JJLL and the FAI in 
the region. A fuller picture of the conscience of the Spanish revolution would 
undoubtedly emerge through a closer analysis of the press and meetings of the 
libertarian movment in Asturias, Valencia, Aragón, Andalucía and Madrid during this 
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period, and would provide welcome context for the findings of the present work. 
Nevertheless, by demonstrating the breadth and multi-layered nature of the anarchists’ 
oppositional activity in Spain’s most revolutionary city, this thesis represents a step 
towards providing this fuller picture, and outlines the parameters of the revolutionary 
conscience that will be of use when searching for its traces in other parts of the country.      
Prior to the civil war, the libertarian movement in Spain had witnessed a boom in 
publications dedicated to outlining the post-revolutionary society. By imagining the 
world remade in the absence of a state, the anarchists posited an end to private property, 
gender inequality and formal politics, proposing the socialisation of land and industry 
and the arming of the people. Following the revolutionary interregnum, the state re-
established itself through a physical, ideological and economic assault on the 
manifestations of this libertarian programme that had emerged in the Republican 
rearguard. By examining the flashpoints where state reconstitution met libertarian 
recalcitrance, we find a broad and theoretically developed current of anarchism that 
attempted to retain its fidelity to pre-war traditions while analysing and drawing lessons 
from the revolutionary experience as it took place. This current requires a wide-ranging 
and synthetic history so that its historical and intellectual significance might be fully 
appreciated. This thesis is a contribution to that history. 
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Chapter One: Spanish Anarchists and the State, 1931-1936 
 
The tendencies of Spanish anarchism were able to co-exist, with varying degrees of 
harmony, within the framework provided by what has come to be known as anarcho-
syndicalism, but which was, in the latter part of the nineteenth and early years of the 
twentieth centuries, more commonly referred to as revolutionary syndicalism. The 
development of revolutionary syndicalism in France was embodied by the 
Confédération générale du travail (General Confederation of Labour - CGT) and had 
been formalised in the famous Charter of Amiens, which that union had adopted in 
1906.1 Inspired by the successes of the CGT, the belief had grown amongst Spanish 
anarchists that, as the Charter stated, an apolitical trade union would be able to combine 
struggles of an economic nature with a wider project of revolutionary transformation.2 
In 1907, Solidaridad Obrera (Workers’ Solidarity - SO), a union federation which 
produced a newspaper of the same name and which did not, at first, extend beyond 
Barcelona, was founded. SO was an amalgamation of ideologically varied unions that 
expanded rapidly and whose early success in bringing together Cataluña’s unionised 
workforce led to a congress in 1910 to decide whether it should be constituted on a 
national basis.3 This was agreed to and the CNT was formed, with Solidaridad Obrera 
becoming the official newspaper of its Catalan region.4  
                                                 
1 On the ideology and practice of the CGT, see F. F. Ridley, Revolutionary Syndicalism in France: The 
direct action of its time (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 83-187. 
2 On this, Spanish perspective, see Angel Smith, Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction: Catalan Labour 
and the Crisis of the Spanish State, 1898-1923 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 129. On the 
project of revolutionary syndicalism more generally see Rudolf Rocker, Anarcho-Syndicalism (London: 
Pluto Press, 1989), pp. 109-30, and the informative introduction by Geoff Brown in Emile Pataud and 
Emile Pouget, How We Shall Bring About The Revolution. Syndicalism and the Cooperative 
Commonwealth, trans. by Charlotte and Frederic Charles (London: Pluto Press, 1990), pp. vii-xvii. 
3 On this congress and the question of forming a national organisation, see Xavier Cuadrat, Socialismo y 
anarquismo en Cataluña (1899-1911). Los origenes de la CNT (Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista de 
Trabajo, 1976), pp. 462-77. 
4 Ibid., p. 477. See also Carles Sanz, La CNT en pie. Fundación y consolidación anarcosindicalista 1910-
1931 (Barcelona: Anomia, 2010), pp. 17-23, and Manuel Buenacasa, El movimiento obrero español 
1886-1926. Historia y crítica (Madrid: Ediciones Júcar, 1977), pp. 37-40. 
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The CNT consisted of confederations organised by region, themselves organised 
into further zonal (comarcal) confederations and then into unions according to trade or 
locality. In 1918 the Catalan confederation of the CNT adopted a structure, soon to be 
taken on by the other regions, whereby its members were organised at an industrial level 
in local Sindicatos Únicos (Single Unions), whose representatives elected delegates to a 
Federación Local (Local Federation), which was then represented in a Regional 
Committee. The CNT’s National Committee would be the temporary responsibility of 
one region, to be chosen at the organisation’s National Congress, its highest decision-
making body.5 In between National Congresses, the activity of the CNT was determined 
by decisions taken at Plenums. A Local Plenum was composed of delegates chosen at 
assemblies of individual unions, and would in turn decide the mandates and delegates to 
represent the locality at Regional Plenums. The Regional Plenums would likewise send 
mandated delegates to National Plenums.  
The founding Congress of the CNT reflected the plurality of priorities and tactics 
favoured by its affiliates. It affirmed the need to overturn existing society and that, 
echoing the First International, the emancipation of the working class was to be the task 
of the working class itself.6 It proclaimed its commitment to tactics of direct action, by 
which was meant the absence of third party mediation in industrial disputes, but it also 
allowed for members of political parties to join the organisation, urged caution with 
regard to the general strike and committed itself to the short term goal of establishing 
the eight hour day.7 The commitment to direct action was related to a further question 
under debate at the Congress: the advisability of constituting a new syndicalist 
organisation on a national level that would be separate from the pre-existing national 
                                                 
5 In 1936 the National Committee would become a permanent body made up of delegates from all the 
regions. See below. For a comprehensive historical exposition and analysis of the functioning of the 
CNT’s internal structure, see Anna Monjo, Militants. Participació i democràcia a la CNT als anys trenta 
(Barcelona: Laertes, 2003), pp. 113-312. 
6 Cuadrat, Socialismo y anarquismo, p. 481. 
7 See Juan Gómez Casas, Historia del anarcosindicalismo español (Madrid: Zero, 1973), pp. 83-5. 
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trade union, the Unión General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workers – UGT), 
which had been founded in 1888. The UGT was the trade union wing of electoral 
socialism, represented in Spain by the Partido Socialista Obrera Español (Spanish 
Socialist Workers’ Party – PSOE). Contrary to revolutionary syndicalism’s commitment 
to direct action, the UGT considered the mediation of its political allies to be potentially 
advantageous to its members. Despite assurances to the contrary from prominent figures 
within the CNT, the probability that the new organisation would provide a revolutionary 
alternative to the UGT was admitted by disappointed Socialists and hailed by 
enthusiastic anarchists in the weeks that followed the former’s foundation.8  
Nevertheless, concerns that the CNT might follow the UGT (as well as the 
erstwhile revolutionary syndicalists of the CGT) along the path of state collaboration 
would be reflected in the founding agreements of a specifically anarchist organisation, 
the FAI, which was formed in 1927, on a peninsular rather than national basis, affirming 
that: ‘The labour organization should turn to anarchism as it did in the past… and the 
anarchist organization of groups should be established alongside it, with the two 
organizations working together for the anarchist movement.’9 The organisational unit of 
the FAI was the affinity group, a collection of comrades united by ties of friendship and 
ideological kinship that did not normally number more than a dozen members. These 
were organised into town and city-wide Local Federations, and co-ordinated by 
Regional Committees and a Peninsular Committee, which were not intended to have 
any executive decision-making role. From its inception the FAI considered a semi-
formal connection, a trabazón, to exist between itself and the CNT, which found an 
                                                 
8 Cuadrat, Socialismo y anarquismo, pp. 482-3. 
9 Quoted in Juan Gómez Casas, Anarchist Organisation: The History of The FAI, trans. by Abe Bluestein 
(Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1986), p. 110. On the UGT and PSOE’s co-operation and eventual break 
with the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), see Paul Heywood, Marxism and the Failure of 
Organised Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 85-109. 
On the growth of reformism within the CGT see Nicholas Papayanis, Alphonse Merrheim. The 
Emergence of Reformism in Revolutionary Syndicalism 1871-1925 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1985). 
19 
 
organisational expression in the comités pro presos (prisoner support committees), 
composed of equal parts FAI and CNT members.10 
When King Alfonso XIII fled Spain on 14 April 1931 and the Second Republic 
was delcared, Spanish anarchism therefore had two organisational reference points, the 
CNT and the FAI. While the former did not require that its members be anarchists, its 
most prominent activists considered themselves to be such and its statutes contained the 
anarchist goal of libertarian communism.11 Yet Spanish anarchism could not be reduced 
to its organisational expressions, and nor could these organisations be considered only 
in terms of their political objectives.12 During the Second Republic, Spanish anarchism 
formed part of an oppositional cultural and moral universe that for many people 
influenced every aspect of their life and behaviour. Strongholds in working-class 
suburbs meant that anarchism was rooted in communities as well as workplaces, and 
outside of such concentrations, anarchist ideology and practice was nevertheless 
sufficiently widespread to be a state-wide concern.13 In spite of the challenges of the 
period, this universe would renew itself, giving rise to new organisations such as the 
Libertarian Youth and Mujeres Libres and sustaining the revolutionary vanguards that 
would prove crucial to the social upheavals of summer 1936.  
Republic or Revolution, 1931-1936 
 
Immediately prior to the declaration of the Second Republic, the CNT had been in 
contact with the animators of the Pact of San Sebastián, a broad-based alliance 
                                                 
10 Gómez Casas, Anarchist Organisation, p. 110. 
11 A National Congress had declared libertarian communism to be the goal of the CNT in 1919. See Sanz, 
La CNT en pie, p. 48. The term became widely used during the Second Republic after the uprising in Alt 
Llobregat, and was the subject of many pamphlets, most notably that of the young purist doctor Isaac 
Puente. See the discussion in Alejandro R. Díez Torre, Trabajan para la eternidad. Colectividades de 
trabajo y ayuda mutua durante la Guerra Civil en Aragón (Madrid and Zaragoza: La Malatesta Editorial 
and Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2009), pp. 32-5.  
12 ‘Politics’ and the ‘political’ were understood in Spanish anarchist literature to have to do with party 
politics and the machinations of state actors. When I use these words with this meaning, as opposed to in 
the broader definition of the political as it is understood in English, I will use quotation marks. 
13 See Ealham, Anarchism and the City, pp. 34-53. 
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committed to establishing a democratic republic. The National Committee, which 
included the veteran activists Joan Peiró and Angel Pestaña, had agreed to support any 
insurrectionary action to that end while protecting the independence of the 
Confederation.14 Public platforms were shared between anarcho-syndicalists and 
republicans throughout Spain. In the CNT stronghold of Gijón, another syndicalist of 
the old-guard, Eleuterio Quintanilla, had proposed the initial republican alliance in that 
city, promising that Gijonese syndicalists would favour republicans with their vote and 
urging the CNT’s state-wide ‘circumstantial solidarity’ with the republican movement.15 
In Barcelona on 14 April, CNT activists, including some of those associated with 
voluntarist insurrectionism, ensured that the new authorities were able to occupy their 
posts.16 In spite of the apolitical commitment in its statutes, therefore, at the dawn of the 
Second Republic it was unclear where limits to collaboration between the CNT and 
other ideological currents could be drawn, or to what extent the CNT would be prepared 
to support the formation of the Republican state. Writing in Tierra y Libertad, the 
mouthpiece of the FAI, the rationalist schoolteacher José Alberola, voiced his 
misgivings:  
To my mind absolutely no point of contact can be permitted between 
what the bourgeoisie finds convenient and the aspirations of 
revolutionary syndicalism, else the latter renounce the goals for which it 
was founded… it is necessary that the Spanish anarchists break the self-
imposed silence that, in the interests of proletarian harmony, we have 
submitted to, and confront that political and bourgeoisified current that 
has penetrated the depths of [the CNT].17  
                                                 
14 See John Brademas, Anarcosindicalismo y revolución en España (1930-1937) (Barcelona: Ariel, 1974), 
p. 30. 
15 Pamela Beth Radcliff, From Mobilization to Civil War: The politics of polarization in the Spanish city 
of Gijón, 1900-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 140. 
16 See the memoirs of Ricardo Sanz, El sindicalismo y la política. Los “Solidarios” y “Nosotros” 
(Barcelona: Copa y Difon, 2013), p. 186. 
17 Tierra y Libertad, 28 March 1931. José Alberola, from Aragón, was a prominent member of the FAI 
who frequently contributed radical articles to Tierra y Libertad in this period. His opposition to state 
collaboration would persist during the civil war. See below. 
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This confrontation began within months, and established the backdrop to libertarian 
activity throughout the Republic’s existence. 
During this time, it was Tierra y Libertad that provided a platform to those who 
were most committed to combatting conciliatory attitudes towards the state within the 
CNT. The perspectives expressed in this organ were in contrast to those of the 
traditional mouthpiece of purist anarchism in Spain, La Revista Blanca, a review of 
international standing under the editorship of Joan Montseny and Teresa Mañé (better 
known as Federico Urales and Soledad Gustavo, respectively), and their daughter, 
Federica Montseny. La Revista Blanca defended a ‘progressive’ acceptance of the 
Republic and an acknowledgement that the goal of anarchy remained some way off, a 
position that was close to that of the gradualist syndicalists in the CNT who, 
nevertheless, were dimly regarded within the pages of the review.18 As such, the need to 
adopt a posture in relation to the new regime cut across the gradualist, purist and 
voluntarist dividing lines of Spanish anarchism. What was to provide new impetus to 
the criticism of those inclined to conciliation was the rapid disillusionment of the 
voluntarists with the new order, and their desire to force events in a more revolutionary 
direction.19 The early and apposite scepticism expressed in Tierra y Libertad made this 
the ideal forum for the voluntarists to advance their agenda alongside the concerns of 
the anti-Republican purists, and made the FAI the organisation that would appear to 
embody this confluence of voluntarist and purist perspectives in the years that followed.  
The first National Congress of the CNT to be held since 1919 took place in 
Madrid in June 1931. There, the ‘confrontation’ advocated by Alberola in Tierra y 
Libertad was in evidence, with the presence of FAI members at the Congress causing 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Federica Montseny’s article, ‘España bajo la República’, La Revista Blanca, 1 May 
1931. 
19 See Abel Paz, Durruti in the Spanish Revolution, trans. by Chuck Morse (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007), 
pp. 216-7. 
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consternation among more moderate delegates.20 The three principal issues of debate 
were the activity of the National Committee with regard to the republican conspiracies 
in the latter days of the monarchy, the articulation of a minimum programme that would 
be addressed to the government, and an alteration of the Confederation’s internal 
organisation that would introduce national Federations of Industry, which incorporated 
the representatives of individual trades and professions into a broader structure. This 
latter proposal was passed in spite of the opposition mounted by radicals who saw in it 
the danger of bureaucratisation.21 Attempts to censure the National Committee for its 
perceived collaboration with ‘political’ elements were likewise unsuccessful, while the 
motion to address the Spanish parliament directly with a statement of perspectives was 
passed, albeit that the protests of several delegates were registered in the minutes.22 At 
various points during these debates, the defenders of the majority positions took the 
opportunity to warn against inopportune revolutionary ventures, given the lack of 
preparation on the part of the CNT and the masses.23 An apparent openness to ‘politics’ 
and bureaucratisation thus became associated with antipathy to voluntarist 
insurrectionism.  
At the same time as radical anarchists were running aground against the 
seemingly entrenched positions of the gradualist majority in the CNT, the former 
current was more successful in setting its own house in order. The Peninsular Congress 
of the FAI also took place in Madrid in June, and there its Peninsular Committee was 
condemned for having participated in the republican conspiracy and temporarily barred 
from positions of responsibility in the Federation. The FAI thus emerged from its 
                                                 
20 Los Congresos del anarcosindicalismo. Tomo 1. Memoria del III Congreso extraordinario de la CNT. 
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21 Ibid., pp. 68-73. 
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Congress shed of any lingering affinity with the Republic.24 The articles carried by 
Tierra y Libertad in the weeks that followed combined criticisms of the new regime 
with declarations of revolutionary optimism that directly contradicted the warnings that 
Peiró, amongst others, had made at the CNT Congress in Madrid. The impression was 
thus given that the confluence of purist and voluntarist interests that had made itself felt 
in opposing perceived moderation, collaboration and bureaucratisation at the CNT 
Congress would be sustained by the positions and strategy of the FAI. 
One non-FAI member who had made an impression at the CNT Congress was 
Juan García Oliver, who seemed to see the problem of revolution as a question of 
audacious leadership. He publicly blamed Pestaña and the deceased former General 
Secretary of the Catalan CNT Salvador Seguí for having passed up the revolutionary 
opportunity of the post-war years, and compared them unfavourably to Lenin and 
Trotsky.25 García Oliver had gained respect in anarchist circles for his activities as a 
leading member of the action group Los Solidarios during the years of pistolerismo - 
when Barcelona employers had hired gunmen to murder CNT activists, several of 
whom had responded in kind - and the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.26 As impatient 
with theoretically inclined purist anarchists as he was with cautious gradualists, García 
Oliver’s voluntarist conception of revolution would see him labelled an ‘anarcho-
bolshevik’ by his opponents.27 Nevertheless, although Los Solidarios, which was 
renamed Nosotros in the summer of 1931, initially remained outside of the FAI, the 
group’s members, which included similarly seasoned ‘men of action’ such as 
Buenaventura Durruti and Francisco Ascaso, publicly associated themselves with the 
organisation.  
                                                 
24 An account, from the point of view of one who was censured by this Congress, is given in Manuel 
Sirvent Romero, Un militante del anarquismo español (Memorias, 1889-1948) (Madrid: Fundación de 
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26 César M. Lorenzo, Los anarquistas españoles y el poder (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1972), p. 39.  
27 See Guillamón, Los Comités de Defensa, pp. 40-1. 
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At a FAI rally in Barcelona on 27 June, García Oliver, Ascaso and Durruti 
affirmed the imminence of revolution, with Durruti in particular signalling the part that 
would be played by the ‘Cuadros de Defensa Revolucionaria’ (Revolutionary Defence 
Cadres, more commonly referred to as defence committees).28 The formation of the 
defence committees had been agreed to at a National Plenum of the CNT in April, and 
seems to have responded to a concern that the Confederation would be called upon to 
defend the Republic in the event of coup attempts from the right.29 At the FAI 
Peninsular Congress, it was agreed that the specifically anarchist organisation would 
supply activists to this new body, which suggests that the defence committees were a 
further organisational expression of the trabazón between the CNT and the FAI.30 For 
the voluntarists, this new branch of libertarian organisation clearly had offensive as well 
as defensive potential, and Dionisio Eroles, a man close to the Nosotros group who had 
recently been released after eleven years in prison, wrote in Tierra y Libertad of the 
necessity that ‘all the activists of the CNT and the FAI realise the exceptional 
importance of these [defence] cadres, who will be the nerve centre, in the very near 
future, of actions of the Spanish proletariat that will amaze the world’.31 
In accordance with the desires of the voluntarists in Barcelona, therefore, the 
defence committees were formed in order to prepare and carry out insurrections. 
However, in many regions and towns of Spain, defence committees were either not set 
up or existed on paper only, at least until a further organisational drive took place 
during the bienio negro, the name given to the two-year period of right-wing 
government that followed the Spanish general election at the end of 1933. This would 
                                                 
28 Tierra y Libertad, 4 July 1931. 
29 See the articles in Solidaridad Obrera urging the unions to take a lead in organising the armed self-
defence of the people, Solidaridad Obrera, 17 and 19 April 1931. On the Plenum at which the decision 
was taken see Solidaridad Obrera, 25 April 1931. 
30 See the report from the Andalusian section of the FAI in Tierra y Libertad, 11 July 1931. 
31 Tierra y Libertad, 27 June 1931. This article was signed ‘J. Eroles’ as opposed to ‘D. Eroles’. It is my 
assumption that they are one and the same person, as Dionisio Eroles contributed articles to Tierra y 
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see the libertarian movement in Barcelona, Madrid and Andalucía attempt to reorganise 
the defence committees in these localities.32 However, in the FAI stronghold of La 
Felguera in Asturias, no defence committees were ever set up, their objectives instead 
entrusted to affinity groups, while in Galicia it was not until July 1935 that the FAI 
agreed to supply delegates to the defence committees.33 Even in Barcelona, where their 
significance was trumpeted by the local voluntarists, the formation of the defence 
committees does not initially appear to have implied anything more than the crafting of 
a command structure onto a loose network of ‘action groups’ of the kind formed during 
the years of pistolerismo to do battle with the hired gunmen of Barcelona employers.34 
Relations between the Republic and the Confederation became embittered soon 
after the former was founded. As governmental repression impeded the normal 
functioning of the CNT, gradualists in the organisation were attacked, both by those 
who wished to defend its anarchist tenets, and the voluntarists, whose chief concern was 
not to pass up an opportunity for a CNT-led revolution.35 In response, the gradualists 
published a position paper at the end of August 1931, which came to be known as the 
Manifesto of the Thirty, due to the number of its signatories (who would henceforth be 
known as treintistas). While affirming that Spain found itself in a revolutionary 
situation, the manifesto rejected the voluntarist conception of the revolution as an act of 
will, and did nothing to dispel the growing suspicion of the purists that the gradualist 
strain of anarcho-syndicalism was acting as a Trojan horse of Marxism and reformism 
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within the CNT.36 Alienated from the other principal currents of Spanish anarchism, the 
treintistas were both isolated and disinclined to fight for their positions within the CNT. 
Over the next two years, at Regional Plenums and meetings where gradualists could not, 
as at the Madrid Congress, rely on the majorities granted them by the bloc votes of 
larger unions and more moderately inclined Regional Committees, anarchists of proven 
‘purism’ were urged into positions of responsibility in the CNT. Throughout 1932 and 
into the beginning of the following year, the split was formalised, and the most 
prominent treintistas founded the syndicalist Opposition Unions in mid-1933, which 
would remain outside of the CNT until May 1936.  
Tensions amongst Spanish anarchists were heightened by the insurrections of 
February 1932, in Alt Llobregat, and that of January 1933, launched on the initiative of 
the Catalan Regional Defence Committee (effectively the Nosotros group). The former 
was an outgrowth of a labour dispute in the town of Figols which had escalated and 
spread throughout the region.37 Characterised by the peaceful takeover of towns and the 
declaration of libertarian communism, the revolt energised both the purist and 
voluntarist currents, who were convinced that it confirmed their prognoses as to the 
practicability of the anarchist ideal and the appetite of the masses for revolutionary 
action.38 The latter was a shambolic operation conceived according to García Oliver’s 
theory of ‘revolutionary gymnastics’, and its most significant consequence was a 
massacre of villagers at Casas Viejas in the province of Cádiz by members of the Civil 
Guard and the Republican police force, the Guardia de Asalto.39 Although the splits and 
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repression subsequent to these risings complicated the organisational life of the CNT, it 
is possible to overstate their impact.40 The widely remarked upon decline in the union’s 
fortunes in this period must be balanced by an awareness of the continuing importance 
of the CNT as a reference point in the lives of both its affiliates and wider support base, 
particularly through the ateneos, libertarian educational and cultural centres.41 The 
Libertarian Educational Youth Groups emerged from ateneos in Granada and Madrid, 
and combined with groups from Barcelona and Valencia to form the Federación Ibérica 
de Juventudes Libertarias (Iberian Federation of Libertarian Youth – FIJL) in Madrid in 
August 1932.42 This organisation soon came to be seen as the third branch of the 
libertarian movement in Spain, although its precise relation to the other organisations, 
particularly the FAI, was complicated by the Catalan section having emerged from the 
Culture and Propaganda group within the regional FAI, from which it was reluctant to 
disassociate.43 The Catalan section was commonly known, and is referred to in the 
literature as, the Juventudes Libertarias (JJLL) rather than the FIJL.  
The CNT would be involved in two further revolts prior to the outbreak of the 
civil war. Unlike the insurrections of February 1932 and January 1933, however, which 
were products of the frustrated hopes that the Republic had aroused, those that followed 
were informed by the rise of fascism in Europe, and the conviction that only a 
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revolution could prevent Spain from succumbing to a similar fate. The first of these 
anti-fascist risings took place in December 1933 in the immediate aftermath of general 
elections, which had been preceded by an extensive abstention campaign carried out by 
the CNT and the FAI. This campaign repeatedly stressed the importance of fighting 
fascism on the street rather than through the ballot box, and urged Spain’s working class 
to avoid the shameful fate of the German labour movement.44 Notwithstanding such 
preparation, at least one regional section of the CNT warned in advance that the 
insurrection had no hope of success.45 There was a jailbreak in Barcelona and the 
adjacent town of Hospitalet, an anarchist stronghold, came under the control of the 
revolutionaries for four days. Libertarian communism was declared in several 
Aragonese villages, and workers’ suburbs in Zaragoza were likewise held by the 
insurrectionaries for days, while there was heavy fighting in La Rioja.46 The rising 
nevertheless posed little problem for the authorities, who crushed it within a week. Of 
greater scale was the insurrection in Asturias of the following year, which was of a 
similarly anti-fascist character.47 There, the revolt had been preceded by an accord of 
revolutionary unity, signed by the regional sections of the UGT and CNT, the latter 
acting against the policy of the national organisation. When the rising was crushed, the 
repressive violence of the state outstripped all previous experience under the Republic, 
while organisational life was made impossible on a state-wide level as union buildings 
were closed and newspapers shut down.48  
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It has been suggested that it was the paralysis brought about by repression and 
disunity that provided the impetus for the reunification of the libertarian movement at 
the Zaragoza Congress of May 1936.49 However, a contemporary ideological shift in the 
FAI, embodied by Diego Abad de Santillán’s Nervio affinity group, also helped to make 
this rapprochement possible. Abad de Santillán, the pseudonym of Baudilio Sinesio 
García Fernández, had spent most of his life in Argentina, where his polemics in favour 
of a specifically anarchist workers’ organisation had won favour among many purists in 
Spain.50 This may help to explain the immediate impact he had on the FAI on his return 
to Spain in 1934, by which time he had become a convert to ‘the idea of toleration 
among all revolutionary parties’.51 In Barcelona, Nervio joined in the effort to sideline 
the Nosotros group.52 As much had previously been attempted by José Peirats, of the 
affinity group Afinidad, although the latter soon tired of Abad De Santillán’s 
‘disciplinary anarchism’ when he endeavoured to undermine the autonomy of the 
affinity groups by subjecting them to organisational control.53 Under the editorship of 
Abad De Santillán, Tierra y Libertad turned sharply away from insurrectionism, 
provoking angry criticism from a former contributor, Alfonso Nieves Nuñez, while his 
industry-centred vision of the future society was not far removed from that advocated 
by Joan Peiró, the most prominent treintista.54  
In the build up to the general election of February 1936, the CNT and the FAI did 
not mount the kind of concerted abstention campaign that had preceded the election and 
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attempted insurrection at the end of 1933. Whether this was due primarily to the 
exhaustion of activists and resources occasioned by the repression of the bienio negro, 
or thanks to what Abad de Santillán would call the ‘happy coincidence of opinion 
amongst those activists whose views counted for a great deal in our ranks’, remains a 
subject of debate.55 The CNT and the FAI concentrated much of their propaganda at this 
time on the need for an amnesty for political prisoners, which formed part of the 
platform of the Popular Front, a broad electoral alliance which had been animated 
chiefly by Manuel Azaña, leader of the moderate republican Acción Republicana 
(Republican Action) and Prime Minister of the Second Republic during the first bienio, 
and Indalecio Prieto, a leader of the moderate wing of the PSOE.56 As several of the 
most prominent figures in Spanish anarchism, from Peiró to Durruti to Federico Urales, 
called, explicitly or otherwise, for a vote for the Popular Front, a resurrection of the 
‘progressive’ alliance that had ushered in the Republic with the support of gradualist, 
purist and voluntarist anarchists could be perceived.57 
On an official level, however, neither the CNT nor the FAI considered parliament 
to be a potential terrain in the fight against fascism. Following a plenum of FAI regional 
federations at the end of January, Tierra y Libertad affirmed that: ‘The anarchists 
consider it deplorable that workers are called to the ballot boxes in the name of 
socialism, and propose as a true dike against fascism the united revolutionary action of 
the proletariat.’58 Two days before the elections and a full five months before the civil 
war began, the National Committee of the CNT issued a communiqué calling for 
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workers to be ‘on a war footing’, identifying Morocco as the ‘epicentre’ of the 
conspiracy, and urging that every attempt be made to ‘ensure that the defensive 
contribution of the masses may lead to the real social revolution and libertarian 
communism... pursued to its utmost consequences without tolerating attempts by the 
liberal bourgeoisie and its Marxist allies to hold back the course of events.’59 In spite of 
tactical differences with regard to voting in February, the dominant feeling in the CNT 
was that bourgeois democracy was unlikely to survive any existential conflict with 
fascism. At the beginning of the year, Durruti had declared at a meeting of his union: 
‘Our slogan must be: dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or libertarian communism. 
Bourgeois democracy is dead in Spain and it is the republicans who have killed it.’60  
The victory of the Popular Front slate allowed the CNT to call a National 
Congress, which began in Zaragoza on 1 May. Assemblies were held to debate the 
agenda for the Congress on successive Sundays throughout the country and hundreds of 
CNT members made their way to Zaragoza, where 649 delegates representing 550,595 
members celebrated the first Confederal Congress since 1931. However, this apparently 
thriving democratic culture disguised the fact that the Congress did not discuss what 
was apparently the chief preoccupation of the organisation, namely, the imminent 
fascist threat, and how best to respond to it. It appears that the national co-ordinating 
body of the defence committees discussed its plans at a private session.61 The principal 
outcomes of the Zaragoza Congress were the agreements to ratify the readmission of the 
Opposition Unions, the approval of a document outlining the content of libertarian 
communism, and the sending of a unity proposal to the UGT. The vision of libertarian 
communism that emerged from the Congress was a compromise between the purist and 
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gradualist currents, and was criticised from the floor by the former for considering the 
union organisation to have a role in a post-revolutionary society and by the latter for not 
granting the union a more prominent role.62 In spite of the fact that the document did not 
claim to provide a rigid formula for a post-revolutionary society and failed to win 
unreserved approval, it is worth noting certain of the principles that were affirmed here 
as integral to the revolutionary project, and which would re-emerge as priorities for the 
conscience of the revolution. These include economic equality, assembly-based 
decision-making procedures, the principle of autonomy, equality of the sexes and the 
arming of the populace.63 
After a similarly heated debate, the unity proposal sent to the UGT urged the 
Socialists to abandon their political illusions and commit to the social revolution. In a 
further example of compromise, however, an additional article recognised the right of 
the UGT to elaborate further conditions for an alliance, which were to be negotiated by 
appointed liaison committees from both organisations, who would then return to their 
members with the results for ratification.64  This proposal was opposed by the delegate 
from Hospitalet, José Peirats, who would become a prominent critic of state 
collaboration, on purist grounds: ‘There can be no entente between liberty and 
authority’, he declared. ‘The criterion of class… is Marxist, and therefore artificial. Men 
are polarised principally according to their ideas, their passions and their mentality.’65 
Speaking in favour of the proposal, the delegate from the fishing industry of Barcelona 
affirmed that ideas could not be sufficient to make a revolution when they were not 
shared by the majority of even the CNT’s own members, and that the impetus for an 
alliance came from below.66 The dangers of a unity negotiated via liaison committees 
                                                 
62 C.N.T., El Congreso Confederal de Zaragoza (Bilbao: Zero, 1978), pp. 200-7.  
63 Ibid., pp. 226-42. 
64 Ibid., pp. 224-6. 
65 Ibid., pp.182-3. 
66 Ibid., pp.185-6. 
33 
 
and which made no stipulations as to the elaboration of workers’ power during and after 
the revolution were not highlighted. In the brief period that followed the Congress of 
Zaragoza before the outbreak of the civil war, the UGT displayed no desire to respond 
to the CNT proposal.67 The trumpeting of the alliance in the CNT press was not, as the 
National Committee admitted, ‘because we believe that [the UGT] will agree to it, since 
they have no honesty within them’, but rather because of the advantageous light in 
which this presented the Confederation in the eyes of pro-alliance workers.68 However, 
the question of an ‘entente between liberty and authority’ could not be side-lined, and 
would soon be posed of the organisation again amidst the rubble and gunpowder smoke 
of July 1936. 
Revolution and State Collaboration, July – December, 1936 
 
As libertarian activists had long promised would happen, the alliance of the working 
class in fact occurred ‘on the street’ in July 1936.69 The attempted coup d’état, initially 
headed by José Sanjurjo and prominent generals such as Emilio Mola, Queipo de Llano 
and Francisco Franco, was the catalyst for the declaration of a general strike, and the 
creation of ad-hoc anti-fascist alliances between trade unions and workers’ parties, to 
which sympathetic members of the security forces added crucial weight. Where the 
military revolt was defeated, the initial collaboration of the CNT with other 
organisations was established as an emergency defensive alliance against an external 
threat. The committees created to coordinate the anti-fascist forces, however, were by 
force of circumstances obliged to challenge existing power relations in their cities and 
towns, controlling movement through barricades and check-points and taking charge of 
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supplies in order to keep local populations fed. These committees also rapidly 
concerned themselves with questions that went beyond the defence of the Republic to 
address longstanding demands of the workers’ movement.70 As the defeat of the revolt 
was everywhere accompanied by the dislocation of state power, the nature and 
durability of these anti-fascist alliances would consequently be tested by an emerging 
revolutionary situation in Republican Spain.  
Barcelona, the traditional stronghold of the CNT and the first major city in which 
the military revolt was comprehensively defeated, would provide the test case for the 
organisation’s attitude to the state, revolution and anti-fascist alliances in this new 
context. There, the rising had met with the determined response of the CNT defence 
committees, which had mobilised around 2000 members according to the plans of the 
Catalan Regional Defence Committee (effectively the Nosotros affinity group).71 They 
had been able to count on the support of a significant proportion of the city’s security 
forces, the intervention of the POUM, and a mobilised working class population that 
thronged the plazas clamouring for arms and which filled the streets in festive spirit as 
the rising was defeated. What remained of the Republican state in Cataluña was 
discredited, through its pusillanimity in the face of the rising and initial refusals to arm 
the people, while its functioning had been thrown into chaos.72 
The fall of the Atarazanas barracks on 20 July, during the assault on which 
Francisco Ascaso was killed, marked the definitive end of the military revolt in 
Barcelona. The transformation of the city, familiar from the abundant literature, 
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photography and cinema that have sought to capture it, was underway. The churches, 
with the exceptions of the cathedral and the Sagrada Familia, were set alight. Men and 
women in workers’ overalls held rifles aloft and exclaimed “vivas!” to the CNT-FAI, 
while requisitioned cars and trucks sped back and forth. Buildings belonging to the 
wealthy, large private companies or religious orders were taken over. The well-dressed, 
if not all of the better off, disappeared from the streets, as the proletarian periphery of 
the city took over the centre. As one eyewitness declared: ‘Today there is not a hat, a 
collar, or a tie to be seen among them; the sartorial symbols of the bourgeoisie are gone, 
a proletarian freedom has swarmed in along the Calle Hospital and the Calle del Carmen 
from the Parallelo.’73 One of the most striking indications of the rupture that had taken 
place in the life of Barcelona was the visible protagonism of women, and the emergence 
of the militia woman, the miliciana, dressed in blue overalls and carrying a rifle, as an 
emblem of the revolutionary moment.74 Even taking into account the forbidding 
national and international context, it is clear that in its twenty-six year history, the CNT 
had never before found itself at the heart of a mobilisation with so much revolutionary 
potential. 
We can assume, therefore, that it was apparent to the members of the CNT’s 
Liaison Committee in communication with the seat of Catalan government, the 
Generalitat, that the defensive measures they had undertaken to defeat the military coup 
d’état had developed along revolutionary lines, in accordance with the predictions of the 
National Committee’s February communiqué. This Committee was composed of three 
members of the Regional Defence Committee, García Oliver, Durruti and Francisco 
Ascaso, who was replaced after his death by Aurelio Fernández Sánchez, a further long-
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standing member of the Nosotros group, along with another, Josep Asens, in 
representation of the Regional Committee of the CNT, and Abad de Santillán, an 
opponent of the tactics employed by the Nosotros group, in representation of the FAI. 
These men attended a meeting at the Palace of the Generalitat with the Catalan 
President, Lluís Companys, on 20 July. Under discussion was the creation of a new 
body, the Comité Central de Milicias Antifascistas (Central Committee of Anti-Fascist 
Militia - CCMA), which would unite the anti-fascist organisations in Cataluña in order 
to co-ordinate the war effort and maintain order.75 The proposal was agreed to by the 
Regional Committee of the CNT, in communication via telephone with the Liaison 
Committee, albeit that the participation of the CNT would be subject to ratification at a 
Regional Plenum to be held the following day. By that time the CCMA was already 
operational, a fact declared by decree of the Generalitat on 21 July. For the Regional 
Committee of the CNT to agree to participation in a body incorporating the 
representatives of a democratic system in crisis, subject to an institution of state, 
represents an apparent paradox. It appears still more paradoxical when we consider that 
the Liaison Committee mediating the discussion was dominated by those members who 
had been most associated with the voluntarist wing of the organisation during the 
Second Republic.  
By 20 July, the defence committees responsible to the Catalan Regional Defence 
Committee, dominated by the Nosotros group, had constituted themselves as 
‘neighbourhood revolutionary committees’ and their members had taken to calling 
themselves ‘milicianos’.76 Movement around the city was controlled by barricades 
overseen chiefly by such milicianos. They formed supply committees to ensure that the 
                                                 
75 See the recollections in García Oliver, El eco de los pasos, pp. 176-8, and the discussion in Guillamón, 
La Revolución de los comités, pp. 56-9. 
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families of those undertaking revolutionary work were fed, and set up huge public 
canteens. They organised the first militia columns that left in the direction of Zaragoza 
on 24 July, with Durruti and Antonio Ortiz, another Nosotros member, leading anarchist 
columns. The prestige and power of the defence committees had never been greater, and 
with the revolutionary developments in Barcelona led primarily by milicianos, it seems 
at first glance that it would have been feasible for the Regional Defence Committee to 
assert its authority at this stage. To have done so may have implied a complete break 
with the CNT, however, whose wider membership’s reaction to such a move would 
have been impossible to predict. This is suggested by the recollections of Ricardo Sanz, 
a member of the Nosotros group: ‘We knew that the organisation was opposed to 
dictatorship. And that’s what it would have been if our position had been accepted.’ 77 
Unwilling to provoke such a schism, the Regional Defence Committee surrendered the 
initiative it held after the defeat of the military rising. 
It must also be borne in mind that the defence committees, in spite of the efforts 
undertaken to re-organise them along more disciplined and militaristic lines, were a 
heterogeneous and unpredictable entity, even in the eyes of García Oliver.78 Beyond a 
core of militants that the Regional Defence Committee could depend on to obey orders, 
the bulk of the defence committees represented a broader network, animated chiefly by 
affinity groups.79 There is evidence to suggest that between this wider network and the 
core were ‘mid-level’ shop stewards and FAI activists who had helped combat 
treintismo in the previous years but who could not be relied upon to simply follow the 
orders of the Regional Defence Committee. As much had been demonstrated on 17 
August when activists from the Maritime Transport Workers’ Union, without waiting 
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for the directions of the Regional Defence Committee, stormed the boats anchored in 
the port of Barcelona and carried off their stores of weaponry. The initiative for the raid 
has been attributed variously to Juan Yagüe and Julián Merino, who both had 
connections to the defence committees.80 The event caused consternation among the 
Nosotros affinity group, who hastened to intervene in order to avoid a state of 
emergency being declared.81 Such apparent mutual mistrust may help to explain why, 
for men in negotiations with the Generalitat both before and after the July days, the 
unpredictable and broadly autonomous wider network of the defence committees may 
not have appeared to be a reliable basis for extending their power and influence.    
The Regional Plenum called by the Barcelona CNT to debate participation in the 
CCMA took place on 21 July. It set a precedent for the way in which the CNT’s 
democratic procedures would be undermined by the war. The urgency of the 
circumstances meant that assemblies were called hastily, with little time for delegates to 
be elected and their positions debated by the wider membership. The key questions to 
be discussed were proposed by the comités superiores (the name given to the Regional, 
National and Peninsular Committees of the different branches of the libertarian 
movement), the function of the assembly was to ratify or reject them. While the comités 
superiores had formerly taken important decisions in circumstances of heightened 
repression or emergency, the permanent emergency situation brought about by the war 
led, in the months that followed the rupture of July, to such decision-making procedures 
gradually assuming a routine quality, which would become increasingly formalised over 
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the course of the war. According to Fidel Miró, the 21 July assembly was made up of 
‘committees and notable activists’ and was not a regularly constituted Plenum.82  
Three positions emerged: one favouring collaboration, one opposing it on 
revolutionary grounds, and one which considered collaboration to be of potential short-
term use to the CNT, which could strengthen its position before proceeding to a more 
complete revolutionary transformation.83 Montseny and Abad De Santillán spoke in 
favour of the first position, the former considering the revolutionary option tantamount 
to an ‘anarchist dictatorship’, the latter warning against the probability of international 
intervention against any such revolutionary endeavour.84 Whether persuaded of these 
arguments or content to bide their time and await developments, the delegates present 
approved collaboration with the CCMA, with only the vote of José Xena, delegate for 
Baix Llobregat, opposed, whose position had been supported by García Oliver.85 The 
CCMA met that same night, with the members of the CNT’s Liaison Committee 
attending as the delegates of the CNT and the FAI. 
It is far from clear that the controversy implied by the decision to join the CCMA, 
identified subsequently by anarchist militants and historians, was understood to be so 
significant by the majority of CNT activists in Barcelona at the time. Diego Camacho, 
then a member of the JJLL, recalled that:  
Only a handful of activists were aware of the constitution [of the 
CCMA], while the immense majority were unaware, or it sounded to 
them like one more revolutionary committee among the many others that 
were operating all over the place.86  
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However, while the CCMA was a product of the revolution, it was not a revolutionary 
organ, and remained subordinate to the pre-existing institutions of state governance. 
Meanwhile, because the CCMA operated on the basis of delegates proposed by the 
different anti-fascist organisations, there was no opportunity for a directly democratic 
process to influence it. For anti-fascist politicians such as Companys, who did not wish 
to see state power abolished, the CCMA provided the state with a seemingly 
revolutionary legitimacy and a base from which to reorganise and marshal their 
strength.87 
The de-facto collaboration of the libertarian movement with the state in Cataluña 
had thus begun. This was a complex process that not only included the presence of CNT 
representatives in the CCMA but which also found expression in libertarian 
involvement, indeed frequent predominance, in the bodies set up by Generalitat decree 
in the days and weeks that followed. These included the Consejo de la Escuela Nueva 
Unificada (Council of the New Unified School – CENU), responsible for education, 
established on 27 July, the Comisión de Indústrias de Guerra (War Industries’ 
Commission) created on 7 August, the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils, charged with 
ensuring the continued loyalty of officers who had served in the army prior to July, the 
Comité Central de Abastos (The Central Committee of Supplies), the Consejo de 
Economía de Cataluña (Council of the Economy of Cataluña), established on 11 
August, and the Patrullas de Control (Control Patrols) founded on the same day, which 
was a police force directed by the Investigation Committee of the CCMA, led by 
Aurelio Fernández and Salvador González (this latter a member of the Partit Socialista 
Unificat de Catalunya [Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña – PSUC]).88 While the 
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revolutionary situation lasted in Cataluña, in which the balance of power remained 
conditioned by the presence of armed workers on the street, it was far from clear that 
this process of collaboration would be definitive or irreversible, and in the case of some 
of the bodies enumerated above, it did not prove to be.89 Nevertheless, in a pattern that 
was to accelerate over the autumn, the process ensured that the CNT’s most prominent 
activists were absorbed into what were called ‘official posts’ in administrative organs, 
while the restructuring of education, public order, the economy and the war industry 
represented a further layer of state collaboration that involved thousands of CNT 
members. The scale of state collaboration was such that, when oppositionists later 
attempted to advocate a withdrawal from official positions, they would be confronted 
not only by ideological arguments in favour of anti-fascism, but by the daunting 
logistical and economic implications of their proposal.90 
Throughout much of what remained of Republican Spain, a comparable process to 
that which had taken place in Cataluña was underway, in which committees of anti-
fascist unity with a variety of different names were formed in cities and towns with the 
participation of the CNT. The organisation dominated the Comité de Guerra (War 
Committee) in Gijón, where industry was run by the unions and the Committee also 
took over the city’s branch of the Bank of Spain.91 A Comité Ejecutivo Popular 
(Popular Executive Committee) was established in Valencia on 20 July, which 
immediately came into conflict with the central government in Madrid.92 In Almería, a 
Comité Central Antifascista (Anti-fascist Central Committee) was constituted by 23 
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July, although the CNT, outnumbered by the UGT in the region, did not join until the 
beginning of August, which may be suggestive of disquiet regarding the question 
among the Confederal affiliates.93 In Málaga, the multiple decision-making bodies that 
had emerged under the auspices of the different workers’ organisations were unified on 
26 July in the Comité de Salud Pública (Committee of Public Health), whose Secretary 
was Francisco Millán, of the FAI.94 In these areas, and many more, the anti-fascist 
Committee was the symbol and embodiment of the new state of affairs, providing an 
alternative structure of power to the municipal governments, which in most cases were 
reduced to a nominal role. The central governmental power of Madrid, after the chaotic 
first days of the rising, sought to re-establish its presence and authority on the streets 
through the mobilisation of security forces and government-issued passes guaranteeing 
safe passage.95 Nevertheless, these measures could not disguise the marginalisation of 
the government, or the consequent importance of the CNT in the organisation of 
resistance and public order in the capital, where its activists found their greatest rivals to 
be the rapidly growing PCE.96 
The composition of the anti-fascist committees in each region was largely 
dependent on the balance of political forces prior to July 1936, albeit with the exclusion 
of the rightist parties. In certain cases, particularly outside of the larger cities, how the 
organisations had responded to the military rising was also a factor in deciding their 
participation in the new committees. In Lleida, the workers’ organisations initially felt 
strong enough to exclude what were seen as the bourgeois parties – in this case the 
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Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Cataluña - ERC).97 The 
committees were often presented at mass assemblies in town centres where they were 
ratified and, in areas where only one organisation dominated or where the workers’ 
organisations had little strength, the assembly might have a more open and active 
character.98 Assemblies as a forum for debate and democratic decision-making were 
features of several revolutionary phenomena: factories taken over by their workers, 
collectives established in rural areas, neighbourhood defence committees and militia 
columns, but did not impinge upon the activity and direction of the quasi-governmental 
anti-fascist committees in the major cities, in which delegates were answerable to the 
organisations they belonged to. The democratic deficit evident in the collaborationist 
organs and the official structures of the CNT itself was however counterbalanced to an 
extent by the assembly-based procedures that characterised the broader revolutionary 
experience.  
Such was the case in the militia columns which, by the end of summer, were 
having to dig in for a lengthy, trench-based war. In August, the columns in Aragón 
halted their advance within sight of Zaragoza, with swathes of land in their rear having 
been collectivised.99 However, an assault on the city never materialised, as military 
personnel who had remained loyal to the Republic advised the anarchists to cover their 
flanks.100 Audacious schemes based on the infiltration of the city and a simultaneous 
uprising from within and assault from without went untested.101 The CNT had failed to 
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elaborate a strategy appropriate to the organisational form of the militias and was, in 
part, prevented from doing so by its commitment to participation in the anti-fascist 
front.102 The situation in Aragón was not unique. The militia columns raised in Gijón 
were convinced to delay before advancing on Oviedo. Those marching on Granada from 
Alicante, including the anarchist Maroto Column, dug in at Baza, in the north of the 
Andalusian province. The strikes declared in the cities under rebel control were worn 
down by the systematic use of terror. The mutinous army did not have to face its enemy 
on two fronts, and the fighting developed along the lines of attrition warfare, 
characterised by sieges and trenches. In such a war, the military strengths of the 
anarchist movement - urban street fighting, mobility and impetuosity - were rendered 
superfluous, while the practice of direct democracy and autonomous organisation 
became a hindrance to effective military action.  
From late July, the rebel commanders had received the active assistance of the 
German and Italian air forces, enabling the transfer of men and weaponry from Spanish 
Morocco to Andalucía.103 Confronted by trained military reinforcements, civilian 
resistance to the rising in Cádiz was overwhelmed, and while systematic repression of 
workers’ and democratic organisations took place there and in the cities of Sevilla and 
Granada, General Yagüe’s army swept north through Extremadura. At Badajoz, which 
had offered serious resistance, the repression was of such a scale that it was to become 
one of the most infamous episodes of the civil war, as hundreds of its inhabitants were 
massacred in the bullring day after day for weeks after the city fell in mid-August.104 
The isolation of the Republic was confirmed by the Non-Intervention Agreement signed 
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by the major European powers in August on the diplomatic initiative of Britain and 
France. An effective arms embargo was thereby placed on the Spanish Republic that 
brought the question of weaponry, and the desire to reassure foreign powers, to the 
forefront of the problems facing the workers’ organisations. Such considerations 
undoubtedly impacted on the internal debates of the CNT taking place during these 
months as to the attitude it should adopt towards the question of government and 
military reorganisation.   
On 4 August the CNT held a National Plenum in Madrid. This event was 
illustrative of the extent to which the normal functioning of the Confederation had been 
compromised by the war, as only three regions, the Centre, Cataluña and Levante, were 
able to send delegations. The Plenum debated the question of CNT collaboration in a 
hypothetical National Anti-fascist Committee, which had apparently been mentioned to 
the National Committee of the CNT by government ministers.105 The Cataluña and 
Levante delegations spoke in favour, while the Central region’s delegation expressed 
reservations, with no final decision being taken due to the lack of representation of 
several regions.  
The reticence of the Central delegation towards the vague proposal may have been 
influenced by calls from the Madrid section of the CNT for the central government to be 
replaced by a Junta de Defensa (Defence Council) without moderate republican 
representation. This argument, in favour of government by an exclusively working class 
committee, was the unifying characteristic of the left wing of Spanish anti-fascism at 
this time, both from within the ranks of the CNT, and also the POUM, for whom this 
was official policy.106 This argument was strengthened by the disastrous military 
situation in which the Republic found itself. There was a widespread perception that 
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‘bourgeois politicians’ were incapable of prosecuting the war with sufficient vigour.107 
On 13 September, San Sebastián, the only city in the Basque Country for which July 
had represented a revolutionary rupture comparable to the rest of Spain, was 
surrendered to the rebels without a shot being fired. As the city was evacuated, Basque 
nationalist police remained behind in order to disarm anarchist militia and prevent the 
retreating forces from burning the city.108 While such losses added urgency to the 
arguments of the collaborationists, they also illustrated the extent to which collaboration 
prevented the militia from adopting the guerrilla tactics associated with revolutionary 
warfare.  
The relationship of the war to the revolution therefore hinged on the question of 
state collaboration. From very early on in the conflict, Horacio Martínez Prieto, 
National Secretary of the CNT from September to November 1936, had considered that 
the only course open to the organisation was ‘to be a solid force within anti-fascism, 
identified with it and protected by it’.109 Martínez Prieto was a veteran of the anarchist 
movement, whose purist scruples had prevented him from joining the CNT until 1932. 
By the beginning of the war, however, he had occupied influential posts, editing the 
national review CNT in 1932, where he was referred to as ‘Sergeant Prieto’ by his 
colleagues, and serving his first term as National Secretary from 1935 until May 
1936.110 As the democratic functioning of the CNT had been severely compromised by 
the war, the National Secretary of the organisation was well placed to define the terms 
and outcomes of the various debates underway in the Confederation during the first 
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months of the conflict.111 While Martínez Prieto was tenacious in his advocacy of 
collaboration, however, the momentum towards participation in government emanated 
primarily from developments in Barcelona that were driven by the regional rather than 
national organisation of the CNT. There, the decision to participate in the government 
of the Generalitat had been taken in unclear circumstances at the end of August.112 The 
wider membership of the CNT was not made aware of the decisions of the Catalan 
comités superiores until the end of the following month, when the presence of the CNT 
in the Generalitat was negotiated. The CCMA was officially dissolved on 1 October.113  
On 4 September a new national government was formed with Largo Caballero as 
Prime Minister and in which the PCE also participated for the first time. The previous 
day a National Plenum of the CNT had agreed in principle to intervention in 
government but rejected immediate participation. The Catalan delegation proposed, as 
had the Madrid delegates a month before, the creation of a new central organ of power 
composed of representatives of the CNT and the UGT, which would be headed by 
Largo Caballero. In accordance with this restatement of the ‘left’ option, Solidaridad 
Obrera declared its preference for a National Revolutionary Council (Junta) ‘of all the 
workers’ and peasants’ organisations’, affirming that ‘the current moment is one 
hundred per cent proletarian’.114 However, at the same time as the Catalan Regional 
Committee was urging the creation of a Junta composed of the unions, it entered a 
process of bringing autonomous and localised initiative back under organisational 
control. In spite of the calls from some elements of the CNT and the POUM for 
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proletarian government, which was undoubtedly sincerely meant, the organisations’ 
representatives in the CCMA did not oppose the decision taken by that body on 2 
September, to oblige the anti-fascist committee in Lleida to accept the participation of 
the ERC.115 The case of Lleida was a small example of a wider picture of state 
reconstruction on the basis of centralisation and class collaboration. This process would 
be contradictory and take place in stages because its apparent logic, of creating a strong 
state with a mobilised population capable of waging a modern war, depended on the 
defeat of a revolution which had, in the absence of such a state, prevented the collapse 
of the Republic and sustained the war effort up to that point.  
On 15 September, two days after the fall of San Sebastián, the CNT held another 
National Plenum in Madrid. The proposal to form a Junta de Defensa to coordinate the 
regionally organised anti-fascist committees was here officially adopted. By contrast to 
the original proposal of an exclusively proletarian council, however, this body was to be 
presided over by Largo Caballero and formed by five delegates from the CNT and five 
from the UGT, with four moderate republicans also represented and Azaña continuing 
in his post as President of the Republic.116 The proposal was thereby stripped of its ‘left’ 
content, and Martínez Prieto considered that the principle of governmental participation 
had now been conceded, as the reconceived Junta differed only superficially from the 
existing administration.117 The momentum was now with those who favoured 
collaboration, and although the Catalan Regional Committee would continue to 
advocate the constitution of a Junta after it had been rejected by Largo Caballero, its 
case was severely undermined by the participation of the CNT in the Generalitat from 
26 September. An equally important outcome of the Plenum was the decision, proposed 
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by Martínez Prieto, to change the composition of the National Committee of the CNT, 
which would henceforth be a permanent body made up of delegates from the regional 
federations.118 Previously, the formation of the National Committee had been the 
temporary responsibility of a Regional Committee chosen at the National Congress, its 
duties intended to be limited to co-ordination. Its refoundation as a representative, 
executive body therefore represented a significant shift away from the CNT’s founding 
statutes.  
Such a retreat from Confederal democracy was a necessary component of both the 
constraints imposed by the war and the contortions required by state collaboration, 
which was as much an ideological process as it was one of formal political participation. 
This was shown clearly in the recasting of the civil war as a war of national 
independence. On the one hand a reaction to the aid the rebels received from Italy and 
Germany, and the presence in Spain of the Army of Africa under the supreme command 
of General Franco, this was also indicative of the Republican state’s need for a common 
mobilising agent other than that of class. Prior to the war, the FAI had made its position 
clear: ‘The struggle against fascism, an international phenomenon, must be carried out 
internationally by the workers’ and revolutionary organisations, to the exclusion of any 
nationalist idea or sentiment’.119 At the end of August 1936, however, in a radio 
broadcast published in Solidaridad Obrera, Federica Montseny described the war as 
one of national independence against ‘fascist civilisation’, characterised in racist terms 
as ‘not… a Christian civilisation but a Moorish civilisation’.120 Illustrative of the 
nationalist component in the reconstitution of the Republican state was the fruitless 
mission of the Comité de Acción Marroquí (Moroccan Action Committee), which 
arrived in Spain in September, seeking a declaration of Moroccan autonomy from the 
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government, in exchange for which they would attempt to organise an uprising in the 
rebels’ African rearguard and to disrupt recruitment to the Army of Africa.121 ‘Anti-
fascist’ nationalism was an ideological corollary of state reconstruction in the Republic, 
and Montseny’s speech was one of many examples of Spanish anarchists promoting this 
official ideology, an activity that cannot be separated from the wider process of state 
collaboration.122 
The recomposition of the Republican state was also accompanied by a reassertion 
of patriarchal values that further undermined the achievements of the revolution. As 
noted above, women in workers’ overalls brandishing rifles was one of the striking 
images of July in the major cities. On 20 July, Solidaridad Obrera noted that women 
had fought alongside men at the barricades in Barcelona.123 The involvement of women 
at the front was initially exalted by the workers’ organisations and the image of the 
miliciana was used in recruitment posters and propaganda, which were aimed at women 
as well as men.124 The process whereby this exaltation was turned into its opposite ran 
parallel to the reconstitution of the Spanish state.125 One early indication of this was a 
note carried in Solidaridad Obrera on 30 September stating that a new column formed 
in Poblet in Tarragona would only admit milicianas who were related to or a partner of 
male recruits.126 This was followed days later by denunciations in the official newspaper 
of the Badalona anti-fascist committee (Diari oficial del Comité Antifeixista i de Salut 
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Pública de Badalona) of women deemed to be ‘showing off’, criticising ‘photos of 
women armed with a gun who have never fired a shot in their lives’.127  
While the libertarian women’s organisation, Mujeres Libres, which had formed 
just prior to the war, did not advocate women’s participation at the front, it formed a 
self-organised presence in the rearguard via which the patriarchal implications of state 
reconstruction would be combatted. That the grouping was able to perceive the danger 
to the revolution posed by the intertwined re-emergence of gendered and racial 
discourse is demonstrated by an article in its eponymous review in response to a 
recruitment poster in Madrid which read ‘Madrileños, do not allow your women to be 
despoiled by the Moors!’: 
Madrileño, comrade, brother: do not join the struggle out of fear of the 
Moorish ‘razzias’, the bane of Christian women… There is no reason to 
revive the instinctive, primitive motives that years of spiritual cultivation 
have calmed, you do not need the spurs of opportunists who, to win a 
victory – almost always for their party – resort to the lowest of 
incitements. 
You are struggling for yourself; out of your deepest conviction and 
not because of the ridiculous threats, of greater or lesser accuracy and 
terror, of humiliation to your wife who, what is more, shares your ideal 
and knows how to defend it and herself.128 
State reconstruction in the Republican zone must therefore be seen as a broader 
process than that implied by the reorganisation of administrative bodies. By the time the 
CNT officially entered the government of Largo Caballero, a fact announced at a rally 
in Valencia on 19 October, sectors of the organisation were already involved in this 
process, both in terms of formal relations with the state, and in public support for its 
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constitution as a patriarchal and racial/national entity.129 That the news implied 
simultaneously a moment in an ongoing process and a crossing of the Rubicon that 
would intensify the CNT’s state collaboration, with all of its implications for the 
internal life of the organisation, was reflected in the varied response it generated from 
within the ranks of Spanish anarchism. For one sector, it was a ‘bombshell’ greeted with 
disbelief, while for others it was accepted as a pragmatic response to the demands of the 
situation.130 According to some sympathisers, the CNT’s acceptance of a secondary role 
in the central government, and the ideological concession this implied, was proof of the 
sincerity of the organisation’s anti-fascism.131 Solidaridad Obrera, meanwhile, greeted 
the presence of anarchist ministers in the Republican government with ingenuous 
enthusiasm: ‘The entrance of the CNT into central Government’, it declared, ‘is one of 
the most transcendental occurrences in the political history of our country. The State 
and Government will oppress the people still less with the intervention in them of 
elements of the CNT’.132 
Any possibility that the ministers and councillors representing the organisations 
that supported the revolution could change the oppressive nature of the state was 
compromised, however, by the fact that they were at all times outnumbered by an 
emerging bloc determined to, in its words, ‘normalise’ the Republican rearguard, 
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thereby enabling the reconstitution of the Republican state.133 This bloc was composed, 
in Cataluña, of the ERC, the PSUC, the Unió de Rabassaires (an organisation of 
Catalan peasants that was traditionally sympathetic to the political left but hostile to 
collectivisation) and Acció Catalana Republicana (Republican Catalan Action). In the 
Generalitat, it was represented by seven councillors (three from the ERC, two from the 
PSUC and one each from the Unió de Rabassaires and ACR), as compared to three 
from the CNT and one POUM councillor. In the newly organised central government, 
the four CNT ministers were accompanied by fourteen other, Socialist, Communist and 
republican ministers.134 While it should be borne in mind that many rank-and-file 
Socialists and UGT members were active participants in the revolution, their 
representatives in government, while belonging to different tendencies, were united in 
conceiving the revolution, if they supported it at all, as a secondary consideration to the 
war and the construction of a strong state.135  
The relative impotence of the four anarchist ministers with respect to this anti-
revolutionary bloc was immediately made clear. As soon as they entered the 
government they were called to an emergency meeting to debate the removal of the seat 
of the Republican government from Madrid to Valencia. This debate took two days to 
resolve because of the opposition to the move mounted by the anarchists.136 Faced with 
the unanimous opposition of their ministerial colleagues and desirous of averting a 
crisis in the new government, however, they eventually acquiesced. The abandonment 
of the capital caused a scandal, and libertarian embarrassment was heightened when 
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ministers leaving the city were detained at anarchist-controlled checkpoints.137 The 
affair cost Martínez Prieto his post as National Secretary of the CNT, and he was 
replaced by the then Regional Secretary of Cataluña, Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez, who 
was similarly committed to collaboration.  
Libertarian ire in Madrid was to an extent channelled into the defiant fervour 
required for the defence of the city, encapsulated by the mobilising slogan ‘Long live 
Madrid without a government!’.138 It was further sated by the ad-hoc organisation 
created by Largo Caballero, the Junta de Defensa de Madrid (Madrid Defence Council – 
JDM), charged with taking on governmental authority in the capital and mounting its 
defence in the absence of the Spanish parliament. Superficially resembling in 
composition and appearance the anti-fascist committees then being wound down under 
the terms of the municipal re-organisation ordered by the Largo Caballero government, 
the CNT in Madrid greeted the creation of the JDM as a vindication of the perspective it 
had maintained in the previous months, of regional anti-fascist committees being 
coordinated by a National Council of Defence.139 Nevertheless, once the immediate 
danger of the city’s fall had passed, the organisation’s delegates to the new body found 
themselves pressurised by their colleagues with regard to an issue that was to become 
familiar throughout the Republican rearguard: the problem posed to public order by the 
continued presence of armed CNT members on the streets. Complaints about the 
organisation from members of the Junta had to do with the apparent refusal of the 
CNT’s affiliates to disarm, or abide by the agreements of the JDM. Lorenzo Iñigo 
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Granizo, delegate of the FIJL, acknowledged that CNT members did indeed refuse to 
accept the authority of the Junta with regard to the question of arms, because the 
organisation dreaded the possibility that the Communist-controlled public order 
authorities would be able to draw up a register of the names and addresses of armed 
CNT affiliates. He even challenged his interlocutors to disarm him at a meeting of the 
JDM, as he did not have a license for his weapon from the Junta.140 An essential 
problem of the CNT’s collaboration with the state was thereby revealed: that the will to 
collaborate in an anti-fascist bloc did not easily translate into an acceptance of 
governmental authority at ground level, particularly when, as in the case of 
disarmament, this was both a life and death issue and an affront to the libertarian 
conception of the revolution. 
As shown by the example of Madrid, ‘normalisation’ of the rearguard, beginning 
with a confrontation over public order and internal security, where libertarian influence 
tended to be important, was deemed necessary even in areas of Republican Spain where 
revolutionary transformation had been more limited than in Cataluña and Aragón. So it 
was that in Almería, the Civil Governor was moved to declare in an order of early 
November that ‘all authority and competence with regard to Government and public 
administration remains linked to accordance with the laws of the Republic, to the town 
halls, mayors and their legitimately designated agents’.141 Expropriations were to end 
while arrests and registers would henceforth only be undertaken by governmental and 
military authorities. Likewise in Málaga, the foremost form taken by state 
reconstruction in the autumn was the reorganisation of public order, whereby the 
functions of the Comité de Salud Pública were transferred to newly established bodies. 
The ‘patrullas mixtas’, which had operated as a rearguard militia, were dissolved and 
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the official police force, responsible to the Civil Governor, was put in control of 
‘everything pertaining to the tranquillity and vigilance of the city’.142 
As partners in this process of state reconstruction, the CNT and the FAI could do 
little to oppose the restoration of state-controlled public order in an official capacity. 
The same was true of militarisation of the militia, and the organisations undertook a 
particular mission to convince their members at the front to accept the introduction of 
martial discipline and rank in the libertarian trenches, following Largo Caballero’s 
Decree of Militarisation issued on 24 October.143 In so doing, however, the CNT and the 
FAI were undermining the bases of their power, and removing the conditions that had 
made their collaboration a necessary precondition for the recovery of the Republican 
state’s legitimacy. By the end of the year, as opponents of the revolution continued to 
regain ground lost in July, many anarchists began to take stock, and to advance 
alternative strategies to that of state collaboration. This would bring them into conflict 
with those engaged in the process of state reconstruction, including, inevitably, the 
comités superiores of the libertarian movement. 
The Outline of a Revolutionary Conscience 
 
As we have seen above, the presence of arms in the rearguard was integral to the 
question of who held power in revolutionary Spain, the state or the organised working 
class, and as such it became a test case for the emergence of Spain’s ‘revolutionary 
conscience’. In Cataluña, the creation of the Patrullas de Control as the legitimate 
guarantors of the revolutionary order in the region, in addition to the scarcity of arms at 
the front, had led the comités superiores to back a campaign for the rearguard to be 
disarmed. Diego Abad de Santillán put the case for such disarmament to a plenum of 
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anarchist groups in Barcelona on 21 August, which agreed to his proposal. At a meeting 
of the Barcelona comités superiores held the following day, however, a representative 
of the city’s defence committees was present who stated that ‘in various assemblies held 
in the neighbourhoods of Barcelona it has been agreed that, prior to handing over 
weapons for the front, the armed bodies responsible to the government should be 
disarmed first’.144 Diego Camacho would later recall a manifesto of Barcelona defence 
committees that declared: ‘The defence groups will not lay down their arms while the 
problem of political power is unresolved and there is an armed force that obeys the 
Madrid government and isn’t under workers’ control.’145  
This assertion of the right of revolutionaries to bear arms was an appeal to 
revolutionary legitimacy as opposed to Republican legality that had as its basis the 
ongoing revolutionary situation in Spain.146 Even at this early stage, however, the 
adoption by anarchists of positions that were outside and against the state would be 
treated by the comités superiores as a breach of internal discipline. At a further meeting 
of the comités superiores on 5 September, in response to the continued autonomy of 
action of the defence committees, the then Regional Secretary of the Catalan CNT, 
Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez, and Marcos Alcón Selma, a member of the Nosotros 
group, insisted that the committees were responsible to the CNT and the FAI and that 
members should raise any concerns with their respective unions.147 Union democracy 
had been severely curtailed by the conditions of war, however, and the political culture 
of workplaces had been diluted by the obligatory unionisation of the Catalan workforce 
and the departure of seasoned activists for the front or for official positions.148 In such 
circumstances, it was inevitable that the defence committees would continue to provide 
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both a meeting point for disaffected voluntarists and purists in Barcelona, and a network 
through which the armed defence of the revolution could be effected. The fact that the 
defence committees were, a month after 19 July, represented by delegates in conflict 
with the collaborative policies of the comités superiores, further reinforces the 
interpretation offered above as to the existence of a core and a wider network of defence 
committees that was mediated by radicals whose obedience could not be relied upon. 
Once the pre-war Regional Defence Committee had dissolved in order to take up 
positions either at the front or in the CCMA, new defence committee representatives 
were chosen from amongst these radicals who swiftly came into conflict with their 
predecessors. 
In September, an affinity group was formed among JJLL members in the 
Barcelona suburb of Gràcia who also belonged to their local defence committees. 
Named Los Quijotes del Ideal, the group was set up to reaffirm the essential principles 
of anarchism in opposition to what was seen as the degeneration of the CNT and the 
FAI, to which latter organisation it did not affiliate.149 It can therefore be perceived that 
the combative approach adopted by the activist delegates at the heart of the defence 
committees was echoed at their youthful, purist periphery. That veteran purists were 
also among the dissenters became clear in December, when the municipal 
reorganisation begun in autumn made its delayed appearance in Aragón. The Regional 
Defence Council of Aragón had been formed at a plenum of the CNT in Bujaraloz on 6 
October, and was dominated by libertarians under the presidency of Joaquín Ascaso, 
cousin of Francisco.150 The reorganised Council, the make-up of which was announced 
on 21 December with the blessing of the central government, contained seven CNT 
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affiliates, and two members each of the Left Republicans, the UGT and the Communist 
Party. A fifteenth member, Benito Pavón, was a member of the Partido Sindicalista and 
had been a long-standing member of the CNT.151 This reorganisation prompted the 
resignation of José Alberola, a veteran of the struggle against the republican alliance of 
1931. In a speech in Lleida in March 1937, he gave an indication of his reasoning:  
… if the vanguard retreat, those who are less advanced will justify their 
own retreat with that of the most advanced and no one will remain in 
their place. The anarchist will accept the world of politics to share in it 
with the bourgeoisie and authoritarians; the socialist will become a 
republican and the republican will turn still further to the reaction, which 
is exactly what is happening… A half completed revolution represents a 
set-back.152  
Opposition to state collaboration would grow in coherence over the first months 
of 1937, and the continued contacts between oppositional voluntarists and purists 
through the defence committees would be crucial to the revolutionary mobilisation in 
May of that year. As had occurred during the first years of the Second Republic, the 
revolutionary press played a significant role in establishing a shared platform for both 
voluntarists and purists to express their misgivings about state collaboration. This 
became clear above all following the acceptance of ministries in the government of 
Largo Caballero. The old-guard of the Solidaridad Obrera editorial board had been 
cleared out before this news was announced, but the revolution had allowed new 
publications to be established, or old ones to be revived, and several voiced their 
scepticism at this turn of events. 
The newspaper of the FAI in Valencia, Nosotros, in an article entitled ‘The 
anarchists and the “circumstances”’, declared that, if anarchist principles were not 
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maintained, ‘we will end up not knowing who is an anarchist and who is a 
republican’.153 Línea de Fuego, the mouthpiece of the Iron Column, an anarchist 
division on the front at Teruel, went further: ‘what was always attacked is now to be 
embraced and the very foundations of our beliefs torn up. From now on there is to be no 
more talk of freedom, but of obedience to “our” government instead.’154 Acracia, the 
publication of the CNT-FAI in Lleida, which had, under the stewardship of José Peirats, 
also made clear its opposition to state collaboration, considered the sudden jump from 
the social to the political terrain to be a ‘senseless contradiction’ even from a 
collaborationist perspective, requiring that ‘we split ourselves up in order to form a 
separate body in organisations unsuited to a revolutionary movement’. The workers of 
the CNT, it went on, did not require the distractions of the ‘political’ sphere to carry 
forward the revolution.155 
By December 1936, several of those sacked from Solidaridad Obrera were 
collaborating in Ideas, the newly established weekly mouthpiece of the libertarian 
movement in Baix Llobregat, an area known for its revolutionism and the only Catalan 
locality whose representative (José Xena) had voted against the CNT participating in the 
CCMA.156 The editors of Ideas made it clear that they thought the CNT was making a 
strategic error in subjugating its principles to the war against fascism, considering the 
situation to be uniquely propitious for the organisation to put forward its perspective. 
Nor were punches pulled in regard to the CNT’s anti-fascist allies:  
the politicians, all the Spanish politicians of the so-called left, are as 
responsible as the fascists for the battle that bloodies the Iberian soil, 
because they allowed the fascist movement to organise itself from the 
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ministries, barracks and colonies of Spain… To those, today as 
yesterday, we must say: … The time of Governments has passed; the 
time of politics has passed… the social hour has sounded. You are 
victims of your own errors; you think of nothing other than Power and 
Money.157 
Leaving little doubt as to its position, the front page headline of this first edition read:  
‘Neither Law nor Official Army. Socialisation and the People Armed!’.158 The issues 
this headline raised: obedience to the law, militarisation, socialisation and the 
disarmament of the rearguard, demonstrate that the contributors to Ideas had identified 
the dividing lines that were to prove fundamental to the forming of the revolutionary 
conscience. On the other side of the divide stood, not only the anti-revolutionary bloc, 
but the comités superiores of the CNT.  
Conclusions 
 
It has been argued that the division of the Spanish anarchists into gradualists, 
voluntarists and purists was rendered meaningless by the onset of the civil war. 
Although porous, these categories in fact retained their validity. The libertarian activists 
that backed state collaboration in 1936 formed an alliance that was reminiscent of the 
movement at the moment of the Republic’s declaration in April 1931, and it was 
justified in such terms in a speech by the prominent Asturian anarchist and future mayor 
of Gijón, Avelino Mallada, on 11 September 1936: ‘During the democracy, dictatorship, 
and whenever it was necessary, the anarchists struggled against tyranny. In the years of 
Primo de Rivera… we anarchists stood at the side of the democrats to put an end to that 
shameful episode’.159 The organisational priorities consistently maintained by a 
gradualist such as Peiró were reinforced during the first months of the civil war by the 
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National Secretary of the CNT, Martínez Prieto, while the purist Montseny’s 
‘progressive’ defence of a national, democratic civilisation in August 1936 likewise 
echoed the sentiments she had expressed at the birth of the Republic. Although the most 
prominent voluntarists were more enigmatic, in some respects their role in July echoed 
their activity in Barcelona on 14 April 1931, when CNT activists ensured that Lluís 
Companys was able to occupy the office of the Civil Governor, or in exile prior to the 
Second Republic, when they maintained close relations with Catalan separatists.160 
Having castigated his forebears for missing the opportunity to take on the mantle of 
‘Lenin and Trotsky’ in Spain, García Oliver, at the helm of the Barcelona defence 
committees, acquiesced in the decision of an unconstitutionally assembled Regional 
Plenum to participate in the CCMA and, rather than attempt to gain support for his 
revolutionary position among the wider membership, became one of the most notable 
figures of state collaboration. He thus came to embody the shifting meaning of the 
pejorative use of ‘Bolshevik’ in libertarian circles, from one who advocates the 
impetuous activity of small groups to one who imposes organisational discipline. 
Prior to the civil war, García Oliver had exhorted the movement to take questions 
of organisation and discipline more seriously in the interests of revolutionary 
preparation.161 As a consequence, he was labelled a ‘Bolsheviser’ by José Peirats, while 
Camillo Berneri, an influential Italian anarchist living in Barcelona, warned the Spanish 
movement against falling prey to ‘a species of “libertarian Bolshevism”’.162 The spectre 
of the Russian revolutionary experience haunted the Spanish anarchist movement, and 
from the first days of the civil war Spanish anarchists expressed a determination to 
avoid falling into similar traps. The first edition of Tierra y Libertad to appear after 19 
July declared that: ‘The experience of Russia should inform us to the utmost degree. 
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There our comrades were relegated to a second rank after struggling energetically 
against Tsarist barbarism.’163 Likewise, the fear of repeating the Bolshevik experience 
undoubtedly played on the minds of those activists who had voted against what would 
later be characterised as Xena and García Oliver’s proposal for an anarchist 
‘dictatorship’ at the Plenum of 21 July in Barcelona.164 In late October 1936, Federica 
Montseny declared that: 
The mission of the anarchists, interpreting the desires of the Spanish 
people, has been so energetic and so productive that it is not humanly 
possible for what occurred in Russia to be repeated in Spain. In Russia, 
the anarchists… did not introduce themselves into all aspects of life, and 
found themselves removed from the management of country… That is 
why in Cataluña our task has been to introduce ourselves into all aspects, 
to be involved in everything, and to be present everywhere. In this way, 
even in the world of politics, we have made a Revolution in Spain. There 
has been no transgression of principle, only a little acceptance of what 
History has to teach us.165 
By November, however, Camillo Berneri was using the term ‘bolshevisation’ to 
describe the erosion of the power of the grass-roots activists of the CNT relative to the 
comités superiores.166 Indeed, it was precisely the determination of the Spanish 
libertarian movement to be involved in the direction of all aspects of administrative life 
that left it facing many of the problems that had characterised the bolshevisation of 
Russian Social Democracy. Like the Bolsheviks, the Spanish anarchists 
were forced to transform themselves from rebels into rulers and to 
reshape or construct new local government and administrative bodies. 
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Moreover, they had to do so without having given any concrete thought 
to how they would govern, at the same time that they were obliged to 
furnish personnel for service in new institutions of national government 
and to spread and defend the revolution around the country. These 
burdens led inexorably to the fundamental transformation of the… 
organisation’s composition, structure, method of operation, and 
relationship to its constituencies.167 
As in the case of Russia, the advances of the Spanish revolution in the summer of 
1936 had been predicated on the decomposition of the state and the creation of 
alternative sources of legitimacy and power by armed workers. When those alternatives 
began to be closed down by the reconstituted state, this process could be understood as 
a counter-revolution, even though in both instances the revolutionary organisations were 
involved in this ‘disguised resurrection of the state’ prophesied by Bakunin.168 What 
would complicate matters further in the Spanish case was that the CNT’s apparent allies 
in the project of state collaboration were ambiguous in their relations with the comités 
superiores, and wholly hostile to the organisation’s grassroots activists. As a result, the 
latter were pushed into a two-fold defence of anarchism, on the one hand attempting to 
maintain fidelity to their anti-state traditions, and on the other resisting the attempts of 
rival organisations to side-line the libertarian movement. The extent to which the 
revolutionary conscience was able to defend its positions in this context, and the new 
organisational expressions this opposition gave rise to, is the subject of the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter Two: ‘Socialisation and the People Armed!’ Conscience and Programme, 
January-April 1937 
 
By the end of 1936, a division within the CNT on the basis of attitudes to the state could 
be perceived. On the one hand, many members advocated a defence of the revolution in 
the rear through a socialised economy and armed populace, and at the front through a 
war waged by a voluntary, popular militia. This was summed up in the slogan advanced 
by the publication Ideas: ‘Socialisation and the people armed!’.1 On the other hand, the 
organisation’s comités superiores were now committed to participation in national and 
regional governments of anti-fascist unity, the principal objective of which was to re-
establish the Republican state in order to wage a conventional war. Either side of this 
divide, the decision-making processes employed by the partisans of each tendency were 
at variance. The radical tendency was characterised by assemblies of activists in the 
neighbourhoods, workers in the factories, and combatants at the front. The comités 
superiores, by contrast, made decisions at closed meetings, often in haste and in 
response to urgent situations. Over the winter and early spring of 1937, the parameters 
of this division would become more clearly defined.   
One factor that initially served to obscure the tensions within the libertarian 
movement was an awareness of the threat to libertarian influence posed by the 
increasing coherence and confidence of those organisations that made the fight against 
fascism conditional upon the suppression of the social revolution, in particular the PCE 
and its Catalan sister party, the PSUC. The line of the Comintern, to which these parties 
belonged, was of presenting Spain to Britain and France as a fellow democratic state 
under siege from fascism and requiring their aid. In order to do this, it was imperative to 
downplay, deny or curtail the revolutionary aspect of the Spanish civil war, while 
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attempting to maintain anti-fascist unity.2 In practice, however, these aims proved to be 
mutually exclusive. Early observations from Comintern agents such as André Marty 
stressed the desirability of splitting the CNT between those of its members who 
favoured unity and those who threatened it.3  
The libertarian camp had generally been slow to react to the position the PCE and 
the PSUC had taken on in the summer of 1936. Attempts had been made to ostracise the 
latter party from revolutionary phenomena in certain parts of Cataluña because it was 
regarded as an arriviste organisation without established credentials, not because of its 
political positioning.4 Consequently, the offensive carried out by the PCE and the PSUC 
against the dissident communist POUM was characterised in Solidaridad Obrera as 
relating to ‘personal or party political questions, questions of pride’ rather than 
representing an attack on the revolution’s most vulnerable adherents.5 Even the POUM, 
however, did not initially consider the Communists to be external to its conception of 
‘proletarian’ anti-fascism. For this reason Andreu Nin, the de facto leader of the party in 
this period, considered there to be a working-class majority in the Generalitat.6 
Nevertheless, by the end of 1936, a ‘counterrevolutionary’ threat had become 
apparent to all sectors of the CNT and not only those already sceptical about anti-fascist 
collaboration.7 This counterrevolution was defined in the official press of the Catalan 
CNT in terms of political intrigue, primarily with regard to the ‘provocations’ and 
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‘rumour mongering’ of the Communists in their attempts to sideline the Confederation.8 
The radicals had a broader understanding of the process, a fact that had cost the veteran 
purist Liberto Callejas his job as editor of Solidaridad Obrera, following the publication 
of an editorial that opposed the Decree of Militarisation in terms that struck at the heart 
of the project of state reconstruction: ‘There is a mentality that… of a piece with the 
position it held before 19 July, tends almost involuntarily towards the reconstruction of 
that which existed then but which has since been destroyed by… the revolutionary 
process.’9 The article, which insisted that the process of militarisation must not be 
allowed to undermine the revolutionary character of the war or resurrect a pre-
revolutionary military spirit, prompted the PSUC and the Catalan branch of the UGT to 
send a letter of complaint to both the Regional Committees of the CNT and the FAI, 
precipitating the dismissal of Callejas.10 
Callejas’s understanding of the counterrevolution as a phenomenon of state 
reconstruction rather than organisational rivalry reflected the division of the CNT into 
street-level and high political perspectives. This divergence would be exposed most 
clearly during the May events in Barcelona, when the comités superiores considered the 
revolutionary mobilisation of the libertarian movement to have as its end the mere 
rectification of yet another Communist-inspired ‘provocation’.11 If the widespread 
identification of an external enemy, the ‘counterrevolution’, in the months prior to these 
events served to obscure the differences within the libertarian movement, this chapter 
will demonstrate that it did not prevent the emergence and crystallisation of a radical 
programme defined in opposition to the re-imposition of state power per se. As much 
was made clear at the start of the year by the rationalist teacher Floreal Ocaña in the 
pages of Ideas, the new journalistic home of Liberto Callejas: 
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The ‘fifth column’, formed by all the political parties, has begun its 
attack on the people’s revolution. With typical guile it has increased the 
size of the old organs of state repression in the hope that, as before, they 
will follow the state’s orders… If the political world, which bears the 
blame for the rise of fascism, succeeds in making the people obey laws 
intended to put the brakes on social and economic progress, and swallow 
the double pill of an official army and armed institutions recognised as 
the only forces and organisational forms permitted to struggle at the front 
and…‘conserve revolutionary order in the rear’, then soon, very soon, we 
will see a campaign for those who aren’t enlisted in one or other 
mercenary body to immediately hand over weapons and munitions. And 
after this campaign will come….registers of homes intended to complete 
the disarmament of the proletariat.12  
This bleak perspective, which would prove to be remarkably prescient, was shared 
by other revolutionaries in Spain. Mary Low, a Trotskyist poet from England aiding the 
POUM in Barcelona, described the ebb of the revolution and the linked reassertion of 
militarism, nationalism and traditional gender roles:  
It was in the air… The regiments going down the streets marched in 
perfect formation, one two, one two, the arms swinging chest high and 
the hundreds of feet striking down on the pavement with a single, 
thunderous blow. The Catalan flag was carried automatically with the red 
banners and the black, there were less women mingled among the men 
going to the front, there were no longer dogs and cats following on the 
end of a string, or perched on kit-bags. It was all as it should be, and we 
stood more chance of winning the war perhaps, but meanwhile the 
chance of winning the revolution was growing gradually fainter.13  
In spite of this relative decline, however, the revolution retained a great deal of 
resources and potential. Across Republican Spain, over one and a half million workers 
and peasants began the year participating in the revolutionary experiment of 
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collectivisation.14 It was, after all, as late as December 1936 that George Orwell arrived 
in Barcelona and described it as a place where ‘the working class was in the saddle’.15 
Furthermore, following the heroic defence of Madrid, sufficient optimism remained as 
to the course of the war for the branches of the libertarian movement to advance policies 
that went beyond the merely defensive or reactive.  
Detectable in this period was an increasing restlessness amongst radicals who did 
not accept the ‘circumstantial’ arguments of the comités superiores and were 
unprepared to be swept along by the tide of events. This led ‘the little Jacobin’ Severino 
Campos, an activist in the Catalan FAI and regular contributor to Ideas, to predict that 
‘the day is soon coming when we will break free from the statist and centralist 
asphyxiation’.16 A change of course was also foreseen by the editorial board of Acracia 
in an overview of the movement published at the outset of 1937: 
Anarchism, in spite of ministerial collaboration, has not betrayed itself, 
which is not to say that the ministers and councillors are behaving like 
anarchists, but rather that not all anarchism is ministerial and nor does it 
make a dogma out of the facts as they stand. There are many of us who 
have remained faithful to the most rigorous anti-statism… We anticipate, 
therefore, a brilliant Confederal and anarchist resurgence… that will 
return to the agreements taken and rectify abuses… The revolution will 
not be strangled with the complicity of its most enthusiastic champions. 
Let us react for the good of everyone. For a humanity without classes 
and a society of free producers.17 
The stage was thus set for an alliance of voluntarists and purists that would seek to alter 
the collaborationist course of the libertarian organisations, as had occurred in the first 
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bienio of the Second Republic, while simultaneously attempting to deepen and extend 
the revolutionary process. As we will see in this chapter, however, this initiative would 
be complicated by the disastrous loss of Málaga, the increasing violence of state 
reconstruction, and the widening gap between the grassroots activists and the comités 
superiores, leading radicals to consider a return to the barricades the only remaining 
option for the salvation of the Spanish revolution.   
The anarchist programme and state reconstruction 
 
As intimated in the above citation from Ocaña, the successful reconstitution of the 
Republican state depended on the governing authorities establishing a monopoly of 
violence at the front and at the rear. Opposed to this, the slogan of ‘the people armed’ 
lost ground to campaigns urging the sending of weapons to the front and the 
establishment of a mando único (single command) to oversee the war effort. What were 
understood to be the implications of a mando único varied from the increased cohesion 
and internal coordination of the militia system with its high proportion of voluntary, 
democratic units controlled by political or union organisations, to the creation of a new 
Republican army based on traditional military hierarchies and discipline. In Málaga, for 
example, the Regional Committee of the CNT called for a mando único to be 
established on the basis of a Provincial Council of Unified Militia.18 Nevertheless, the 
insistent propagation of the mando único as a campaigning slogan by Communist and 
republican parties was, as Juan Andrade, an activist of the POUM, noted in the party 
newspaper La Batalla, intended to suggest that ‘there are some on the left of 
“antifascism” who oppose general mobilisation and unity of command…they 
[Communists and republicans] are making an error, if it is not a conscious manoeuvre 
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on their part’.19 We might surmise that ‘mando único’ was being used euphemistically 
by the proponents of militarisation to hasten the return of those aspects of soldiery that 
this ‘left of antifascism’ did oppose: martial discipline, military rank and the loss of 
political and revolutionary characteristics.   
The possibility that a voice as influential as that of Durruti could be added to 
those opposing militarisation had been extinguished by a bullet on the Madrid front in 
November 1936. Until that point, the Durruti Column had resisted militarisation.20 
Although Durruti had not openly used his influence to defy the CNT, and had 
reluctantly taken a squad of militia with him from the Aragón front to join the defence 
of Madrid at the behest of the organisation, a speech he had made before his departure, 
delivered on the radio and transmitted across loudspeakers in Barcelona, had indicated 
the widespread unease felt at the front with regard to the compromises made in the 
rear.21 After his death, his legacy was to become a battleground, symbolised by the 
slogan ‘We renounce everything except victory’, a phrase falsely attributed to him by 
anti-fascist allies that would soon be employed by the comités superiores of the 
libertarian organisations.22 Former members of his Column, meanwhile, recalled 
Durruti having stated that militarisation would be rejected regardless of decisions made 
in the rearguard.23 Suspecting that their commander had been murdered, either by 
Communists or even by his eventual replacement, the former military officer José 
Manzana, the reluctance of the Durruti Column in Madrid to reincorporate into the front 
became a cause of severe embarrassment to the comités superiores of the CNT.24  
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The position of those resisting militarisation was much weakened by the fall of 
Málaga in February. Hombres Libres, the newspaper connected to the Maroto Column 
in the province of Granada, had continued to affirm in January that the revolution and 
the war were inseparable.25 However, once Málaga had fallen, its defenders starved of 
ammunition and support by the central government, the Maroto Column agreed to 
militarisation at a general assembly.26 Miguel García, a Catalan militia volunteer and 
CNT member who had joined the front at Madrid, recalled that anarchists ‘let 
themselves be persuaded into accepting the inevitable for the sake of the promised 
arms’.27 González Inestal, the man who had been charged with imposing militarisation 
on anarchist columns by Martínez Prieto, told more recalcitrant militia that they would 
be unable to count on organisational support in requesting arms and ammunition if the 
decision of the CNT to accept militarisation was not respected.28 
 On 5 February, a plenum of anarchist and Confederal columns took place in 
Valencia.29 It had been called by the Iron Column, in operation on the front at Teruel, in 
consultation with  the Maroto Column, which was unable to send delegates because of 
the advance of the mutinous army on Málaga. The reasons given for the calling of the 
plenum were, firstly, that the ‘enormous quantity’ of decisions made in the rearguard 
had taken place without consulting the militia columns, and secondly, that those in the 
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rear had seemingly forgotten ‘the revolutionary meaning of the moment’.30 As if to 
confirm the timeliness of this assembly, at a Regional Plenum of the Catalan CNT the 
previous day, delegates from Baix Llobregat and Cardona affirmed that militarisation 
‘annuls the revolutionary organisation’, while the suggestion of the delegate from 
Badalona that representatives from the militia columns be granted representation at 
National Plenums of the CNT was rejected by the Regional Committee.31  
While several attendees stressed the ‘historic’ or ‘transcendental’ nature of the 
gathering of militia, the representative of the National Committee of the CNT made 
plain his irritation at the manner in which the plenum had been called and denied its 
authority. He reported, furthermore, that Largo Caballero had personally informed him 
that ‘the arms of the state will be given to the forces of the state… if [the militia] do not 
want to enter into [the state] then their organisations can supply them with arms’.32 It 
was clear therefore, that the price paid for military supplies would be an acceptance of 
state authority. The alternative, as was swiftly becoming clear, was abandonment by 
both the General Command and the libertarian organisations. The continued viability of 
columns operating in accordance with anarchist principles at the front depended on the 
persistence of the revolutionary interregnum in the rear. In the case of the Iron Column, 
its attempt to rely on the resources of this revolution came under sustained attack from 
the forces of the state in the first months of 1937. A small socialised factory in Burriana 
that supplied the column with munitions was subject to an attempted occupation by 
Assault Guards that was only averted on the intervention of armed militia and the 
negotiation of the CNT’s National Committee.33 Then, on 8 March the occupation of a 
workers’ centre in Vinalesa by Assault Guards prompted clashes that led to the 
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occupation of the district by government forces and the arrest and imprisonment of two 
hundred libertarians, including ninety-two members of the Iron Column.34   
On 21 March, the Iron Column finally agreed to militarisation at an assembly.35 
The previous month, the similarly recalcitrant combatants in the del Rosal column had 
been loaded onto trucks and taken from the front line to Cuenca, where a representative 
of the National Committee informed them that they would be expelled from the 
organisation if they failed to militarise.36 Following militarisation, the meaning of ‘the 
people armed’ could only have revolutionary significance in the rearguard, where many 
activists, male and female, continued to bear arms. In the first half of 1937, these 
activists would be joined by a steady stream of combatants leaving the front. By far the 
most significant group to abandon the lines en masse was that from the Gelsa section of 
the Durruti Column, of which eight hundred members returned to Barcelona with arms 
in hand in February. While militarisation had settled the question of the monopoly of 
violence at the front in favour of the state, in the rear, and particularly in Cataluña, it 
remained open to contestation. There the police forces, the Assault Guards and the 
National Republican Guards, jostled for hegemony with the Patrullas de Control. 
Although initially intended to comprise affiliates from all of the anti-fascist 
organisations, the Patrullas were in effect controlled by the CNT, and in some cases 
were answerable to the local defence committee.37 Those same committees pressured 
anarchists to overcome their reluctance to enlist in a body which had the appearance of 
a police force, challenging militants who complained of abuses to join in order to 
safeguard the ‘revolutionary morality’ according to which the Patrullas were to 
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operate.38 Early in 1937, however, the Patrullas would become a target of the 
propaganda and law-making of the republican and Communist parties, particularly in 
the wake of the much publicised events in La Fatarella in January. La Fatarella was an 
agricultural town in Cataluña, where an attempt to form a collective by a minority of its 
inhabitants, affiliated to the CNT, led to the crystallisation of an anti-collectivisation 
bloc composed of the PSUC, the ERC, the UGT and the Unió de Rabassaires. Growing 
tension in the town led to a bloody showdown between some of its anti-revolutionary 
inhabitants and the Patrullas de Control sent from Barcelona, resulting in tens of 
deaths, mostly of townspeople.39 The uprising of La Fatarella was represented by the 
libertarian organisations as the work of the ‘fifth column’ but was defended by the anti-
revolutionary bloc as an expression of legitimate grievances.40 The UGT subsequently 
withdrew its members from the Patrullas de Control and in February the PSUC 
organised a protest, in which the official police bodies participated, calling for their 
dissolution.41 In spite of decrees issued in March and April, the Generalitat did not 
succeed in dissolving the Patrullas de Control, many of whose members in this period 
appear to have responded directly to the orders of their local defence committee.42 
Jaime Balius wrote in La Noche of the necessity of maintaining the Patrullas de 
Control as a guarantee of the revolution that would not be subject to or incorporated 
into the traditional forces of public order: 
It must not be the Patrullas de Control that mix in with the uniformed 
bodies, but rather the members of the institutions of the old regime who, 
after a rigorous selection process, should then form part of the Patrullas 
                                                 
38 Casanovas, ‘La Guerra Civil a Barcelona’, pp. 56-7. 
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civil’, Estudis D’Historia Agrària, 17 (2004), 659-74. 
40 The CNT’s version of events was given in Solidaridad Obrera, 26 January 1937. Two days later 
Acracia also described the events as a ‘fascist’ uprising, and stated that the presence of fascists in ‘left’ 
organisations was due to the ‘unscrupulous’ way in which certain organisations had attempted to increase 
their memberships: Acracia, 28 January 1937.  
41 Chris Ealham, ‘Una revolución a medias: los orígenes de los hechos de mayo y la crisis del 
anarquismo’, Viento Sur, 93 (2007), 93-101 (p. 97).  
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de Control, and it must be our comrades of the workers’ organisations 
that control absolutely everything pertaining to public order.43 
At issue was one of the questions considered fundamental to a classical understanding 
of the state as ‘a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of 
legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence’.44 In the Catalan rearguard in this 
period, as Balius’s article makes clear, a power struggle was underway between those 
who claimed their legitimacy from legality and those whose claim to violence was 
based on the revolution of July 1936. Who dominated whom had yet to be decided, but 
Balius was not alone in linking this question to his concern that the revolution had not 
gone far enough. In this respect, the economic question was as significant as that of 
public order, and the relevance of one to the other would be made explicit in this period. 
A recognition that the libertarian organisations had allowed the direction of the 
economy to escape their control following the first burst of revolutionary activity in the 
summer had, by the end of 1936, become general within the libertarian movement. This 
resulted in the socialisation campaign that, in the first half of 1937, became crucial to 
the question of whether the revolution, or the project of state reconstruction, would 
triumph. The campaign would also reveal fault-lines within the libertarian movement, 
with the comités superiores understanding socialisation to imply union control of the 
economy, while radical sectors defined it as a complete transformation in the relations 
of production leading to ‘a community of free producers’.45   
On 30 December 1936, an editorial in Solidaridad Obrera declared the intention 
of the CNT to ‘prepare the intervention of the unions in the highest direction of 
production and of the economy in general’, retrospectively suggesting that its initial 
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cited in Antoni Castells Duran, El proceso estatizador en la experiencia colectivista catalana (1936-
1939) (Madrid: Nossa y Jara Editores, 1996), pp. 29-30. 
77 
 
acceptance of a system of partial collectivisations in which union control was not, in the 
main, assured, had been intended as a ‘transitional solution’.46 Dissatisfaction regarding 
the collectivisations as they had functioned hitherto stemmed from several factors. The 
existence of variables in prices within the same industry suggested that collectives in 
both the town and country were operating in competition with each other and not 
according to the needs of society at large.47 Furthermore, in some cases militants felt 
that the effect of the committees set up to administer collectivised factories was that one 
boss had been replaced with five.48 For radical anarchists, the collectivisations fell short 
of their revolutionary aspirations. Severino Campos lamented in the first issue of Ideas 
that:  
While the revolution has begun its rapid march, its constructive phase 
has not yielded the kind of results on the economic terrain that could 
satisfy the broad conceptions of anarchism… nevertheless we must not 
hold ourselves back nor take… collectivism as a model of the social 
future… the collectivisations cannot continue in the manner in which 
they have been interpreted and practised until now. It is necessary to 
think of something that will guarantee bread and work for all, while at 
the same time suppress the exorbitant wages of those who contribute the 
least work.49  
On 6 December, the first Regional Plenum of the FAI to be held in Cataluña since July 
had called for the socialisation of production and distribution, ‘avoiding the partial 
collectivisation of enterprises, which represents a complete negation of the spirit of 
socialisation’.50 In early January, a plenum of Catalan peasants affiliated to the CNT 
was held, at which the continued malign influence of the middle man was denounced by 
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delegates, that of Pi de Llobregat declaring that ‘until such a time as there may be an 
across-the-board socialisation of wealth it will necessarily be very difficult to attain the 
end in view’.51  
For the comités superiores, there were further potential advantages to the 
campaign. Its initiation enabled a return to the question of federations of industry, a 
reorganisation of the CNT’s structure that had been debated at the Madrid Congress of 
1931.52 Using the argument that the CNT as it stood would be unable to implement 
socialisation, long-time advocates of the federations of industry, such as Joan Peiró, 
attempted to persuade those sectors of the CNT that had obstructed their 
implementation for five years that the unions should be reorganised, with the 
concomitant increase in bureaucracy and centralisation this implied.53 The weekly 
publication of the FAI, Tierra y Libertad, dedicated double page spreads of consecutive 
issues to explaining the need for both socialisation and federations of industry and how 
they would function.54 On 7 January, Fidel Miró, Secretary of the JJLL in Cataluña, 
published an article in Ruta, the mouthpiece of that organisation, which also stressed the 
revolutionary import of socialisation and the need for it to be preceded by the 
organisation of federations of industry.55  
Socialisation also appealed to the more radical sectors of the CNT, and in this 
sense, the campaign had the potential to unify the organisation. From the perspective of 
the comités superiores, an increase in union control over the economy might have 
mitigated the CNT’s decreasing influence at the level of state administration, while 
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socialisation may also have been viewed as an opportunity to bring the union’s own 
affiliates into line. Problematic in this regard was that the radical sectors of the 
libertarian organisations did not consider the socialisation campaign as a question of 
internal discipline. Nor did they view it in the staid and unromantic terms of Peiró, who 
declared that:  
Socialisation and nationalisation is, in essence, the same thing. 
Socialisation loses part of its virtues if it is the state that carries it out. It 
conserves all of them… when its enactor is the anti-state, specifically, 
the union. For this reason it is necessary that the required reaction is 
produced among Confederal affiliates, and the superstructure of the 
industrial unions and the creation of the National Federations is 
proceeded to rapidly…56 
By tapping into the mood of the movement’s radical sectors, the campaign risked 
measures being taken before the new union structures could be implemented, and an 
initiative which had been expected to shore up the internal cohesion of the CNT 
threatened to produce a quite different outcome.  
Radicals in L’Hospitalet de Llobregat had already undertaken, under the auspices 
of the socialised supplies industry, the expropriation of two cooperatives on Christmas 
Day 1936, which had resulted in the resignation of the ERC and the UGT 
representatives from the municipal council.57 In January, the local CNT took steps to 
socialise the entire economy of the town.58 There, socialisation was to be controlled, not 
by national federations, but by a regional General Council of the Economy, in line with 
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proposals sketched out by José Xena.59 The radicals read this development in a 
maximalist light:  
We give this idea to the comrades of other localities so that, if they are 
not afraid of being labelled extremists, they put it into practice and 
facilitate the creation of the General Regional Economic Council, the 
basis for bringing to a happy conclusion the free commune within a 
Federation of the Free Peoples of Iberia.60 
For the CNT in Lleida, socialisation likewise implied that ‘everything pertaining to the 
life of the town should be controlled and administered by the collective as a whole’.61 
Furthermore, radicals expanded on their conception of socialisation to incorporate calls 
for the strict observance of ‘union federalism’ and a critique of governmental 
collaboration.62  
In Aragón, a Congress took place in Caspe in February, where four hundred and 
fifty-six delegates representing two hundred and seventy-five collectives agreed to the 
creation of a Regional Federation of Agrarian Collectives in order to improve co-
ordination among themselves.63 While this rationalisation of the gains of the revolution 
was unanimously agreed to, the Congress also revealed tensions between the delegates 
in attendance and the comités superiores. When the delegate of the Regional Committee 
of the CNT suggested that Adolfo Arnal Gracia, a CNT member and Councillor of 
Agriculture in the Regional Defence Council of Aragón, act as an advisor in the 
drawing up of the functions of the new Federation, the delegate of Alcorisa declared 
that ‘there can be no place whatsoever for political meddling at this Congress’, while 
that of Binéfar alleged that the Council of Agriculture behaved in a counter-
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revolutionary manner.64 The assembled delegates were subsequently lectured to by a 
representative from the National Committee: 
…when it was only ourselves who were making the revolution we were 
able to mount an immovable defence of the ideas that we carry in the 
deepest recesses of our hearts; if the current revolution was ours alone, 
that of the CNT, the one we want, then we would consider refusing to 
compromise on any issue… Remember that not everywhere is like 
Aragón. Here, fortunately, you form an undeniable majority, but in the 
provinces of Cuenca, Murcia, Albacete and some others the Confederal 
organisation has barely any representatives; that is why it is necessary 
that in those places where we are the greater force… we compromise 
somewhat in our aspirations. All I am trying to remind you of is that it 
was you yourselves, in your unions, who conferred on your Regional 
Committees the mandate and the agreement to constitute municipal 
councils and, without realising it, you are wrecking your own 
agreements.65 
Nevertheless, the uncompromising mood of the delegates to the Congress was reflected 
in the election of José Mavilla, the man Arnal had replaced as Councillor of Agriculture 
in the Regional Defence Council, as Secretary of the newly established Regional 
Federation of Collectives.66 
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It has been suggested that the comités superiores did not, in fact, envisage the 
war-time implantation of socialisation, but were desirous of preparing the union for a 
leading role in post-civil war economic reconstruction while, in the meantime, 
conceding ultimate control of industry to the state.67 If this was the case, the campaign 
for socialisation must be understood to have ultimately undermined as much as 
promoted libertarian unity, as radical sectors, mobilised by this objective, would come 
into conflict, not only with reluctant colleagues and open opponents of the revolutionary 
process, but also the leadership of their own organisations.68 While radicals saw 
socialisation as emanating from the base of the workers’ organisations, resulting in a 
marginalisation of the ‘political’ sphere, the comités superiores of the CNT saw the 
problem as fundamentally concerned with internal union discipline.69 Viewed from 
either perspective, the possibility that the trade unions could recover a protagonism 
denied them by the reconstituted state depended on the collaboration of the UGT. 
Working class unity on the basis of fidelity to the revolution thus became a priority for 
many radical anarchists in this period. As we shall see in the following subsection, 
however, this question also had the potential to destabilise the alliance of voluntarist 
and purist radicals brought together by a shared maximalist interpretation of 
socialisation.  
‘Let us unite!’: Unity beyond ‘generic anti-fascism’? 
 
As we have seen, anti-fascist unity was the foundational principle of state reconstruction 
in Republican Spain. Over the summer of 1936, active participants in this process made 
frequent reference to the revolution. By 1937, however, it was far from clear whether 
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anti-fascist unity necessarily contained any revolutionary component at all. Among 
radicals, for whom the question of unity was meaningful only insofar as it was linked to 
fidelity to the revolutionary process, it was admitted that: ‘The sacred commonplace of 
unity has begun to make us suspicious’.70 Juan Andrade of the POUM likewise declared 
in La Batalla on 9 December 1936 that: ‘Generic anti-fascism conceals political 
confusion’.71 In clarifying the terms of revolutionary unity, radicals would establish the 
unsustainability of ‘generic anti-fascism’ in the absence of consensus over issues such 
as public order and socialisation, and attempt to win over grass-roots members of rival 
organisations so that these questions could be settled in the radicals’ favour. 
Unity between the two Spanish labour unions was trumpeted on the pages of 
Ideas in spite of the fact that the opposition of the UGT was a serious stumbling block 
to socialisation in Cataluña. For the editorial board, it was an article of faith that the 
unions were the guarantee of the proletarian character of the revolution.72 The time of 
‘politics’ having passed, the question of how social life was to be organised had become 
a function of the economy, where the primacy of the unions would be assured through 
socialisation and the unity of the CNT and the UGT. CNT propagandists evidently 
believed that the UGT base was more radical than its leadership, and complaints in 
Solidaridad Obrera about the lack of democratic procedure at the Congress of Catalan 
Land Workers reflected unease that those in charge of the UGT would be able to sway 
its affiliates from their revolutionary aspirations.73 The paper returned to the theme in 
April: ‘The workers must prevent, for the good of the revolution and the triumph of the 
people in arms over the invading armies, anyone from interfering [in their affairs]… in 
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the manner of the comrades who currently lead, in the autonomous region, the union 
organisation of the UGT’.74 
This interpretation implicitly, and somewhat ingenuously, denied that the growth 
of the UGT in Cataluña since the beginning of the war had anything to do with its 
opposition to revolutionary measures. However, since the introduction of compulsory 
union membership in Cataluña in August 1936, the UGT had established a foothold in 
industries where the union had, prior to July, no serious implantation. Obligatory 
unionisation was considered a ‘barbarity’ and a ‘crime’ by Jacinto Borras, who had been 
on the editorial board of Solidaridad Obrera at the outset of the war, a sentiment that 
was widely shared in the Catalan libertarian movement.75 By forcing non-revolutionary 
workers to join a union, the policy not only served to increase the membership of the 
UGT, but also provided those sectors of the workforce most opposed to the 
revolutionary aspirations of the CNT membership with an organisational base from 
which to obstruct them. Far from heralding the proletarian moment, therefore, the rise of 
the UGT in Cataluña was based on a reassertion of ‘petit-bourgeois’ privileges against 
the levelling aspirations of the local CNT unions. Baix Llobregat, a traditional 
stronghold of radical Spanish anarchism, even hosted a PSUC mayor by November 
1936, in the town of Molins de Llobregat, where conflicts had centred on the forced 
collectivisation of small businesses and the union take-over of cellars and woods.76 In 
the Catalan countryside, the UGT operated according to a similar logic, displaying a 
banner at the aforementioned Congress of Catalan Land Workers which read: ‘Less 
experiments in collectivisation, more produce’, the insincerity and intended effect of 
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which were denounced in Solidaridad Obrera.77 Catalan peasants affiliated to the CNT 
complained that former landlords had joined the UGT, while the outright opposition of 
the latter to further collectivisation in the countryside had the effect of driving a wedge 
between the CNT and the Unió de Rabassaires.78 The Socialist union also opposed 
collectivisation in parts of Aragón, where the regions in which the UGT had 
outnumbered the anarcho-syndicalist organisation prior to the civil war had fallen to the 
rebels.79 
Reactions to the activity of the UGT among many Spanish anarchists were notable 
for their confusion and naivety. In a speech of March 1937, José Alberola, the radical 
former member of the Regional Defence Council of Aragón, wondered why the UGT 
should oppose collectivisation, when this form of organisation corresponded to the 
‘gradualism’ of the Socialists, in contrast to the conceptions of the anarchists, for whom 
the collectives were a compromise.80 In an article regarding the affiliation to the UGT in 
Lleida of the Gremis i Entitats de Petits Comerciants i Industrials (Associations and 
Bodies of Small Traders and Industrialists - GEPCI), Acracia declared that: ‘The 
workers of the UGT must demand the immediate expulsion of that organisation 
which… wants to hold back the movement initiated on 19 July’.81 Solidaridad Obrera 
likewise commented on its front page that ‘it would be timely if these “representatives 
of the proletariat” that speak so much of the interests of the petite-bourgeoisie, would 
think a little more about the interests of the workers’.82 Such a ‘timely’ change of 
course, however, would have been improbable given that, as an article in Mujeres 
Libres put it, ‘the petite-bourgeoisie, forced to join a union… chose the lesser evil’ 
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between the revolutionary CNT and ‘reformist’ UGT, and that the PSUC controlled the 
Catalan UGT to such an extent that the latter had become estranged from its national 
leadership.83 An indication that as much was understood by the mid-level union 
delegates of the CNT is given by the minutes of a plenum of Barcelona unions held on 
23 January 1937. There it was widely accepted that an ideological gulf existed between 
the CNT and the UGT and that only radical measures, ranging from mass assemblies of 
workers to the expulsion of politicians from the Socialist union, could bring about an 
understanding between the organisations. The existing liaison committee between the 
CNT and the UGT was strongly criticised, and the health workers’ delegate even 
contemplated the possibility of an armed showdown between the unions on the streets.84 
Even in areas where Communist influence within the UGT was not so marked, the 
prospects for joint union initiatives were not great. On 12 February, after the fall of 
Málaga, the UGT National Executive issued a manifesto stating that ‘everything done in 
the rearguard to establish social methods and administration regarding the future of our 
economy, must today be completely suspended’.85 By contrast, military disaster 
produced a radicalising effect among anarchists. For Lucía Sánchez Saornil, one of the 
founders of Mujeres Libres, the fall of Málaga represented the failure of bourgeois 
democracy on a domestic and global level: ‘And yet still they talk in Spain of 
democracy, and in its name they attempt to betray and subjugate us. No; the image of 
Málaga sacrificed digs into our hearts with nails of fire. Democracy, no; social 
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revolution!’.86 An editorial in Ideas was similarly uncompromising: ‘Málaga is the 
victim of the policy of depriving the non-political anti-fascist fronts of the elements 
necessary for their defence. We must react in time; we must strengthen the 
revolutionary spirit that all political parties, without exception, deaden and divert.’87 In 
Asturias, where the experience of October 1934 had made cooperation between 
Socialists and anarchists easier to achieve, conflict arose over the re-introduction of 
small businesses in Gijón, the freedom of which both Socialists and Communists 
wished to protect.88 Opposition to the restoration of elements of capitalism led to the 
jailing of some two dozen members of the CNT supplies union. The CNT members of 
the Council of Asturias had them released almost immediately after visiting the home of 
the Civil Governor, where the anarchist baker and union activist, Ramón Álvarez 
Palomo, alleged that:  
You want to return to the enemy, whether he is fascist or not… what you 
call his interests, but we do not want to give the working class the idea 
that they are fighting for the bourgeoisie… for now all aspirations have 
to be kept intact.89  
The contention that the war-time sacrifices demanded of the working class could only 
be guaranteed by acknowledging the validity of revolutionary aspirations was made 
frequently at this time. In an editorial linking the war to the question of socialisation, 
Tierra y Libertad declared that: ‘A popular army can only be victorious if it fights for a 
revolutionary ideal, which is the expression of the hopes of the proletarian masses to be 
free from capitalist exploitation.’90 Attempts to unify the workers’ organisations on this 
basis were fraught with difficulty, however. 
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This was made explicit in the case of the youth organisations when initial attempts 
to form an Alianza Juvenil Antifascista (Anti-fascist Youth Alliance - AJA) stalled over 
the question of whether the POUM’s youth wing, the Juventud Comunista Ibérica 
(Iberian Communist Youth – JCI), could be included.91 Fiercely opposed to this, the 
Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas (Unified Socialist Youth – JSU) was nevertheless 
insistent on admitting Catholic youth organisations into an anti-fascist umbrella 
organisation.92 This was unacceptable to the libertarian youth, and an alternative unity 
platform of explicitly revolutionary anti-fascism was thus practically foisted upon the 
FIJL and JCI.93 This gained momentum in the early part of 1937 and threatened to have 
serious implications, not least because it acted as a pole of attraction to a disaffected left 
wing of the JSU.94 This led to the rare if not quite unprecedented phenomenon of 
anarchists appealing to the Socialist youth on the basis of the shared commitment which 
both libertarians and ‘authentic’ Marxists had to revolution, a commitment rejected by 
the JSU leadership. The speech of a leading member of the JSU, Santiago Carrillo, was 
criticised in Solidaridad Obrera as ‘reformist hot air’. The article went on to address the 
organisation’s members:  
If the JSU are not socialists, communists or Marxists, what are they? The 
only thing to be seen with clarity in all of this is the desire to return… to 
the good times of the ‘Republic of workers of all classes’. And this, 
socialist comrades, cannot be tolerated, must not be tolerated.95  
Relations between the FIJL and the JCI during the civil war were, on the other 
hand, generally cordial. Alfredo Martínez, a senior figure within the JJLL and assistant 
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to the organisation’s secretary, Fidel Miró, spoke at a POUM rally in December, while 
even anarchist purists such as Diego Camacho of the Los Quijotes del Ideal affinity 
group respected the integrity of individual POUM militants.96 Martínez and Miró were 
considered suspect by the purist ‘redskins’ within the JJLL for their apparent 
‘reformism’ and adhesion to the ‘circumstantialist’ line of the parent organisations.97 
Nevertheless, the solidarity displayed with the POUM as the campaign against the 
dissident communists gained momentum, combined with a refusal to relegate the 
revolution to the requirements of war, suggest that this characterisation lacks nuance. 
As early as November 1936, Ruta, then under Miró’s editorship, declared that ‘if that 
unity serves only to defend the democracy in ruins or to bolster the Republic, it does not 
interest us in the least’.98 In February 1937, a National Plenum of the FIJL made the 
unity of anti-fascist youth conditional upon support for the revolution then underway. 
The JSU’s bluff had been called, and the organisation refused to participate in the mass 
rally held by the JCI and JJLL that took place on 14 February in Barcelona on the 
initiative of the latter organisation. On 19 February, a pact establishing the tenets of the 
Frente de la Juventud Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Youth Front – FJR) in Cataluña 
was signed by representatives of the JJLL, the JCI, the youth sections of Mujeres Libres 
and the Partido Sindicalista, along with various student organisations. 
The first article of the pact recognised the revolution then underway in Spain and 
declared the mission of the FJR to be that of making both revolution and war. The pact 
also called for greater unity between the unions, the proportional representation of 
revolutionary forces in positions of leadership, a purge of the bureaucracy, and an army 
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that faithfully reflected the ‘revolutionary aspirations of the combatants’. It also 
affirmed its support for the socialisation of industry and land, while allowing for 
smallholders who did not employ labour to remain outside of collectives.99 While it 
stopped some way short of advocating a withdrawal of revolutionaries from 
government, the FJR thus aligned itself with those sectors of the Spanish revolutionary 
movement that saw the greater co-operation, influence and initiative of the unions as a 
potentially key factor in rolling back the advancing counter-revolution. As such, the 
bases of the FJR were a challenge to the JSU and, by extension, to anti-fascist unity as it 
was then constituted in the governing bodies of Republican Spain. By 1 March, the 
Catalan JJLL were reporting to the Peninsular Committee of the FIJL that the FJR had 
40,000 members, and on 18 March it was reported that the founding of the FJR in the 
Levante region was imminent.100  
In the manifesto that accompanied the pact emphasis was placed on the 
importance of prioritising action over doctrinal disputes.101 This was undoubtedly 
resented by those purist anarchists who believed that the JJLL should focus on 
propagandistic and educational work, leaving aside the ‘politics’ of alliances. In Ideas, 
Amador Franco, pseudonym of Diego Franco Cazorla, a leading member of the Catalan 
JJLL, the Federación Estudiantil de Conciencias Libres (Student Federation of Free 
Thinkers - FECL) and of the Irreductibles affinity group alongside José Peirats, 
sounded a note of scepticism:  
I have always considered the tendency towards alliances and the 
obligation to ‘fraternise’… a fatalist imposition… I consider unity, as far 
as the youth is concerned, to be something that does not require pacts or 
signatures… The Libertarian Youth is the hope for our idea and its 
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practice if we know how to keep ourselves outside of useless pacts and 
continue our empowering labour.102  
In April 1937 a Regional Congress of the Catalan JJLL representing over 35,000 
affiliates at the front and in the rear revealed a strong purist current urging that the 
organisation should proceed ‘as before 19 July’, focusing on propaganda and 
education.103 Fidel Miró had to survive a vote of confidence as Regional Secretary 
while objections were raised with regard to participation in the FJR. In spite of such 
misgivings, the position of the Regional Committee was ratified. Even the FECL, a 
student body affiliated to the FIJL with strong purist associations (the aforementioned 
Amador Franco, along with Vicente Rodríguez García of the Acracia editorial board 
and the anti-collaborationist Ada Martí were all prominent members) was a signatory of 
the initial pact. 
Meanwhile, radicals in the Catalan CNT greeted the FJR with enthusiasm even as 
its press also provided a platform for its discontents: ‘With an understanding of the 
moment that the “elders” have not displayed’, declared Ideas in a double-page spread,  
‘the Revolutionary Youth has come together to signal what path to take’.104 A joint rally 
of the Catalan FAI and the JJLL was held in Barcelona in April, at which regular 
contributors to Ideas, Severino Campos and José Xena shared a platform with Juan 
Santana Calero and Fidel Miró of the JJLL. The speeches denounced the counter-
revolution and openly identified the PSUC with it.105 Unsurprisingly, the POUM, which 
had taken up more radical positions following its exclusion from the Generalitat and 
practical illegalisation in Madrid, also looked on with interest at the development of 
events in the youth wings.106 In April Juan Andrade advocated the formation of a 
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Workers’ Revolutionary Front that would ‘stop the counter-revolution in its tracks and 
pose the problem of power by means of its own organs: committees of workers, 
peasants and combatants’.107 The possibility that libertarians could take the lead in 
establishing such a revolutionary front was the only hope for a party that lacked the 
numeric power to seize the initiative itself, and which had proved incapable of 
developing a means of influencing either the top or bottom levels of the CNT 
membership during the civil war.108 The Catalan Regional Committee of the CNT 
reported in February that:  
The POUM has been wooing our organisation since its departure from 
the government, to the extent that it has proposed the entrance of whole 
sections into our organisation, something that we have not allowed on 
the understanding that anyone who wishes may come individually, but 
not as a collective.109  
In spite of the reluctance of the comités superiores to associate with the POUM, 
the FIJL and the JCI were able to acknowledge a common, revolutionary, ground that 
was not shared by the Communist Party and its affiliate organisations. This was partly 
because, as Wilebaldo Solano, a leader of the JCI, would recall, they ‘were not 
councillors in the Generalitat… and they had lesser responsibilities’.110 Moreover, to the 
street-based activists of the JCI and the JJLL, the rationale of the Comintern position, 
adopted by the JSU, which was based on high politics and international diplomacy, 
seemed remote and irrelevant.111 In this sense, by adopting such an openly anti-
revolutionary position the JSU overplayed its hand, not only because it was 
unacceptable to the large anarchist youth organisation, but also because it alienated 
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sections of its own membership, thereby contributing to the crisis of anti-fascist unity of 
spring 1937. The FIJL denounced the leadership of the JSU that had held up to ‘public 
ridicule’ the ‘social theories of Marx and Lenin’ and appealed directly to the base, the 
‘truly Marxist and therefore revolutionary’ young Socialists who had suffered the bienio 
negro and fought in Asturias: ‘you cannot accept this shameful affront to your doctrines 
and organisation… Ignore the siren calls of the defenders of bourgeois democracy, the 
seed of brutal fascism!’.112 The flysheet Esfuerzo, affiliated to the FIJL under the 
stewardship of Juan Santana Calero, who had arrived in Barcelona at the time of the fall 
of his native Málaga, made plain this appeal:  
Young socialists! Those of you who are Marxists and therefore 
revolutionaries! React in time against the confusionist and 
counterrevolutionary policy of your leaders. Consider your responsibility 
before the international proletariat and before History. Young socialists! 
We want to march with you on the path of victory. For the triumph of the 
war and the revolution: LET US UNITE!113  
The acknowledgement that Marxists could also be true revolutionaries represented a 
shift in rhetorical emphasis for radical anarchism, and an adaptation to the political 
realities of the moment. It also informed the thinking of radicals in the Catalan CNT 
who felt that an alliance of the trade unions could be effected from the bottom up. 
Regardless of the pitfalls of this assumption, discussed above, negotiations 
between the two unions were in fact being carried out by their respective leaderships 
without the involvement of their wider memberships. The implications of this were 
made clear in an ‘urgent circular’ to the Peninsular Committee of the FIJL, signed by 
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Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez for the National Committee of the CNT on 8 March. Here 
it was implausibly stated that the reason for a delay in calling a National Plenum of the 
regional organisations was that there had not been any ‘fundamental problem to submit 
to discussion’, the chief political problem facing the CNT being that of unity with the 
UGT. In that regard, the circular informed affiliates that a pact was imminent, as the 
Executive of the UGT had finally seen sense, but that ‘it is imperative that nothing 
occur that could cloud this favourable situation… It is necessary that you send 
communiques and orient the organisation, in the sense that any clash or violence with 
the unions or affiliates of the UGT be avoided’.114 Viewed by radical cenetistas as a 
necessary step toward safeguarding the revolution, the pact between the unions was 
seen by the National Committee of the CNT as something to be engineered behind 
closed doors and then presented to a Plenum as a fait accompli, used in the meantime as 
a device for imposing internal discipline. ‘Let no-one forget’, it continued, ‘that there 
could well be elements, even in our midst, interested in preventing the aspiration of all: 
THE REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TWO UNIONS … let no-one 
play the game of the mean-spirited and irresponsible’.115 If the revolution could indeed 
be safeguarded by such high-political and bureaucratic practices, these were not the 
traditional methods of the CNT, whose members were increasingly entertaining more 
‘irresponsible’ options. That the libertarian youth would be at the forefront of this 
process was indicated at a rally of the JJLL the following month, when Miró affirmed 
that ‘the anarchists would return to the barricades of 19 July rather than give up the 
workers’ revolution’.116   
Towards a Second July 
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The possibility of a ‘return to the barricades’ gained currency in the spring of 1937 as a 
consequence of reflections on the lost opportunity and errors of the previous July, which 
even Abad de Santillán acknowledged had ‘revived’ the state apparatus.117 Such 
reflections became commonplace in the revolutionary movement in this period. Santana 
Calero, in a pamphlet intended as a rallying cry to the libertarian youth, considered it ‘a 
duty to demonstrate the errors made since July’, principally the acceptance of 
‘bourgeois legality’.118 Balius, in an article cited by Nin in La Batalla, affirmed that: 
‘We are the guilty ones; with the revolution in our hands we allowed the grandeur of the 
moment to frighten us.’119 Miró, in the speech cited above, likewise lamented that: ‘On 
19 July we lacked sufficient vision to wipe out the vestiges of the failed political 
system’.120 Perhaps the boldest of such declarations was made by Lucía Sánchez 
Saornil, who also emphasised the need to turn the tide of the counter-revolution through 
action:  
… by keeping the government, the workers respected its old bourgeois 
structure and the weight of the bureaucratic apparatus that had hitherto 
surrounded it. They did not notice that they were leaving the greatest 
enemy of the revolution standing… The state began the strangulation of 
the revolution. Nevertheless, all is not lost if the unions know how to act 
with determination… and [if they] defend their right to the management 
of the economy we will be able to save ourselves.121  
A radical critique was thus crystallising around a common identification of a missed 
revolutionary opportunity and a belief in the continuing possibility of rectifying this 
through insurrectionary activity. That this might impact on a war effort to which 
anarchists were being enjoined to sacrifice their principles was evidently not lost on 
Sánchez Saornil, who defiantly addressed such concerns in her article: ‘And to those 
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who shout at us that the war must come before everything, we reply: For the war 
everything, except liberty. Viva la Revolución!’.122  
Sánchez Saornil was one of several contributors to the Mujeres Libres publication 
pushing a radical line, and offering an immanent critique of the shortcomings of the 
libertarian movement. Less well-known writers also offered lucid perspectives on the 
consequences of a stalled revolution, ranging from the sexism of comrades to the need 
for complete socialisation. One anonymous contributor lamented that: 
The notion of an army of iron, of a strong nation, of rigidity, of 
inflexibility, of a firm hand, all this has been internalised. It has 
burrowed deep, and our revolution has begun to stagnate, to stiffen, to 
turn to stone… The institutions born spontaneously of the people are 
being hacked at and chopped down by the cutting blade of discipline. 
Men that we saw scattered by the strong winds of 19 July now huddle 
behind that word, ready to stand up and grab the reins, to take up the 
whip… Discipline is all very well, but take care. Discipline and blind 
obedience are also the preconditions of slavery.123 
Women were at the forefront of the ongoing ‘war of bread’ in Barcelona, during which 
the Councillor of Supplies in the Generalitat, Joan Comorera, and the supplies 
committees of the CNT blamed each other for a situation in which queues of working 
class women waited for bread that was not always available, while those who could 
afford it resorted to the black market.124 While its publication called for socialisation to 
end ‘speculation with the hunger of the people’, the Mujeres Libres grouping also 
acknowledged its support for the more immediately effective direct action that women 
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had undertaken  in Barcelona, invading markets and stalls to ‘take justice into their own 
hands’.125 
While the distance of Barcelona from the front-lines and the depth of anarchist 
implantation in the city made it the likeliest setting for a ‘second July’, there were also 
signs of discontent and restlessness further afield. The FAI affiliates behind the 
Valencia-based review Nosotros reported in March that there were more than two 
hundred anarchist prisoners in the city, including ninety-two members of the Iron 
Column, and affirmed that: ‘in this Republic of workers ruled by the bourgeoisie, there 
is only conservatism and a desire to choke the revolution underway in Spain… 
comrades, we will not cease to defend freedom and attack everything suggestive of 
dictatorship, whether white, brown or red’.126 On the Andalusian front-line, Alfonso 
Nieves Núñez distributed a letter at the end of April from the imprisoned anarchist 
commander Francisco Maroto denouncing the lack of solidarity he had received from 
the comités superiores. The arrest of Maroto had followed a confrontation with Gabriel 
Morón, the Civil Governor of Almería, and caused consternation among libertarians 
throughout Republican Spain.127 Nieves Núñez, on behalf of the affinity group Los 
Intransigentes, added the following postscript: ‘A new fascism stabs us in the back. We 
must react against it. A single clamour: FREEDOM FOR MAROTO, FREEDOM FOR 
ALL REVOLUTIONARY PRISONERS. If we need to begin again to achieve this, as 
on 19 July, LET US BEGIN!’.128  
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In March a new grouping emerged which was intended to provide cohesion to this 
upsurge of revolutionary discontent. The Agrupación Amigos de Durruti (the Friends of 
Durruti Grouping – AAD) was formed in Barcelona, animated chiefly by journalists 
around the weekly Ideas and former members of the Gelsa section of the Durruti 
Column, and its early meetings were well attended. The AAD issued some 5000 
membership cards and gained pockets of support outside Cataluña, such as in Belver de 
Cinca and Pina de Ebro in Aragón.129 The membership cards read: ‘We are enemies of 
the bureaucracy, privileges and military rank. We are revolutionary fighters. We aim at 
the immediate realisation of the social projects that the CNT-FAI defended in the 
glorious years of Confederal Cataluña.’130 The POUM was encouraged by this 
development. News of the AAD’s formation and its initial appeal were published in La 
Batalla.131 Juan Andrade was also favourably impressed: ‘The AAD has formulated its 
programme in posters pasted on all the streets of Barcelona… There are two points… 
that are also fundamental for us: All Power to the working class and democratic organs 
of the workers, peasants and combatants’.132 However, the apparent similarity of AAD 
and POUM aims at this juncture does not imply that the former was inspired by the 
latter, and the POUM was not mentioned at the April rally of the AAD in Barcelona.133  
A central plank of the AAD programme was the formation of a revolutionary 
Junta, composed of ‘workers of the city and country and combatants’, which would 
replace the government of the Republic. This programme appeared on posters plastered 
on walls around Barcelona.134 Apart from the proposal of a revolutionary Junta, the 
programme reflected libertarian concerns regarding public order and militarisation, 
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while advocating socialisation of the economy and union control of supplies.135 It 
offered a voluntarist approach to concerns that, as this chapter has attempted to show, 
were widely held in Confederal ranks. It is likely that the proposal of a Junta in the 
programme represented a reformulation of the Junta de Defensa Nacional, which had 
been favourably viewed by much of the CNT since its discussion at a national plenum 
in September 1936.136 Solidaridad Obrera had strongly supported the formation of a 
National Defence Council when Jaime Balius, chief theoretician of the AAD, was a 
member of its editorial board.  
The American Marxist observers Hugo Oehler and Russell Blackwell, who 
attended rallies held by the new formation, described the AAD as a ‘left reaction’ to the 
collaboration of the CNT in government. Their report, while coloured by ideological 
bias, nevertheless displayed an understanding of the essential divide within oppositional 
anarchism between purists and voluntarists. They contrasted the approach of the AAD 
to that of an anarchist affinity group (probably Los Quijotes del Ideal, discussed in the 
previous chapter): ‘Whereas the small Anarchist Group of the Ideal that has distributed 
some leaflets has swung back to “pure” Anarchism, the Friends of Durruti are of a far 
higher and more serious type.’137 In fact, the enthusiasm with which Marxists greeted 
the AAD may have contributed to limiting the attraction of the grouping within the 
CNT and the FAI, as purist anarchists were troubled by the seemingly ‘Bolshevik’ tone 
of the group’s pronouncements.138 Peirats averred that ‘the reason that the AAD had 
little influence could be due to the slight importance of its membership, the intervention 
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of the POUM in its centre and the Marxist flavour of certain of its slogans’.139 While 
this statement is inaccurate as regards the intervention of the POUM and overzealous in 
its dismissal of the grouping’s importance, it is illustrative of the purist reservations that 
would hamstring the AAD’s attempts to serve as a pole of regroupment within the 
libertarian movement.  
In spite of its evident sensitivity to radical demands, therefore, the fulcrum for a 
new insurrectionary convergence among libertarians in Barcelona would not be 
provided by the programme of the AAD, but would emerge instead from within the 
more familiar settings of the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups. An insight 
into the nature of the perspectives advanced in the Barcelona FAI at this time is given 
by the second session of a Plenum of affinity groups of 12 April 1937, at which 
delegates of the defence committees and the JJLL were in attendance.140 At this Plenum, 
a majority of delegates favoured the withdrawal of anarchists from the Generalitat, and 
in what appears to have been a tense atmosphere, alternative executive bodies were 
proposed. The representative of the Local Federation of the JJLL suggested that, if 
further collaboration proved impossible, the anarchists constitute a revolutionary 
Convention.141 The affinity group Constancia proposed that the withdrawal of the CNT 
and the FAI from government be accompanied by the nomination of a Central 
Committee on the part of the defence committees.142 The anarchist defence group from 
the Barcelona suburb of Gràcia known as Grupo 12 advanced a programmatic proposal 
similar in aims and tone to that of the AAD, involving withdrawal from government, 
complete socialisation and the creation of a revolutionary anti-fascist committee to co-
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ordinate the armed struggle against fascism.143 The Plenum, which Jacinto Toryho, then 
editor of Solidaridad Obrera, declared to be unauthorised when it became clear that the 
collaborationist positions had been defeated, is suggestive of a coalescence of 
voluntarist positions among members of the JJLL, the defence committees and the 
anarchist affinity groups of Barcelona. 
The centrality of the defence committees to the radical positions advanced at this 
Plenum may also provide a clue as to the content of the AAD programme. According to 
Eduardo Pons Prades, then a young CNT member in the socialised carpentry industry, 
the defence committees and the AAD ‘were almost one and the same’.144 Certainly, the 
presence of at least two members of the AAD at this plenum, Santana Calero and Pablo 
Ruiz, demonstrates that there was some overlap between the Agrupación and the 
perspectives advanced there. However, while the agreements taken at the Plenum, 
which were not published in Solidaridad Obrera or Tierra y Libertad, were to an extent 
reflected in the programme of the AAD, of greater significance was the position paper 
that resulted as a direct consequence of these discussions, which was presented on 24 
April in the name of the Local Federation of the FAI, the defence committees and the 
JJLL. This paper would posit a practical basis for action which, because it emerged 
from within the heart of the libertarian movement with no hint of external Marxist 
influence, represented a voluntarism that was palatable to purist anarchists, and was 
indicative of the continuing capacity of anti-statist anarchism to give an organisational 
expression to radical discontent. 
By some distance the most radical programmatic statement to have emerged from 
oppositional anarchism up to that point, the paper was nevertheless the logical 
outgrowth of an oppositional critique that had centred on the error of state collaboration 
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and a revolutionary practice at loggerheads with the process of state reconstitution. It 
proposed the withdrawal of anarchists from official posts and a return to the 
‘revolutionary and anti-state terrain’, comprehensive socialisation and, most 
intriguingly, the ‘constitution of a local revolutionary committee for the coordination of  
the armed struggle against fascism and the counterrevolution, in all its forms’.145 
Although we are unaware of whether this local revolutionary committee was ever 
constituted, at the very least we might posit that this paper conferred a mandate on those 
who would be central to the revolutionary mobilisation of May 1937. We might even 
speculate that the delay between the Plenum and the publication of the paper may be 
explained by further conversations among Barcelona anarchists as to the viability and 
composition of such a committee. The novelty of this local revolutionary committee 
resides in its emerging constitutionally from a regular Plenum and yet having a mission 
that bypassed the authority of  the comités superiores. This was an innovation of mid-
level delegates and activists hamstrung by the libertarian hierarchy that seemingly 
squared the circle of struggling against the state and on behalf of the revolution while 
remaining part of an organisation with a foot in both camps. It is therefore worth paying 
attention to those who authored the paper.  
At the plenum, the composition of the paper had been entrusted to a working 
group composed of Iglesias, Caudet of the affinity group Constancia, and the delegates 
of the affinity groups Móvil, Luz y Cultura and Cultura y Acción. If the Iglesias referred 
to here was Abelardo Iglesias, of the A affinity group, strongly associated with the 
defence of state collaboration, it would appear improbable that he had much to do with 
the confection of the position paper.146 Little is known about the affinity group Móvil 
although its likely radicalism is attested to by its later opposition to the legalisation of 
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146 A common name, the Iglesias delegated to the working group charged with composing the position 
paper could also feasibly refer to another Iglesias who would urge anarchist insurrection as late as 
October 1937 (discussed in Chapter Five). 
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the FAI.147 The closeness of the Constancia group to the defence committees is implied 
by the nature of its proposal to the Plenum, discussed above.148 Of the members of Luz y 
Cultura we know that one, Joaquina Dorado Pita, was also a member of the defence 
committee of the city centre and of the JJLL in the suburb of El Poble-sec, and would 
participate in the fighting in May.149 She was also secretary to Manuel Hernández in the 
socialised carpentry industry of Barcelona, replacing him when he departed for the 
front. Eduardo Pons Prades, a worker in the same industry, recalled that Hernández was 
a member of the AAD.150 Baldomero Mesas, another member of Luz y Cultura, was 
also a member of the JJLL.151 A picture is thus emerging of a working group, brought 
together by shared membership of the FAI, with close links to the JJLL, the defence 
committees and the AAD, three of the most important components of the mobilisation 
in May. It is to the most notable figure in the affinity group Cultura y Acción, Julián 
Merino, that we will now turn.  
Merino was a veteran member of the FAI and an important union organiser in the 
CNT who had fought against treintismo and been imprisoned both before and during the 
Republic in the years prior to the civil war. He was probably a mid-level figure within 
the defence committees prior to July 1936, which would explain García Oliver’s 
annoyance at his having jointly led a raiding party onto boats in search of weapons on 
the eve of the military revolt.152 He had also been present as a delegate of a militia 
column at the Plenum in Bujaraloz that had agreed to the formation of the Regional 
                                                 
147 This is discussed in Chapter Five. The names of three members of the Móvil group have been 
recovered from membership cards: Antonio Alex, a textile worker based in Gràcia, José Casanovas and 
Pascual Prades: CDMH, PS Barcelona, 1793/1.  
148 The full name of the affinity group was Constancia y Desinterés, the delegate of which was Francisco 
Caudet. See FAI membership card: CDMH, PS Barcelona, 1793/1. 
149 See Iñiguez, Esbozo de una enciclopedia, p. 191, and Vega, Pioneras revolucionarias, p. 226.   
150 Eduardo Pons Prades file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 76. Dorado Pita would also be the 
lifelong partner of Liberto Sarrau, a member of the Los Quijotes del Ideal affinity group. 
151 See FAI membership card: CDMH, PS Barcelona, 1793/1, and ‘Mesas, Baldomero’ < http://militants-
anarchistes.info/spip.php?article10656> [accessed 28 January 2016]. 
152 See previous chapter. 
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Defence Council of Aragón.153 Now secretary of the Local Federation of affinity 
groups, his presence in the meetings of the comités superiores had disrupted their 
normal functioning and brought an insistent, radical voice to proceedings. In February 
he had defended the refusal of the Gelsa section to militarise and was roundly abused, 
called an ‘oddball… undermining the general sentiment of the JJLL and the FAI’.154 He 
had also made the link, in March, between the question of socialisation, supplies and 
public order, relating how a warehouse full of potatoes had recently been discovered, 
the majority now rotten, which were only successfully made available to ‘the women of 
the town’ under the protection of the Patrullas de Control in an armed standoff with 
Assault Guards.155 Merino’s awareness of this event further underlines his probable 
connection to the committees of defence and supply.156  
Merino’s involvement in the writing of the position paper may explain why the 
initial suggestion of the defence group Grupo 12 to constitute a ‘revolutionary anti-
fascist committee to co-ordinate the armed struggle against fascism’ became radicalised 
to also incorporate the struggle against the counter-revolution in the rear. At the January 
plenum of unions in Barcelona referred to above, the delegate for the Maritime 
Transport Workers’ Union, almost certainly Merino, had lamented that the CNT was 
only able to conceive of the ‘anti-fascist front’, ignoring the ‘anti-Confederal front’ that 
                                                 
153 See Joaquín Ascaso, Memorias (1936 – 1938) hacia un nuevo Aragón (Zaragoza: Prensas 
Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2006), p. 24. His presence at the front at this time suggests that his return to 
the rear may have been due to his opposition to militarisation. 
154 ‘Reunión celebrada el día 12 de febrero de 1937 a las diez de la noche estando presentes el compañero 
Manzano [sic], de la columna Durruti, C.R de la FAI, Federación Local, JJLL y Comité Regional de 
Cataluña’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) CNT 85 C. 
155 Guillamón, La Guerra del pan, pp. 378-9 
156 As a prominent member of the Barcelona Transport Workers’ Union, such a connection is not to be 
wondered at, but is also suggested by the name used to sign the combative declaration of the ‘Liaison 
Commission’ of the Barcelona supplies committee that had denounced Joan Comorera and defended the 
record of the committees at the end of December 1936: P. Bonet. Merino had been prosecuted during the 
Second Republic for authorship of articles written under the pen-name José Bonet. See La Vanguardia, 
25 November 1933. I am grateful to Agustín Guillamón who, when I drew his attention to the possibility 
of this being a pseudonym of Merino’s, suggested that the initial ‘P’ in the supplies committee statement 
could perhaps be explained by ‘Pepe’ being a common pet form of the name José. 
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was then in operation.157 As a key union delegate, defence committee member, secretary 
of a radicalised local section of the FAI, long-standing opponent of ‘treintismo’ with 
links to both the bread queues and the revolutionary deserters opposed to militarisation 
– indeed possibly being among that number himself - Merino thus emerges as both the 
living embodiment of the different sectors of radical anarchism and one of those best 
placed to convert the desire for a ‘return to the barricades’ into a concrete strategy. As 
we will see in the chapters that follow, in the May days and in the subsequent struggles, 
his ability to speak to both voluntarist and purist concerns, as well to show practical 
solidarity to the hungry and to anarchist prisoners, would make him one of the 
outstanding figures of oppositional anarchism. If his varied connections make him seem 
an almost composite character, it should be borne in mind that I am not trying to 
establish Merino as a convenient ‘superman’ capable of single-handedly bringing about 
the May days mobilisation: that revolutionary intervention was, like Merino himself, the 
product of a varied and complex movement whose anti-statist principles, amongst those 
sectors remaining outside of state collaboration, had been renewed in the period under 
discussion. 
The radicalisation of these sectors was in response to, and served to intensify in 
turn, the violent encroachments of the Republican state into, on the one hand, territories 
considered anarchist strongholds, and on the other, sites of ongoing contestation, such 
as factories debating socialisation. Two such events in Cataluña served to heighten 
tension in the region in the period immediately prior to the May days. On 25 April 
police responding to a request for assistance from UGT affiliates at the Trefilería 
Barcelonesa factory, where a majority of the workforce backed socialisation, arrived on 
                                                 
157 Guillamón, La Guerra del pan, p. 206. 
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horseback, surrounding the factory while an assembly of workers was taking place.158 
Then, on 27 April Antonio Martín, a veteran CNT member and a key figure of the 
organisation in the border town of Puigcerdà, was killed. A former member of the 
CCMA, Joan Pons Garlandí of the ERC, then a delegate to the Interior Security Council 
of the Generalitat (the JSI), the body responsible for public order in Cataluña, described 
in his memoirs, written just after the war, of how trusted Catalan ‘patriots’ had been 
sent to nearby Bellver to take advantage of the first opportunity to end the power of 
Martín, known as ‘el cojo de Málaga’, ‘the cripple from Malaga’. This opportunity 
arrived with the attempt of Martín and others from Puigcerdà and the town of La Seu 
d’Urgell to occupy Bellver, which met an ambush, during which ‘a patriot, known as 
The Shirtless, renowned throughout the region for his marksmanship, situated in a 
strategic spot, fatally wounded [Martín]’.159  
Contemporaneous to the events in the border region was an exchange of letters 
between Largo Caballero and the CNT, demonstrating that the death of Martín, whose 
name subsequently became something of a ‘black legend’, was of a piece with the wider 
project of state reconstruction and the dismantling of the revolutionary procedures 
established in July.160 The correspondence began when the Prime Minister stated that he 
had been informed  by an unnamed source that suspicious elements, a list of whose 
names was included in the letter, had been crossing the border with ‘passports issued by 
the FAI’.161 A subsequent exchange between Joan Peiró, Dionisio Eroles and the CNT’s 
                                                 
158 See Carme Vega, Anna Monjo and Mercedes Vilanova, ‘Socialización y hechos de mayo: una nueva 
aportación a partir del proceso a Mauricio Stevens (2 de junio de 1937)’, Historia y Fuente Oral, 3 
(1990), 93-103 (p. 95). 
159 Joan Pons Garlandí, Un republicà enmig de faistes (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 2008), pp. 150-2. For a 
hostile account of the activities of Antonio Martín, see Joan Pous i Porta and Josep M. Solé i Sabaté, 
Anarquía i república a la Cerdanya (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1991). 
160 For a discussion of the causes of Martín’s reputation, see Antonio Gascón and Agustín Guillamón, 
‘Antonio Martín Escudero (1895-1937) “The Durruti of the Cerdaña”’, trans. by Paul Sharkey, Christie 
Books website (2015) < http://www.christiebooks.com/ChristieBooksWP/2015/03/antonio-martin-
escudero-1895-1937-the-durruti-of-the-cerdana-by-antonio-gascon-and-agustin-guillamon-translated-by-
paul-sharkey/>  [accessed 28 January 2016]. 
161 Letter from Largo Caballero to Joan Peiró, 24 April 1937, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 523/3. 
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Committee for Statistics and Control saw this latter body deny absolutely the notion that 
the FAI issued passports and defended those named in Largo Caballero’s letter, 
‘comrades who have been active in the revolutionary movement for years and [who] 
have come here hounded by reactionaries the world over’. The exchange is revealing of 
the proportionate increase in combativity, self-confidence and internationalism of the 
libertarian movement according to the activists’ degrees of distance from the state. 
Peiró, a Minister, transmitted the concerns of his colleague and superior to Eroles, a 
former ‘man of action’ who now occupied an ambiguous position as both a member of 
the Catalan JSI and the head of the Patrullas de Control (recognised as simultaneously 
of the state and a threat to the same). When the message was finally conveyed to a 
libertarian committee with a specific, autonomous, remit it was dismissed as ‘offensive’ 
and used as an opportunity to affirm the right to asylum that revolutionary refugees 
should enjoy in Spain. The opportunity was also taken to voice a recurring complaint 
among oppositional anarchists: that official concern for the anti-fascist probity of 
revolutionaries was strange given that ‘thousands upon thousands of suspicious 
elements walk freely in the ministries and public offices of Valencia, Madrid etc’.162 
This letter was dated three days after the altercation in Bellver.  
The murder of Martín followed that of Roldán Cortada, an activist of the PSUC 
and a former member of the CNT who had signed the treintista manifesto. It has been 
suggested that Cortada was murdered by the CNT, as the organisation had recently been 
informed of his role in preparing an attack on ‘the FAI’.163 The murder of the PSUC 
member prompted a police investigation centred on the anarchist stronghold of 
                                                 
162 Letter from the Vice-Secretary of the Defence Section of the CNT to Dionisio Eroles, 30 April 1937, 
CDMH, PS Barcelona, 523/3. 
163 Godicheau, No Callaron, p. 37. According to sources in the POUM, Cortada was in fact an opponent 
of the PSUC’s sectarian policies: see Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz, Spanish Marxism Versus Soviet 
Communism (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), pp. 186-7. 
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L’Hospitalet.164 It also led to a redoubling of calls from the PSUC to disarm the 
rearguard.165 In spite of its appeals for calm throughout this period, Solidaridad Obrera 
nevertheless made an urgent appeal with regard to the subject of arms on 2 May that 
contradicted the tendency of official CNT directives since the previous autumn:  
The guarantee of the revolution is the proletariat in arms. To attempt to 
disarm the people is to position oneself on the other side of the 
barricades. Whether Councillor or Commissar, an order of disarmament 
cannot be dictated against the workers, who are struggling against 
fascism with more generosity and heroism than all the politicians of the 
rearguard… Workers: Let no-one disarm you under any pretext! This is 
our slogan: Let no-one disarm you!166  
This appeal, anomalous in the trajectory of Solidaridad Obrera under the 
editorship of Jacinto Toryho, suggests that it was beginning to dawn on even the 
comités superiores of the CNT that the arms its members disposed of were fundamental 
to the power of the organisation as a whole, and that its plans to recover lost influence 
through control over the economy would count for little if factories were left at the 
mercy of the police. As much was intimated in an editorial in Tierra y Libertad, which 
affirmed the ‘impossibility of leaving in the hands of the state the destiny of our 
revolution, the revolution begun, driven and defended by the workers in arms’.167 Given 
the role that the comités superiores would go on to play during the May days, we might 
wonder whether such combative language was merely a bluff intended to ease state 
pressure on their affiliates. The May days would also prove, however, that the radical 
anarchists were not bluffing when they posed the possibility that ‘the gesture of the 19 
                                                 
164 See Solidaridad Obrera, 1 May 1937 and Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, p. 431.  
165 Gallego, La crisis del antifascismo, p. 391. 
166 Solidaridad Obrera, 2 May 1937. On the same day, a young member of the Catalan JJLL was killed in 
Barcelona by gunfire emanating from the local HQ of the Catalan nationalist party, Estat Català. See Paz, 
Viaje al pasado, pp. 136-7.  
167 Tierra y Libertad, 1 May 1937. 
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July’ would ‘have to be repeated’.168 There was no ambiguity or subtlety in the 
challenge the Local Federation of the JJLL in Barcelona made to the police chief 
Eusebio Rodríguez Salas: ‘we will continue to be armed… and whosoever attempts to 
disarm us without respecting our documentation, will have to do so over our dead body. 
And we will see who emerges victorious.’169  
Conclusions 
 
From the winter of 1936 to the spring of 1937, the persisting revolutionary gains in the 
territory of the Spanish Republic were threatened by the expanding parameters of the 
state. The relationship of Spanish anarchism to this process was complicated by the 
participation of its chief representatives in the anti-fascist alliance and the absorption of 
thousands of less well-known activists into administrative bodies and the front line. 
During this period, the comités superiores of the CNT and the FAI, in spite of their 
continued intention to intervene in government, were aware that the activity of their 
political opponents threatened to end the influence won for the organisations in July. In 
the first half of 1937, they attempted to bolster this influence through the campaign for 
socialisation. This attempt was only partially successful, however, on the one hand 
because it depended on the support of the UGT, and on the other because the process of 
socialisation was conceived of in different terms by the CNT hierarchy and its most 
active proponents on the ground. If the campaign failed to effectively unite the 
movement, the slogans of the comités superiores and the radical activists did not, 
however, reflect the extent to which the organisation was divided in this period. In fact, 
immediately prior to the May days, the radicalisation of the slogans of the CNT noted 
                                                 
168 Esfuerzo. Periódico mural de las Juventudes Libertarias de Cataluña, second week of April, 1937. 
169 See the leaflet, JOVENTUTS LLIBERTÀRIES. FEDERACIÓ LOCAL DE BARCELONA, ‘Una 
provocación más’ (Barcelona, 1937) PDLR, Fons DH, DH 6 (4) 1- Joventuts Llibertàries (FIJL – FAI). 
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above perhaps encouraged the illusory hope that the comités superiores would not 
disown a new revolutionary mobilisation.170 
While the libertarian movement was divided in its attitude to the anti-fascist state, 
the attempt to evolve a revolutionary alternative to it was also illustrative of the 
ambiguities and divisions in the movement’s more radical wing. The creation of the FJR 
on the initiative of the JJLL in Barcelona revealed the potential for libertarians to take 
the lead in creating a revolutionary alliance to oppose and split statist anti-fascism, 
while the AAD advanced a programme by means of which the revolutionary conscience 
might impose itself rather than be swept aside or absorbed by the state. While both of 
these endeavours achieved a certain degree of success, they did not unite the radical 
anarchists of Spain. Purists opposed the former initiative because it was ‘political’, in 
the sense of involving political parties, and the latter because they considered it to have 
a Marxist or Bolshevik – that is to say, authoritarian – approach to the problem of 
government.  
In spite of the persistence of such divisions, the first four months of 1937 had seen 
the consolidation of oppositional anarchism as an identifiable current within the 
libertarian movement. The Mujeres Libres grouping, the Juventudes Libres, anarchist 
trade union delegates in Barcelona, the defence committees and the AAD were united 
behind the demand for socialisation and the need for workers to retain their weapons. In 
Barcelona, this confluence of priorities would result in the May mobilisation that would 
prove to be the definitive, if not the last, battle in the radical anarchists’ struggle to 
resist state reconstitution. This mobilisation would be supported by the new groupings 
formed in this period, the FJR and the AAD, but its organisational basis would emerge 
from the local FAI, which had shown its capacity, as at the beginning of the Republic, 
to unite voluntarist and purist anarchists behind a radical agenda on the eve of the May 
                                                 
170 This is discussed further in the following chapter. 
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days. The first months of 1937 had seen the revolutionary conscience of the Spanish 
revolution develop a programme based on a critical understanding of the revolutionary 
experience hitherto, and had seen new alliances and new organisational forms take 
shape. This period had also demonstrated, however, the persistent vitality of the 
networks of libertarian ateneos, defence committees and affinity groups, and their 
undimmed impulse to think and act outside and against the state. 
The programme that emerged in opposition to state construction in Spain had been 
encapsulated in the slogan of Ideas: ‘socialisation and the people armed!’. When police 
on horseback broke up an assembly of workers well-disposed to socialisation in April 
1937, the mutually constitutive relation between state force and hierarchical relations in 
production could be perceived. In the months prior to the May days, the role of 
Republican police in defending private or state property from anarchist projects had 
become more clear, while the process by which anarchist volunteers could be 
transformed into an anti-fascist police force through the Patrullas de control had 
seemingly gone into reverse. With the Patrullas back under the jurisdiction of the 
defence committees and those same committees tasked with participation in the 
coordination of a ‘revolutionary committee’ to fight both fascism and the ‘counter-
revolution’, it was entirely logical that any further attempt by police to obliterate 
workers’ power in Barcelona would provide the spark required for the armed enaction 
of the oppositional programme. The frontiers of the anarchist city would once again be 
marked by barricades, the successful defence or conquest of which would bring to a 
definite end the revolutionary interregnum begun in July 1936. 
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Chapter Three:  May 1937. From a Second July to the ‘Spanish Kronstadt’ 
 
The confrontation, known as the May days, which took place in Barcelona at the 
beginning of May 1937 was prompted by a police raid on the city’s telephone exchange, 
the Telefónica. Since the summer, the Telefónica had been run jointly by a CNT-UGT 
committee and a delegate representative of the Generalitat. The Telefónica, site of the 
first great strike in Barcelona during the Second Republic, and which had only been 
taken in July at the cost of several lives, was of great importance to the CNT.1 Run by a 
United States-based, and notoriously anti-union, company since the days of Primo de 
Rivera, the coming of the Second Republic had not brought its nationalisation, as had 
been promised by republicans and Socialists.2 The system of workers’ control put into 
operation there under the auspices of the CNT was therefore a living symbol of how the 
revolution had delivered where the Republic had failed. It was also a source of real 
power, as the workers at the exchange could monitor and even interfere with phone 
calls.3 In a context in which the violence associated with state reconstitution had 
recently intensified, it was therefore little surprise when armed squads of Assault 
Guards were sent to the Plaça Catalunya on 3 May to take control of the Telefónica 
building.4 In fact, it was reported at a regional meeting of the CNT that day that this was 
the fourth time in recent weeks when such an attempt had been made by the security 
forces.5  
                                                 
1 See Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 267. 
2 See José Luis Gutiérrez Molina, Valeriano Orobón Fernández. Anarcosindicalismo y revolución en 
Europa (Valladolid: Libre Pensamiento, 2002), p. 107. 
3 Eduardo Pons Prades file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, pp. 66-7. 
4 For useful eyewitness accounts of the May days from different perspectives, see: Orwell, Orwell in 
Spain, especially pp. 103-27 and Manuel Cruells, Mayo Sangriento. Barcelona 1937 (Barcelona: Editorial 
Juventud, 1970). 
5 ‘Reunión extraordinaria que celebró el Comité Regional, con los demás comités responsables el día 3 de 
Mayo de 1937, en la ciudad de Barcelona’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 85 C. Pons Prades recalled 
that the windows of the Telefónica building had been reinforced by the occupants in the days prior to the 
attack: Eduardo Pons Prades file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 68. 
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A provocative act in itself, the assault on the Telefónica was clearly of a piece 
with the wider project of state reconstruction. The mobilisation that took place in 
response to it should therefore be seen in this context, and this chapter will accordingly 
discuss the events of May 1937 in Barcelona as a mobilisation of the anti-statist 
conscience of the Spanish revolution.6 The focus of the first part of this discussion will 
be on the nature, size and composition of the libertarian mobilisation. Piecing together 
the reports, memoirs and recollections of participants, an overview will be provided of 
how and why the mobilisation took place in the way it did, and what opportunities it 
appeared to offer radicals to implement their programme. The mobilisation has much to 
tell us about the character, extent and limits of the Spanish revolutionary conscience. 
Equally illuminating in this context is the way in which the demobilisation of the 
movement was enacted. This chapter will discuss the abandonment of the barricades in 
May as a reassertion of organisational hierarchies within the CNT, and examine the 
immediate effect this had on the outlook of the libertarian participants. It will then 
proceed to analyse the disputes internal to the Spanish libertarian movement that were 
triggered by the events and the ensuing repression of revolutionaries in the Spanish 
Republic.  
The interpretation presented here accords with that of Guillamón, who describes 
the May days as an ‘inevitable struggle between the Republican state apparatus… and 
the defence of the “conquests of July” mounted by the CNT activists’.7 It also follows 
Graham’s assessment that ‘the war effort saw both CNT and FAI leaders increasingly 
incorporated into the governing machinery of the liberal state, leaving isolated and 
                                                 
6 Due to considerations of space, this chapter will consider the events in May almost entirely insofar as 
they impacted upon the libertarian movement in Barcelona. For a wider perspective on the events, see 
Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 429-61; Graham, The Spanish Republic, pp. 267-97; Manuel 
Aguilera, Compañeros y Camaradas. Las luchas entre antifascistas en la Guerra Civil Española 
(Madrid: Editorial Actas, 2012), pp. 80-171. For accounts of comparable, concurrent disturbances that 
took place on a smaller scale in and outside of Cataluña, see Peirats, The CNT, Vol. 2, pp. 132-6 and 
Casanova, Anarchism, pp. 147-8. 
7 Guillamón, Barricadas en Barcelona, p. 149. 
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uncomprehending sectors of their own cadres and social base whose daily experience 
led them to continue to resist its encroachment’.8 The systematic nature of the 
mobilisation presented here also backs up the arguments of Guillamón and Graham, and 
contrasts with that suggested by Casanova, who places emphasis on the assumed role of 
provocateurs and those he refers to as ‘revolutionary tourists’.9 Although an 
understanding of the May events as a confrontation between the agents of state 
reconstruction and its revolutionary opponents is not novel, the interpretation offered 
here, through its focus on the mechanisms of the libertarian mobilisation, represents a 
significant historiographical advance with regard to why and how these events took 
place and in answer to the question of who was mobilising, and why, posed but 
insufficiently answered by Graham.10 It also offers a new explanation for how the 
demobilisation took place, in spite of the will to fight displayed by the revolutionary 
conscience.  
The Mobilisation of the ‘Anti-State’ 
 
The assault on the Telefónica building on 3 May was resisted by the CNT workers 
inside. An uneasy standoff then took place, both inside and outside the building, in the 
Plaça de Catalunya. A meeting of the Regional Committee of the CNT was held to 
discuss developments, where it was noted that if the Generalitat did not rectify the 
situation, ‘our people’ were prepared to take to the streets. In this regard, the 
intervention of the representative of the Local Federation of the FAI, who suggested 
that those present keep in mind the ‘project for the organisation of the defence groups’, 
is suggestive. However, Manuel Escorza, head of the CNT’s Investigation Services, 
declared: ‘We are granting this occurrence an importance which it does not merit. It is a 
                                                 
8 Helen Graham, ‘“Against the State”: A Genealogy of the Barcelona May Days (1937)’, European 
History Quarterly, 29. 4 (1999) 485-542 (p. 524).   
9 Casanova, Anarchism, p.149. 
10 Graham, ‘The Barcelona May Days’, p. 485. 
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mundane affair, a premature action that has not been thought out in the least… What 
remains to be seen is whether we really control our membership.’11 The meeting 
concluded with the agreement that the organisation demand the dismissal of the police 
chief Rodríguez Salas.12 When this demand was refused, the basis for a de-escalation of 
the situation disappeared.13 However, why and how the city had become ‘a sea of 
barricades’ by the following day requires further explanation.14  
The mobilisation has been described as ‘spontaneous’ by both eye-witnesses and 
participants.15 Certainly, the rapid response of the revolutionaries on the streets of 
Barcelona was not the result of directives from the anarchist press or the comités 
superiores of the CNT. In the prevailing atmosphere of high tension, it was observed 
that ‘The political atmosphere was charged with electricity and everyone was waiting 
the inevitable spark.’16 To the Americans, Charles and Lois Orr, it seemed that ‘the 
workers… went out into the street en masse… all quite spontaneously, not only without 
any leadership, but actually against their leaders, and against all newspapers’.17 
                                                 
11 ‘Reunión extraordinaria que celebró el Comité Regional’. This comment suggests that Guillamón’s 
hypothesis as to the key role played by Manuel Escorza in the mobilisation is unlikely. See Guillamón, 
Barricadas en Barcelona, pp. 153-4. Nevertheless, the alternative hypothesis I present here has been 
made possible, at least in part, by Guillamón’s research, particularly on the months leading up to May, in 
the works cited in the previous chapter. 
12 ‘Reunión extraordinaria que celebró el Comité Regional’. 
13 Manuel Cruells was of the opinion that the ‘bloody week of May’ would have been avoided were it not 
for the incomprehensible intransigence of President Companys at that moment, Cruells, Mayo sangriento, 
pp. 55-6. 
14 The phrase comes from Helmut Kirschey, ‘A las barricadas. Memorias y reflexiones de un antifascista’ 
in Barcelona, mayo 1937. Testimonios desde las barricadas, ed. by C. García, H. Piotrowski, S. Rosés 
(Barcelona: Alikornio ediciones, 2006), p. 174. 
15 See the letter of Jaime Balius to Burnett Bolloten, 24 June 1946, reproduced in Guillamón, Los Amigos 
de Durruti, p. 155. Eye-witness observations on the supposed ‘spontaneity’ of the events can be found in 
Albert Weisbord, ‘Barricades in Barcelona’, available at the internet archives of Albert and Vera 
Weisbord: <http://search.marxists.org/archive/weisbord/Barricades.htm> [accessed 1 August 2014], and 
Adolfo Carlini (Domenico Sedran), ‘Un bolchevique-leninista de España os cuenta toda la verdad sobre 
las Jornadas de Mayo’ in Barcelona, mayo 1937, p. 91.  
16 Clara and Paul Thalmann, ‘La sublevación en Cataluña’ in Barcelona, mayo 1937, p. 112. The 
Thalmanns were a Swiss couple whose participation in the May events and contact with elements of the 
AAD, as well as the tiny Trotskyist milieu in Barcelona, make their account of events extremely 
interesting.  
17 Postcard written by Charles Orr to his mother on 8 May 1937, reproduced in Letters From Barcelona: 
An American Woman in Revolution and Civil War, ed. by Gerd-Rainer Horn (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), p. 161. The Orrs were left-socialists working for the POUM in Barcelona. A part of 
the international heterodox left milieu in Barcelona, presumably it is such people that Casanova has in 
mind when he disparagingly refers to ‘revolutionary tourists’. However, the impressionistic accounts we 
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However, while the combination of tension and provocation contributed to a rapid 
escalation that surprised onlookers, the May mobilisation cannot be said to have been 
spontaneous in the way that this term is normally understood. A traditional 
understanding of spontaneity as a synonym for ‘unplanned’ or ‘politically unconscious’ 
would make its usage unsuitable in this context.18  
A simple explanation for the events, amply attested to by eye-witnesses, 
participants and subsequent histories, is that the neighbourhood defence committees of 
the libertarian movement mobilised their forces. How this was brought about is 
discussed below. What is less clear is why the defence committees felt sufficiently 
emboldened to act, at this moment, apparently beyond the margins of organisational 
discipline. A clue as to why this happened is provided by the intervention of the 
delegate of the Local Federation of the FAI at the meeting discussed above. It seems 
plausible that the ‘project’ to which the delegate referred was the formation of the 
‘central committee’ discussed in the previous chapter, which the combined 
representatives of the local FAI, JJLL and defence committees had considered necessary 
in order to carry forward the fight against both fascism and the counter-revolution. 
Merino, the regular delegate for the Local Federation of the FAI at regional meetings of 
the libertarian movement in Cataluña was not present on 3 May, and it is possible that 
his absence was due to activity preparing the ground for the mobilisation. This is 
speculation, but there can be no doubt as to his active involvement in the events, which 
makes his link to the projected central committee highly suggestive. What can be 
                                                                                                                                               
have from such witnesses, while valuable, show these people to be quite removed from the internal life of 
the libertarian movement, and certainly incapable of playing an important part in a mobilisation on the 
scale of the May days. Lois Orr amusingly described her circle as ‘the most intellectual of the 
intellectuals – each of whom belongs to some one or two member fraction – who all have a particular line 
which they are trying to influence the POUM exec committee to adopt as the only way to save the 
revolution… there is a general ignorance as to what is going on, most of the learned comrades can’t read 
Spanish and have great difficulty keeping up on affairs’: ibid., p. 102. 
18 The meaning of ‘spontaneity’ in its relevance to working class mobilisation has recently been discussed 
in Alex Levant, ‘Rethinking Spontaneity Beyond Classical Marxism: Re-reading Luxemburg through 
Benjamin, Gramsci and Thompson’, Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 40. 3 (2012), 367-87.    
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concluded, at least as a working hypothesis with which to understand the timing of the 
May events, is that the Local Federation of the FAI considered a renewed project of 
aggressive, revolutionary self-defence to have been mandated by a regularly constituted 
Plenum, and that this was likely brought up at the meeting of 3 May to indicate to those 
present the option of an armed mobilisation. The reference to the defence committees at 
this meeting, although vague and inconclusive in itself, is one among several links 
between the mobilisation of May and the radical measures proposed by a combination 
of the defence committees, affinity groups and JJLL through the Barcelona FAI. These 
links are important because they indicate how the action could be said to have emerged 
through the traditional decision-making processes of the anarchist movement, and were 
not conceived of by the participants as contravening organisational discipline.  
The neighbourhood defence committees of the CNT were probably initially 
alerted to the raid on the Telefónica directly via telephone by workers in the building in 
contact with the headquarters of the various committees.19 Sara Berenguer, a member of 
the neighbourhood defence committee of Les Corts, recalled in her autobiography:  
As the alarm went up in response to that shameless attack on the 
Telefónica, the Confederal neighbourhood committees intervened 
energetically… The activists of the neighbourhoods called us on the 
telephone every minute to find out about our situation and to let us know 
of their own initiatives.20  
Wilebaldo Solano, then of the POUM youth organisation, the JCI, stressed that ‘when 
we talk of spontaneity we must bear in mind that… in this concrete case it was the 
                                                 
19 This explanation was offered by the leading POUM activist Jordi Arquer, in the Jordi Arquer File, 
Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 140. 
20 Sara Berenguer, Entre el sol y la tormenta (Barcelona: Seuba Ediciones, 1988), p. 88.  
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neighbourhood committees that took up arms… That it is to say that it was… not really 
the base, but the intermediate cadres that took the initiative’.21 
As in July 1936, the only libertarian mobilisation of comparable scale to have 
taken place in Barcelona, the core delegates who represented these neighbourhood 
defence committees informed the wider network of activists, who were instructed to 
present themselves with their weapons at their local defence committee headquarters. 
Diego Camacho, an activist of the JJLL in the neighbourhood of Clot, recalls being 
informed of events by telephone at his place of work by Juan (sometimes referred to as 
Antonio) Turtós Vallès, a member of the JJLL of Clot and a delegate member of the 
neighbourhood defence committee.22 The shop-steward at Camacho’s workplace, 
having confirmed the information with the local trade union committee, assembled the 
workers who then voted to go on strike and report to their neighbourhood defence 
committees and union sections.23 Members of the Patrullas de Control in the 
neighbourhood of Sants were told that the Patrullas no longer counted for anything, and 
that their unit of around fifty members was now responsible only to the local defence 
committee.24 Albert Weisbord, an independent dissident communist from the United 
States who was in Barcelona at the time, remarked on the prominent role of the 
Patrullas, who probably numbered around 890: ‘The Patrolmen, armed with 
submachine guns, go from barricade to barricade, investigating every house and rooftop 
to ferret out any surprise the enemy might try to spring.’25 The CNT’s National 
Committee would later claim that the Patrullas de Control had not participated in the 
                                                 
21 See the Wilebaldo Solano file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, pp. 53-4. 
22 Paz, Viaje al Pasado, p. 141. Juan Turtós Vallès was a member of the defence group Orto who had 
participated in the fighting in July. See Iñiguez, Esbozo de una enciclopedia, p. 606, and ‘Juan Turtós 
Vallès – Anarquista del Grupo Orto’ <http://puertoreal.cnt.es/en/bilbiografias-anarquistas/3415-juan-
turtos-valles-anarquista-del-grupo-orto.html> [accessed 20 August 2014].  
23 Paz, Viaje al Pasado, p. 143. 
24 See ‘Entrevista amb Joan “Remi”’, pp. 97 and 126.  
25 Weisbord, ‘Barricades in Barcelona’. On the figure of 890, see José Luis Ledesma, ‘Una retaguardia al 
rojo. Las violencias en la zona republicana’ in Violencia Roja y Azul. España, 1936-1950, ed. by 
Francisco Espinosa (Barcelona: Crítica, 2010), p.198 
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events of May, a claim that has been taken at face value in the historiography.26 It is 
likely that the functioning of the Patrullas as adjuncts of the defence committees during 
this period is at the root of this confusion.27 
As a result of the frenetic activity of the defence committees, around 6500 - 7000 
libertarian revolutionaries were mobilised.28 In addition to Spanish libertarians, 
barricades were mounted by members of the POUM and also by foreign revolutionaries 
in Barcelona, such as the German anarcho-syndicalist organisation, the Gruppe 
Deutsche Anarcho-Syndikalisten im Ausland (Group of German Anarcho-Syndicalists 
in Exile - DAS) and Italian anarchists who had left the front but who had regrouped in 
Barcelona in order to form a new battalion.29 It should also be borne in mind that 
several anarchist activists on the periphery of the city remained confined to their 
neighbourhoods without actively participating in the events in spite of a readiness to do 
so if necessary.30  
The mobilisation was backed up by a degree of popular support among working 
class non-combatants, indicated by a successful general strike throughout the city.31 
There is also anecdotal evidence of wider community participation in the building of 
barricades. Albert Weisbord observed that ‘the large crowds that gathered around [the 
                                                 
26 For example, in Godicheau, No Callaron, p. 38. Their role is also played down in Guillamón, 
Barricadas en Barcelona, p. 150. 
27 In addition to the testimony of Joan ‘Remi’ a hostile witness also reported that the Patrullas responded 
to the orders of the defence committees. See the telephone conversation between the leading Communist 
Vicente Uribe and an unnamed interlocutor, recorded at 12.15 am on the morning of 7 May, ‘Dossier 
elaborat per Josep Tarradellas, relatiu als Fets de Maig i a la posterior repressió del POUM’, Fons ANC1-
1 / Generalitat de Catalunya (Segona República). 
28 See the convincing estimates in Aguilera Povedano, ‘Los hechos de mayo de 1937’, pp. 789-816. Here 
the total numbers of combatants is suggested to be between 7000 and 7500 on the revolutionary side. 
29 Aldo Aguzzi, ‘Un anarquista italiano en las Jornadas de Mayo’, in Barcelona, mayo 1937, pp. 155-7. 
On the DAS, see D. Nelles et al., Antifascistas alemanes en Barcelona (1933-1939). El Grupo DAS: sus 
actividades contra la red nazi y en el frente de Aragón (Barcelona: Editorial Sintra, 2010). 
30 See Paz, Viaje al pasado, p. 154. 
31 In a report on the May days prepared for the internal discussion bulletin of the Barcelona POUM prior 
to the planned celebration of the local party congress, which in the event never took place, Josep Rebull 
affirmed that ‘The movement was greeted with sympathy by the working class in general in the first days 
– proof of this is the breadth, rapidity and unanimity of the strike – and left the middle classes in a state of 
watchful neutrality, influenced, naturally, by terror.’ See Josep Rebull, ‘Las Jornadas de mayo’ 
<http://es.internationalism.org/book/export/html/3244> [accessed 18 September 2014].  
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barricades] clamoring for action left no doubt that the overwhelming mass of workers 
were wholeheartedly behind the vanguard and were only awaiting the orders of their 
respective organizations to march forward’.32 Orwell also recalled popular participation 
in barricade building: ‘long lines of men, women and quite small children were tearing 
up the cobblestones, hauling them along in a hand-cart that had been found somewhere, 
and staggering to and fro under heavy sacks of sand’, a testimony corroborated by the 
report of Edi Gmür, a Swiss Communist volunteer in Spain.33 Orwell also states that, in 
the POUM headquarters: ‘the office upstairs was ceaselessly besieged by a crowd of 
people who were demanding rifles and being told that there were none left’.34  
Such a degree of enthusiasm and willingness to participate does not mean that 
working class support for the rising was unanimous. Diego Camacho was unsure of 
popular support in his neighbourhood, noting that people ‘seemed shocked, as if 
wondering whether we hadn’t all gone crazy. It was difficult to know if they approved 
or disapproved of seeing rifles on the street once more’.35 Nevertheless, the mobilisation 
clearly indicates considerable popular backing for the revolution and ‘its people’ in 
opposition to the state. Orwell’s account continues to be the subject of polemic, but it 
seems likely that his contemporary interpretation of events was widely shared:  
The issue was clear enough. On one side the CNT, on the other side the 
police. I have no particular love for the idealised ‘worker’… but when I 
see an actual flesh-and-blood worker in conflict with his natural enemy, 
the policeman, I do not have to ask which side I am on.36 
In any case, that such a widespread sentiment, which was not new, could result in an 
apparently successful mobilisation against the Republican state was remarkable when 
                                                 
32 Weisbord, ‘Barricades in Barcelona’.  
33 See, respectively, Orwell, Orwell in Spain, p. 108, and Edi Gmür, ‘(En Barcelona, después de disfrutar 
de un permiso en Valencia)’, in Barcelona, mayo 1937, p. 184.  
34 Orwell, Orwell in Spain, p. 106. 
35 Paz, Viaje al pasado, p. 143. 
36 Orwell, Orwell in Spain, p. 106. 
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one bears in mind that thousands of the CNT’s most seasoned militants had left 
Barcelona for the front, and that its comités superiores had nothing to do with it.37 To 
that extent, therefore, the May events demonstrated both a degree of support for the 
anti-state programme defended by the radical anarchists and the fact that many workers 
did not question the continued viability of the anarchist project even in wartime. 
Excluding foreign participants, who may have accounted for up to eleven per cent 
of the combatants, the libertarian mobilisation was composed of members of the JJLL, 
the Barcelona defence committees, the Patrullas de Control, FAI affinity groups, militia 
on leave, the MMLL, the AAD and specific unions of the CNT.38 It should be noted that 
these groups had an overlapping membership. Members of the JJLL were also members 
of the CNT and, if they had joined the youth organisation prior to the revolution, would 
also have belonged to the FAI. Joan “Remi”, for example, belonged to all three 
organisations and was also a member of the Patrullas de Control. Sara Berenguer was a 
member of her neighbourhood defence committee, the JJLL and the MMLL. Ada Martí, 
an active participant in the May days, also belonged to these three organisations and, as 
a member of the Agrupación Los de Ayer y Los de Hoy and a future contributor to the 
mouthpiece of the AAD, El Amigo del Pueblo, was probably also a member of the latter 
grouping.39   
                                                 
37 On perceptions of the respective quality of militants at the front and rear, see the Eduardo Pons Prades 
file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 70. 
38 The figure of eleven per cent of revolutionary combatants in May being of foreign origin is estimated 
from the number of foreign victims and is provided in José Luis Oyón, La quiebra de la ciudad popular. 
Espacio urbano, inmigración y anarquismo en la Barcelona de entreguerras, 1914-1936 (Barcelona: 
Ediciones del Serbal, 2008), p. 474. The number of foreign victims on the libertarian side included at least 
five Italians and one Portuguese, although it should be noted that two of these Italians, Camillo Berneri 
and Francesco Barbieri, were not combatants but were arrested at home and then murdered. It is also 
known that several German anarcho-syndicalists participated in the fighting, and in this regard, the name 
of one anarchist victim about whom nothing is known, Elias Werna, is suggestive. For a list of the victims 
of the May days along with their organisational affiliation see Manuel Aguilera Povedano, ‘Lista de 
víctimas de los Hechos de Mayo de 1937 en Barcelona’, Miguel Aguilera Povedano blog (2013) 
<http://wp.me/p2FTqL-8V> [accessed 5 August 2014].   
39 Los de Ayer y Los de Hoy was formed by veteran members of the CNT at the beginning of the civil war 
and was affiliated to the Local Federation of the FAI. It was intended to bridge the generational divide 
between older and younger activists in the movement. According to Negrete and Oehler, it had agreed to 
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The participation in the events of members of the MMLL meant the visible return 
of one of the most important features of the July days: armed women on the 
barricades.40 Their presence not only added to the sensation, summed up in La Batalla, 
that ‘The spirit of July has once more taken possession of Barcelona’, but also 
confirmed that the socio-cultural aspect of state reconstruction was no more complete 
by May than was the project to regain a monopoly of violence.41 This should be borne 
in mind when we note Sara Berenguer’s recollection that: ‘It seemed to me that the 
effervescence of the first days had returned.’42 Comparisons with the July days were 
widespread during the street fighting, and were indicative that the struggle was 
understood by revolutionary combatants as a point of rupture, the opportunity to ‘begin 
again’ sought by radicals, discussed in the previous chapter.43   
Aside from membership of the CNT, which applied to the vast majority if not all 
the libertarian combatants in May, the most common organisational denominator within 
this movement has generally been taken to be the JJLL.44 At a National Plenum later in 
the month, the delegate for the Catalan Regional Defence Committee stated that the 
JJLL had ‘borne the brunt’ of the struggle in Barcelona.45 It has been suggested that the 
preponderance of the JJLL in the May fighting was owing to the desire of younger 
libertarians to experience what they had missed out on in July, desirous of imitating the 
vanguard role played by more experienced revolutionaries in those days. With many of 
the combatants of July now at the front or dead, as well as several others now 
                                                                                                                                               
adhere to the AAD at a meeting in Barcelona on 1 May: Negrete and Oehler, ‘Negrete and Oehler report 
back from Barcelona’. 
40 See the recollections of participants in Vega, Pioneras y revolucionarias, pp. 222-8. 
41 La Batalla cited in Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, p. 432. 
42 See Berenguer, Entre el sol, p. 88.  
43 See Orwell, Orwell in Spain, p. 126, and ‘Reunión extraordinaria que celebró el Comité Regional’. 
44 The prominence of the JJLL in the fighting was emphasised by friends and foes of the anarchists alike. 
In the aftermath of the events, Solidaridad Obrera was moved to publicly defend the JJLL, which it 
described as ‘the target for the rage of many people who are either ignorant or frankly 
counterrevolutionary’, see Solidaridad Obrera, 8 May 1937.  
45 See ‘Actas del Pleno Nacional de Regionales, Extraordinario, del Movimiento Libertario, celebrado los 
días 23 y sucesivos de mayo de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 46 B. 
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incorporated in the administration of the state, it was the turn of the youth to show their 
mettle.46 This hypothesis may have some merit but it is not substantiated by the 
evidence at our disposal. The average age of the victims from amongst the libertarian 
combatants whose age is known is 35.47 This can be explained by the fact that the JJLL, 
in spite of its name, did not in reality function as an organisation of only younger 
members of the libertarian movement.48  
In its origins, the Catalan JJLL had operated as the cultural, educational and 
propagandistic wing of the FAI. During the war, the JJLL had taken over buildings in 
every district of Barcelona in order to set up educational ateneos and neighbourhood 
headquarters. Such spaces, in which young anarchists could mix with veterans, became 
integral to the organisational and social life of anarchists in Barcelona and were closely 
connected to the neighbourhood defence committees, the headquarters of which also 
served as centres of anarchist socialisation in this revolutionary period.49 Membership 
of the JJLL was common to many members of affinity groups and of defence 
committees, and its place alongside these bodies in the vanguard of Catalan anarchism 
during the war is indicated by the joint Plenum of these three organisations discussed in 
the previous chapter. Involvement in the JJLL, which grew from less than 10,000 to 
around 50,000 members in Cataluña during the first year of the war, therefore led to an 
exposure to anarchist ideas and to the libertarian cultural world, and provided the 
opportunity to attend almost daily assemblies and gatherings.50  
By contrast to workplaces in Barcelona, where the departure of experienced 
activists, the introduction of compulsory unionisation and the production demands of 
                                                 
46 Aguilera Povedano, ‘Los hechos de mayo de 1937’, p. 795. 
47 See Aguilera Povedano, ‘Lista de víctimas de los Hechos de Mayo’. 
48 See Jesús L. Santamaría, ‘Juventudes Libertarias y Guerra Civil (1936-1939)’, Studia Histórica, 1 
(1983), 215-22 (p. 217). 
49 See the recollections of JJLL members Diego Camacho and Sara Berenguer in, respectively, Paz, Viaje 
al pasado, pp. 56-62 and Berenguer, Entre el sol, p. 48. 
50 For membership figures see Santamaría, ‘Juventudes Libertarias y Guerra Civil’, p. 222. 
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the war economy had to some extent de-politicised the role of the CNT in certain 
factories, the ateneos and local centres of the JJLL and defence committees remained 
spaces of anarchist discussion and activity.51 While this anarchist character did not 
confer an ideological or strategic unity upon these specific organisations, membership 
did imply an active identification with anarchism in a way that wartime membership of 
the CNT alone did not. For the local JJLL, the combination of a strong purist current, 
absence from the spheres of government and hostility to the banal and sectarian anti-
fascism of the JSU would make this an anarchism of a radical and anti-state nature. The 
prominent role that members of the JJLL played in the May days is therefore reflective 
of the mobilisation as a manifestation of the anti-statist anarchist conscience, as well as 
of the strong links between the centres of the JJLL, the neighbourhood defence 
committees and the Local Federation of the FAI. Youthful exuberance and impetuosity 
were not absent from the May days, but nor were they determinant factors.  
At several removes from the escalating tension in Barcelona, the National 
Committee of the CNT was taken by surprise by events.52 The perspective of this 
leadership was expressed by Joan Manent Pesas, then Ministerial secretary to Joan 
Peiró, who remembered that ‘from a governmental point of view, for us it was 
catastrophic, so much so that it was as if we were going to lose the war the next day’.53 
Despite Solidaridad Obrera describing the attack on the Telefónica as a ‘monstrous 
provocation’ on 4 May, it made no gesture of support for those of its readers behind the 
                                                 
51 Active participation in the Barcelona CNT varied, as before the war, from industry to industry, and 
from one workplace to the next. Even in this most revolutionary of cities, it was possible for activists to 
feel ‘isolated’ as anarchists in their workplace, ‘Antonia Fontanillas. Correspondence with the author’ 
(Dreux, 2012). Some examples of the difficulties the CNT faced during the war in galvanizing the 
Barcelona work-force to participate actively in the work-place are provided in Michael Seidman, Workers 
Against Work. Labor in Paris and Barcelona During the Popular Fronts (Oxford: University of 
California Press, 1991), p. 95. That this should not be overstated, however, is indicated by the grass-roots 
support for the socialisation campaign discussed in the previous chapter. 
52 Jordi Arquer, a leading member of the POUM, was in Valencia when news of the May days arrived. He 
was able to speak to Joan Peiró, who was none the wiser about what was taking place in Barcelona. See 
the Jordi Arquer file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p.74 
53 Joan Manent Pesas file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 57. 
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barricades.54 At this point, state power in the city was effectively confined to the centre 
and, with the artillery at the hill of Montjuïc in the hands of the CNT and trained on the 
Generalitat, the revolutionaries held the upper hand. As much was enthustiastically 
conveyed to a meeting of representatives of the Catalan libertarian movement by 
Merino on the morning of 4 May, in spite of Valerio Más, Regional Secretary of the 
Catalan CNT, warning those in attendance of the danger facing the movement if the 
situation was allowed to continue.55 By contrast, Merino reported that, from his point of 
view ‘our position is unimprovable… The fact that we have been able to take the city 
and to take Civil Guards prisoner should give an idea of the state of our morale; that is 
to say, that of our comrades’.56 
This apparent slip of the tongue would likely have revealed to those present the 
extent of Merino’s involvement, if his detailed knowledge of the situation had not 
already done so. In any case, the ‘governmental point of view’ was not dominant at this 
meeting, where several delegates raised possibilities that went beyond the resignation of 
those responsible, which was considered a minimum requirement for the cessation of 
hostilities by the delegates of the unions and the representative of the defence 
committees. Other delegates stressed their opposition to negotiations with the 
Generalitat. The delegate from Gerona declared that ‘it is useless to hold joint rallies: 
we are like the spider and the fly. We have to go all out [to finish with] the Government. 
If we allow our governmental activity to get in our way we will never be able to operate 
freely’. The delegate from the Healthworkers’ union expressed a ‘conviction that we 
have been too tolerant. The order of the day is to liquidate these provocations, so that 
nobody dare contradict the Organisation. With the facts as they stand we are convinced 
that if the Government is to take a step back for once then it will be due to fear’. The 
                                                 
54 Solidaridad Obrera, 4 May 1937. 
55 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada el día cuatro de mayo de 1937, por el Comité Regional y los demás 
comités responsables de Cataluña’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 85 C. 
56 Ibid. 
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delegate from the Food Supplies Union found it ‘paradoxical that we are about to enter 
talks with those who less than a few hours ago were calling us mutinous and 
uncontrollable’.57 The meeting ended, as one delegate noted, with two positions in 
evidence, which while not explicitly stated had to do with whether the CNT would be 
prepared to head up the mobilisation, with the implication of bringing down the 
Generalitat, or whether it would continue to negotiate with its governmental partners. 
While the negotiations continued, the meeting ended with the more radical option 
hanging in the air. 
That same day, La Batalla, the daily newspaper of the POUM, called on the 
working class to form committees for the defence of the revolution.58 This was to be the 
closest that the POUM would come to taking the initiative during the events,  as the 
party was understandably unwilling to act independently of the CNT. Representatives of 
the POUM met with the regional CNT leadership at the beginning of the fighting, on the 
night of 3 May. Their proposal, to form a joint revolutionary leadership and ‘destroy the 
internal enemy’, was politely rebuffed.59 Juan Andrade, of the POUM executive, also 
made contact with the Regional Committee of the FAI during the events, and towards 
the end of the fighting urged a co-ordinated military action that would at least secure a 
better bargaining position for the revolutionaries, but this was also rejected by the 
anarchists.60 Although unlikely to have been decisive, Andrade’s decision to approach 
the Regional Committee of the FAI, as opposed to the more radical Local Federation 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 See Weisbord, ‘Barricades in Barcelona’ and Wilebaldo Solano, ‘La Juventud Comunista Ibérica en las 
Jornadas de Mayo de 1937 en Barcelona’ <http://www.fundanin.org/jcimayo.htm> [accessed 15 
September 2014].  
59 See Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, p. 433, from which the reference to destroying the internal enemy 
is taken (Bolloten is quoting Julián Gorkin, a member of the POUM’s executive committee). See also the 
Wilebaldo Solano file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, pp. 42-4.  
60 Juan Andrade, ‘La revolución española y el POUM’, in Juan Andrade (1897-1981). Vida y voz de un 
revolucionario, ed. by Pelai Pagès, Jaime Pastor and Miguel Romero (Madrid: La Oveja Roja, 2008), p. 
90. 
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which was directly involved in the events, was indicative of the distance of the POUM 
from the internal radicalisation of the anarchist movement in Barcelona. 
The mobilisation in defence of the revolution had revealed to the participants the 
opportunity to deliver a comprehensive blow to the counterrevolution in the city. The 
Thalmanns, stationed behind a barricade on La Rambla de les Flors on the first night of 
the fighting, recalled that the workers there were convinced that ‘now the end had 
arrived for the Stalinists in Cataluña’.61 Moving from the defensive to the offensive had 
further implications, however: would the victorious revolutionaries impose their 
programme? The situation in May brought back to the surface the questions the 
libertarians had debated in July, that of collaborating with the state or ‘going for 
everything’.62 By May, however, the experience of what one member of the JJLL 
described as ‘forty-eight hours of revolution and ten months of counter-revolution’ had 
given a clearer, if not a definitive, idea of what ‘going for everything’ could mean in the 
context of civil war and revolution: socialisation of industry, unity based on loyalty to 
the revolution, and the people armed.63 It was also clear that these ends could not be 
attained while the government was left standing.  
The ‘governmental point of view’ of the National Committee of the CNT was 
now divided from that of the activists of Barcelona by a labyrinth of barricades. 
Appealing over the radio for calm on 4 May, García Oliver, who had arrived in 
Barcelona on a peace-making mission, declared that ‘even if I had a rifle or a bomb in 
my hand, I would not know against whom to fire, because all those fighting are my 
brothers’.64 This speech was so far removed from what the young militants who idolised 
him expected to hear that rumours proliferated that the Minister of Justice had been 
                                                 
61 Thalmann, ‘La sublevación en Cataluña’, p. 114.  
62 This is discussed in Helmut Rüdiger, Ensayo crítico sobre la revolución española (Buenos Aires: Imán, 
1940), p. 23; Paz, Viaje al pasado, p. 143, and García Oliver, El eco de los pasos, p. 429. 
63 Ideas, 20 May 1937. The quote is from an article by Francisco Pérez, a member of the JJLL in Tamarite 
(Aragón). 
64 García Oliver, El eco de los pasos, p. 426.  
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taken hostage and forced to make the speech under duress.65 As far as the comités 
superiores were concerned, however, the combatants had allowed themselves to be 
provoked by their adversaries and, incorrectly believing themselves to be defending the 
CNT, were in fact risking a military disaster for which the organisation would be 
blamed.66 This stance put the exhortations to workers to resist disarmament of a few 
days earlier in perspective, and whether or not such slogans were merely hot air, the 
incompatibility of maintaining a position of even nominal resistance to state 
reconstruction while participating in that same process was brutally exposed by the 
events of May. Any contemporary hopes that these same committees would lead the 
libertarian movement in an offensive against the counterrevolution were thus to be 
disappointed.67  
The ‘comités superiores de defensa’: from a plan of attack to demoblisation  
 
On 5 May, those coordinating the neighbourhood defence committees drew up their 
plans for the military defeat of the forces of the state in Barcelona. The Italian anarchist 
Ernesto Bonomini, then sharing a house in the city with Camillo Berneri, reported that, 
at the end of the second day of fighting, the defence committees decided to mount a 
final assault on the enemy positions, whereupon ‘The comrades in the castle at Montjuïc 
immediately put themselves at the orders of the [neighbourhood defence] committee, 
and at the agreed hour were prepared to bombard the Generalitat, the police station and 
                                                 
65 See Peirats, The CNT Vol. 2, pp. 123-4. For the disbelieving and indignant reactions to the speeches 
over the radio of the CNT and the FAI representatives, see Fraser, Blood of Spain, p. 379 and p. 382, the 
‘García’ file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 19, and Bonomini, ‘Semana sangrienta’, p. 153. 
66 See the official report compiled by the National Committee in the aftermath of the events and published 
as an appendix in Brademas, Anarcosindicalismo y revolución, pp. 255-63, also García Oliver, El eco de 
los pasos, p. 420. 
67 See the contemporary, eye-witness reflections on the possibilities and dangers for the CNT should it 
take an aggressive stance in Jane H. Patrick, ‘Cuatro cartas de Barcelona’ in Barcelona, mayo 1937, pp. 
165-7. Jane Patrick was a veteran Glaswegian anarchist and one of the founders of the Anti-Parliamentary 
Communist Federation, who had travelled to Barcelona with fellow anarchist Ethel MacDonald. 
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the Hotel Colón [Headquarters of the PSUC Central Committee]’.68 The defence 
committees in the suburbs were told to ready themselves to march on the centre of the 
city and occupy centres of government and the premises of the PSUC.69 The Tierra y 
Libertad column, stationed at the Espartaco barracks, which had at first maintained an 
almost entirely defensive posture, prepared to launch an operation to overpower the 
Communist-controlled Carlos Marx barracks, also on 5 May.70 In Gràcia, on the 
initiative of the neighbourhood defence committee, an agreement for coordinated action 
was established between the POUM, the CNT defence committees, the JJLL, the JCI 
and the DAS.71 That same day, amid rumours that the POUM was about to be declared 
illegal, the party activists stationed in its headquarters on Barcelona’s main 
thoroughfare, La Rambla, reluctantly readied themselves for an assault on the nearby 
Café Moka, which had been occupied by Assault Guards.72  
According to Joan ‘Remi’, this plan ‘did not come from the Regional Committee 
or the Local Federation but from the Regional Committee of defence groups [the 
Regional Defence Committee]… which had nothing to do with the Regional Committee 
of the union… The defence groups were something separate, and they’d reached the 
limit of their patience’.73 The delegate of this Regional Defence Committee present at 
                                                 
68 See Ernesto Bonomini, ‘Semana sangrienta’ in Barcelona, mayo 1937, p. 151. 
69 Ibid., for the general outline of the plan. On the column organised in Sants, see  ‘Entrevista amb Joan 
“Remi”’, p. 98, and for Gràcia, the Wilebaldo Solano file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, pp. 48-9. 
70 See  Aldo Aguzzi, ‘Un anarquista italiano en las Jornadas de Mayo’, in Barcelona, mayo 1937, p. 160. 
71 See the Wilebaldo Solano file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 54. In ‘La Juventud Comunista 
Ibérica en las Jornadas de Mayo’, Solano makes the link between the policy advocated in La Batalla on 4 
May and the formation of this committee. The JJLL delegate at a meeting of the comités superiores of the 
libertarian movement would later affirm that links between the JJLL and the POUM had been formed 
purely on a temporary basis and due to the exigencies of the moment, see ‘Reunion extraordinaria del 
comité regional de Cataluña con asistencia de la camarada ministra de sanidad, el comité nacional y 
demás comités y camaradas responsables de la organización. Celebrada el día 8 de Floreal de 1937’, CNT 
(España) Archives (IISG) 39 A. Neither source is particularly reliable, given that Solano, as an important 
figure in the POUM, may have wished to overstate the influence of that organisation, while the JJLL 
representative, questioned by the libertarian movement’s leadership in the hostile and panicked 
atmosphere following the May events, would have been prudent to play down any such initiative. For his 
part, Helmut Kirschey, a leading figure in the DAS, would later affirm that he had had no contact with the 
POUM at all, see Kirschey, ‘A las barricadas’, p. 176. Solano’s recollections to Fraser that it was the 
defence committee of Gràcia who took the initiative seems the most plausible explanation. 
72 Orwell, Orwell in Spain, p. 117. 
73 ‘Entrevista amb Joan “Remi”’, p. 103. 
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the meeting of representatives of the Catalan libertarian movement on the morning of 5 
May was evidently under pressure from those behind the barricades to sanction a plan 
of attack: ‘We can’t put up with any more. We will be in serious danger if we don’t act 
quickly. We can’t hold back the neighbourhoods any longer, they want an all-out attack 
and nothing else.’74 García Oliver reports seeing Julián Merino in the ‘Casa CNT-FAI’ 
‘giving orders on a telephone reserved for the Regional Committee’, and it is highly 
likely that Merino was a delegate member of the regional organisation co-ordinating the 
defence committees.75 Matías Suñer Vidal, a member of the FAI who participated in the 
fighting, testified that at this time he was ‘at the orders of a secret revolutionary 
committee [of which Merino was a member]… that directed military operations against 
the PSUC’ - we might assume this was the Regional Defence Committee.76 Severino 
Campos later recalled that Merino convoked the meeting of 5 May.77 It may well have 
been Merino who made the suggestion at this meeting that a ‘Council of Defence’ be 
formed.78 In any event, the meeting ended with the decision to nominate new members 
to the Regional Defence Committee who would augment the existing body. These new 
members were José Manzana and José Xena, to be aided by the CNT Councillor for 
Defence in the Generalitat, Francisco Isgleas, and Gregorio Jover, a veteran cenetista 
and former member of the Nosotros affinity group, who was at that point lieutenant 
colonel of a division on the Aragón front, back in Barcelona briefly on account of the 
unfolding crisis. He had brought with him a resolution agreed by those in his division to 
                                                 
74 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada por el Comité Regional de Cataluña con asistencia de casi todos los 
compañeros más responsables de la organización’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 85 C. 
75 García Oliver, El eco de los pasos, p. 421.  
76 See ‘Suñer Vidal, Matias’ (2016) < http://militants-anarchistes.info/spip.php?article13135> [accessed 4 
June 2016].  
77 See Gimenólogos, En busca de los Hijos de la Noche, p. 567. 
78 While the possibility that this delegate was suggesting the formation of an alternative authority to that 
of the Generalitat is seductive, it is imposible to verify. The word used is not ‘Junta’ but ‘Consejo’, 
evoking the Defence Council of Aragón, which Merino was involved in founding. Nevertheless, it also 
seems possible that what was being suggested was the broadening of the existing Regional Defence 
Committee, which is what in fact took place. Nor is it clear who was speaking, as the delegate appears in 
the minutes as ‘F.L’, which could stand for the Local Federation of Affinity Groups (Merino), or the 
Local Federation of Unions.  
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march on Barcelona, which was, in a further example of how democratic procedure at 
the front was trumped by bureaucratic procedures in the rear, rejected by the delegates 
at the meeting, seemingly without discussion.79 Following the failure of García Oliver 
to make an impact on the combatants, the broadening of the Regional Defence 
Committee suggests an attempt by the regional comités superiores to co-opt it, in tacit 
recognition that it was its authority, not that of the comités superiores, that was 
respected on the barricades. Although this manoeuvre is not alluded to in the 
historiography, it would seem likely that these heavyweight additions to the defence 
committee structure played a significant role in the subsequent demobilisation of the 
rising. Significantly, the account of Matías Suñer Vidal also names Manzana as a 
member of the committee directing events on the ground.80  
Meanwhile, perhaps as a consequence of the plans of the defence committees to 
move onto the offensive, elements of the AAD saw an opportunity to advance their 
programme. Delegates from the Agrupación had already met with representatives of the 
POUM executive committee on 4 May, agreeing that the best that could be hoped for 
from events was an orderly withdrawal following the abandonment of the barricades by 
the governmental forces and assurances that no repression would be visited upon the 
combatants.81 On 5 May, however, the grouping drew up and distributed a leaflet 
                                                 
79 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada por el Comité Regional de Cataluña con asistencia de casi todos los 
compañeros más responsables de la organización’. 
80 ‘Suñer Vidal, Matias’. The other person named as a member of this committee is Luciano Ruano, 
pseudonym of the Argentinian anarchist Rodolfo Prina. Ruano had been a part of the action group that 
murdered the Catalan nationalist former police chief Miquel Badía and his brother in April 1936. His 
presence at the meeting of 5 May is confirmed by Campos: see Gimenólogos, En busca de los Hijos de la 
Noche, p. 567. His membership of the Regional Defence Committee in May 1937 would appear unlikely, 
although it should not be discounted, due to his having been sentenced to death by a meeting of the CNT-
affiliated metalworkers’ union on 27 January 1937, for crimes of robbery and murder committed in the 
Aragonese countryside: see Agustín Guillamón, ‘Justo Bueno (1907-1944)’ (2014) 
<http://grupgerminal.org/?q=system/files/JustoBueno-1907-1944-Guillamon.pdf> [accessed 4 June 
2016]. His tenure as Durruti’s replacement on the Aragón front had also brought accusations of arbitrary 
shootings and plunder. His eventual murder, carried out on 15 July, appears to have taken place with the 
common consent of the regional comités superiores and even his friend and fellow action group member 
Justo Bueno. His girlfriend, his brother and his brother’s girlfriend were killed alongside him. For further 
biographical information see Gimenólogos, En busca de los Hijos de la Noche, pp. 557-69.  
81 See Guillamón, Los Amigos de Durruti, p. 70. 
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behind the revolutionary barricades, urging the combatants to remain at their posts. It 
demanded the execution of those responsible for the provocation, the socialisation of 
industry and the replacement of the Generalitat with a revolutionary Junta in which the 
POUM, having fought alongside the revolutionaries, would be represented.82 The leaflet 
was later disowned in the strongest terms by the Regional Committee, which described 
its content as ‘absolutely intolerable’ and further stated that, a new government of the 
Generalitat having been formed, ‘everyone must accept its decisions given that we are 
all represented within it.’83 The leaflet was only distributed with great difficulty. Balius 
would later state that some people lost their lives while distributing it, while the manner 
in which it was received by the combatants evidently varied from the enthusiastic to the 
hostile.84 The newspaper of the Agrupación, El Amigo del Pueblo, would later claim 
that the leaflet was received ‘with jubilation’ on the part of ‘the men of the 
barricades’.85 By contrast, Clara and Paul Thalmann, who helped distribute the leaflet, 
recalled that ‘Everywhere we were received with distrust… In many places we came 
across a brusque refusal, they rejected us.’86 
The AAD was not the appropriate formation to take on a vanguard role at this 
time, and it was probably not the intention of its chief animators that it should do so, in 
spite of the hopes of the international, heterodox leftist milieu that had gravitated 
towards it.87 The question at issue was whether the revolutionaries of the defence 
committees would be able to follow through with their plans, not only in flagrant 
                                                 
82 See AGRUPACIÓN “AMIGOS DE DURRUTI”, ‘Trabajadores’, PDLR, Fons DH, DH 6 (1), 4- 
Amigos de Durruti (CNT-FAI). The leaflet is reproduced in Guillamón, Los Amigos de Durruti, p. 78. 
83 See the report attached to a FAI circular dated 1 June 1937, ‘FAI Comité Peninsular Secretariado. 
Circular 28-1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG), 49 A. See also La Noche, 6 May 1937. The 
Councillors of the Generalitat had collectively resigned and been repaced by a temporary ‘unity’ 
government of the anti-fascist forces on 5 May. 
84 See the letter of Jaime Balius to Burnett Bolloten, 24 June 1946, reproduced in Guillamón, Los Amigos 
de Durruti, p. 155. 
85 See El Amigo del Pueblo, 12 June 1937. 
86 See Thalmann, ‘La sublevación en Cataluña’, p. 116. 
87 Aside from the Thalmanns this milieu also included Moulin, the pseudonym of Hans David Freund, 
who assumed leadership of the Trotskyists in Spain during the May days and had maintained some 
contact with the AAD. 
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opposition to the desires of the comités superiores, three of whose chief representatives, 
Rodríguez Vázquez, García Oliver and Montseny, were now in Barcelona, despatched 
from Valencia by Largo Caballero to call for calm, but also in spite of the new additions 
to the Regional Defence Committee. Time was of the essence. While Pons Prades 
remembered that nobody among the libertarians doubted that ‘in the end we would 
make ourselves the masters of Barcelona’, the reality was that hunger and fatigue would 
come into play the longer a state of watchful deadlock was maintained.88 As much had 
been predicted on 4 May by ‘Aurelio’ (probably Aurelio Fernández in spite of it being 
unusual to have delegates identified by their first names in the minutes of meetings): 
‘This is going to end in chaos, through fatigue. They’ll go at it today, tomorrow as well, 
but in a few days tiredness will conquer everyone, if not the lack of ammunition. The 
movement must be directed: does that suit the CNT or not?’.89 The following day it was 
reported that the CNT activists in the Telefónica building had not eaten since the events 
began.90 
On 5 May, the anarchist emissaries of the Republican government in Valencia 
were locked in negotiations with the Generalitat.91 Pressured by the comités superiores 
to await their outcome, the neighbourhood defence committees instructed the 
improvised columns preparing to march on the centre from the suburbs to hold back.92 
The members of these columns belonging to the POUM were advised by Nin of the 
impossibility of proceeding without the co-operation of the CNT, and thus the attack on 
the Café Moka also failed to materialise.93 Meanwhile, the commander of the Tierra y 
                                                 
88 Eduardo Pons Prades file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 77. 
89 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada el día cuatro de mayo’. 
90 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada por el Comité Regional de Cataluña con asistencia de casi todos los 
compañeros más responsables de la organización’. 
91 See the National Committee report in Brademas, Anarcosindicalismo y revolución, p. 258 and Abad de 
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93 See Solano, ‘La Juventud Comunista Ibérica en las Jornadas de Mayo’ and the manifesto written by 
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in Nin, La revolución Española, p. 336. 
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Libertad column was ordered by the Regional Committee of the CNT not to proceed 
with the planned assault on the Carlos Marx barracks.94 In an effort to break the 
deadlock, the JJLL in Gràcia launched an extraordinary appeal, addressed ‘to the 
authentic revolutionaries’: 
The continuous provocation brought about by the politicians and the 
armed police bodies has had as its consequence a new rising of the 
workers affiliated to the CNT, FAI, JJLL and POUM… It would be a 
vile joke to play on the comrades who have fallen in the bloody struggles 
against these animals if we were to accept a new trap laid by the 
politicians, when it is us workers with arms in hand who must have the 
final word. If the comrades sealed off in our committees do not have 
sufficient energy to push on ahead we must relieve them and delegate a 
Revolutionary Committee capable of doing so. Comrades, it’s now or 
never! Let’s do away with the armed police bodies that offer no 
guarantees as to the revolutionary future. Let’s do away with the political 
parties that attempt to immobilise our cause with their poison. Let us not 
wait another moment. While some remain on the barricades defending 
the revolution with arms, others must proceed rapidly to the socialisation 
of wealth and the means of production. We won’t accept ambiguities. 
Either we get rid of the armed police, politicians and other enemies of 
the working class or they will get rid of us…. Let us learn from what 
we’ve lived through and not leave a single institution standing that 
represents the hateful past. Revolutionaries! Forward with the social 
revolution above everyone and everything else!95  
As with the leaflet produced by the AAD, this proclamation from the JJLL in Gràcia is 
notable for its acknowledgement of revolutionary solidarity with the POUM and its 
recognition of the mobilisation as an opportunity to implement the radical programme 
and rectify the half-measures of July that had left standing the institutions of ‘the hateful 
past’. It is also notable for its derision of the comités superiores, ‘sealed off’ from 
                                                 
94 See Aguzzi, ‘Un anarquista italiano’, p. 160.  
95 ‘Las Juventudes Libertarias de Gracia a los auténticos Revolucionarios’, Fons ANC1-1 / Generalitat de 
Catalunya (Segona República). 
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events. However, while the solution of these ‘authentic revolutionaries’ was to replace 
these committees, to do so they required, at the very least, the backing of the defence 
committees that had initiated the rising. 
At that point, the members of the JJLL and the neighbourhood defence 
committees on the ground were anxiously awaiting word from what Joan ‘Remi’ 
intriguingly refers to as the ‘comités superiores de defensa’, that is to say, the 
committees that co-ordinated the defence committees at a local and regional level.96 
These committees were under a great deal of pressure, and had no doubt been made 
aware by their new members and by the comités superiores that an autonomous 
initiative would be disowned by the organisation. Diego Camacho recalled that the 
delegates from the neighbourhood defence committee, transmitting information to the 
JJLL headquarters in Gràcia, were conscious that the representatives of the Generalitat 
were not negotiating in good faith and that the logic of the comités superiores, in 
insisting on a negotiated settlement, was flawed. Nevertheless:  
…the idea that anarchism must never be tainted with the responsibility of 
losing the war seemed to weigh upon them. It was, therefore, that fear 
that produced the committees’ hesitation with regard to adopting a 
radical resolution.97  
As Wilebaldo Solano affirmed with regard to the defence committees:  
It is highly difficult that this kind of position… crystallises and affirms 
itself. There is discontent. There is unease. There is even opposition… 
But from that to a clear rupture… there is a big difference… What is 
more is the question of pride in the organisation. They were capable of 
                                                 
96 ‘Entrevista amb Joan “Remi”’, p. 130. The plural is used here following Joan ‘Remi’ but it would seem 
more likely, from the minutes of the regional meetings, that there was only one such committee operating 
in Barcelona, which was probably the Regional Defence Committee that, before the war, had been 
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authority. 
97 Paz, Viaje al pasado, pp. 165-6. 
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criticising the organisation, of criticising their leaders. But the moment 
arrived at which the criticism halted. The definitive step was not taken.98  
Josep Rebull, a local member of the POUM, would state that the failure of the 
revolutionaries to take the Generalitat by force could only be explained by such 
‘psychological factors’.99 A further point must be borne in mind, however, which was 
unknown to these activists of the POUM and which has generally been disregarded by 
the historiography, which is that the composition of the body co-ordinating the defence 
committees in Barcelona had been augmented at the meeting of 5 May by the 
nomination of four additional members. Of these, Isgleas was a Councillor in the 
Generalitat and Manzana a front-line officer who had overseen the militarisation of the 
Durruti Column. While the position of Xena and Jover was more ambiguous, it is 
probable that by the afternoon of 5 May, the initial members of the committee were not 
acting with a free hand, regardless of whether its members were assailed by doubts or 
not. To judge by his subsequent behaviour, discussed in the following chapters, it would 
seem that Merino, at least, was untroubled by such ‘psychological factors’, although he 
would later admit to bitterness as to the lack of courage shown by his comrades.100 
The orders of the defence committees to hold back were not uniformly accepted 
throughout the revolutionary ranks and arguments reportedly raged in the Espartaco 
barracks, where the Tierra y Libertad column was stationed, and in the ‘Casa CNT-FAI’ 
itself.101 In spite of the combative manifestos put out by the JJLL and the AAD, 
however, the backing of the defence committees was crucial to the success of the 
mobilisation, and it is unlikely that any initiative external to those bodies was ever 
                                                 
98 See the Wilebaldo Solano file, Col·lecció Ronald Fraser, AHCB, p. 127. 
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100 See Chapter Five. 
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considered. Even the leaflet of the AAD issued on 5 May should not be seen in that 
context. While the line it expressed was clearly contrary to the pacifying appeals of the 
comités superiores, the AAD did not believe itself capable of carrying out its 
programme alone, but instead wanted to win support for that programme within the 
movement in order to influence the policy of the organisations. It was later affirmed, in 
the by-then underground organ of the Agrupación, that ‘We were not going to attempt 
an isolated action or persevere with a conduct that we could not sustain with the 
resources of the Agrupación alone.’102 Juan Andrade, who had contact with members of 
the AAD, later recalled that ‘[the AAD] did not want to be anything more than an 
internal opposition within the FAI’.103 
By Thursday, with the arrival of well-armed Assault Guards from Valencia 
imminent, the slow abandonment of the barricades had begun. The Catalan flag replaced 
the black and red flag of the CNT flying over the Telefónica building.104 But the May 
days did not represent a victory for Catalan nationalists as such, as the effective 
autonomy enjoyed by the region since July came to an end with the arrival of the 
Assault Guards and the assumption of central governmental control over public order.105 
The anarchists’ contestation of the state’s monopoly of violence was dealt a severe blow 
when, on Friday 7 May, it was announced that the Patrullas de Control had placed 
themselves at the orders of the central government. That same day, Solidaridad Obrera 
appeared in a special edition of two pages, declaring the struggle to be over and 
                                                 
102 El Amigo del Pueblo, 12 June 1937.  
103 Andrade, ‘La revolución española y el POUM’, p. 88. 
104 Orwell, Orwell in Spain, p. 121. 
105 See Graham, The Spanish Republic at War, pp. 279-83. Orwell observed that, in the wake of the May 
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reproducing appeals for calm and serenity from Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez and 
Federica Montseny.106 
The bleak prediction of the radicals regarding the consequences of inaction proved 
correct. While the comités superiores of the CNT had done what they could to hold 
back their members, their opponents had taken advantage of what opportunities they 
had to strengthen their position.107 At a meeting of the Regional Committees of the CNT 
and the FAI on 13 May, Severino Campos, speaking for the Regional Committee of the 
FAI, declared that ‘When we obeyed the cease-fire, they came against us so violently 
that we suffered many losses.’108 Important anarchist critics of the Communist Party and 
its policy had been murdered. The corpses of twelve members of the Catalan JJLL from 
the Sant Andreu district were dumped in the cemetery at Cerdanyola. They had been 
tortured to death on 4 May.109 The most famous case was that of Camillo Berneri, shot 
on 5 May along with his comrade and compatriot, Francesco Barbieri.110 Berneri had 
published scathing critiques of Soviet Union policy, particularly with regard to its 
continued commercial relations with Nazi Germany and persecution of anarchists, in the 
Spanish heterodox leftist review Orto as far back as August 1933.111 He had also 
publicly defended the POUM and, in an article completed just before his murder, 
declared the attacks of the PSUC on the POUM to be ‘an act of sabotage against the 
anti-fascist struggle’.112 As his residence was situated next to a PSUC-controlled 
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barricade, once it had been registered and his identity confirmed, his fate was sealed.113 
In an ex post facto justification for his death, the PCE’s official history of the war would 
later label him as the ‘chief theoretician of the “putschist” policy’.114 
On 7 May, the Local Federation of the JJLL met to exchange impressions of what 
had occurred. Although there was agreement on the need to adopt procedures 
appropriate to underground activity, there was no such accord as to the import of the 
events. Diego Camacho remembered that: ‘I had a Bolshevik conception of the 
revolution. I thought that… having failed to assault the Palace of the Generalitat and put 
the Stalinists of the PSUC to the sword, we had been defeated.’115 The young libertarian 
was, however, struck by the optimism of Diego Ruiz Arnau, an anarchist doctor then in 
his mid-50s, who considered that the people had ‘demonstrated their resolve to confront 
the counterrevolution’.116 Eduardo Pons Prades was also optimistic that the 
revolutionaries’ show of strength would alter the course of events.117 This echoed the 
attitude that the CNT’s Regional Committee had displayed in its meeting with the 
POUM, that the counterrevolutionaries would be given pause now that the workers had 
‘shown their teeth’.118  At a meeting of the comités superiores immediately after the 
events, discussed below, Josep J. Domènech, the former Supplies Councillor of the 
Generalitat and then Public Services Councillor, in a comment that reflected the 
complacency and ingenuity of the leading stratum of the CNT-FAI at this time, affirmed 
that, with ‘tact and good sense’, the Telefónica would soon be returned to the control of 
the CNT, because the new occupants knew nothing of telephones!119 However, the 
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disappearance on Friday 7 May of Alfredo Martínez, member of the Regional 
Committee of the JJLL and secretary of the FJR, was the first sign that the cessation of 
hostilities would not imply an end to the repression, which was given a particularly 
grisly aspect by the convergence of a triumphal imposition of ‘order’ on the part of the 
police and the instructions given to Stalinists worldwide to exterminate ‘Trotskyists’.120 
In this regard it is worth noting that Martínez had been the JJLL member ‘who had 
worked hardest in the creation of the FJR’, and had spoken at a POUM rally in 
December.121  
In this context of defeat and impending terror, the Thalmanns exchanged 
impressions with the Trotskyists Erwin Wolf, Moulin and Grandizo Munis, who 
represented the miniscule Bolshevik-Leninist organisation in Spain (the Sección 
Bolchevique-Leninista de España).122 While Munis and Wolf, who had not been in 
Barcelona during the events, were optimistic about the possibilities for a revolutionary 
advance, Moulin was circumspect. For the Thalmanns, by contrast, no optimism was 
warranted: ‘The May uprising, in which we have participated, was the Spanish 
Kronstadt’, a defeat for the revolution that would prove to be definitive.123 As the 
suppression of the Kronstadt revolt has historically been defended by the Trotskyist 
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movement, the Thalmanns’ remark left Munis apoplectic. Grinding his teeth, he 
declared his interlocutors to be ‘puerile anarchists’ and ‘clowns’. Nevertheless, in terms 
of representing a defeat for working class participation and control that represented a 
point of no return on the trajectory of the revolution, the Thalmanns’ analogy was to 
prove both prescient and apposite.124 
The Experience of Defeat 
 
Following the May days, the divide between the leading cadres of the CNT and its 
remaining activists in the rearguard was such that the organisation has been described as 
being effectively, if not formally, split.125 On the night of 8 May an enlarged meeting of 
the Catalan libertarian movement took place in Barcelona.126 Present were many of the 
leading figures of the Regional and National Committees of the CNT and the FAI: in 
addition to Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez and Federica Montseny, yet to return to 
Valencia, were the Sub-secretary for Defence in the Catalan Government, Juan Manuel 
Molina, the Public Services Councillor, Josep J. Domènech, the CNT delegate for 
public order in the Catalan Government and one of those responsible for the Patrullas 
de Control, Dionisio Eroles, a CNT delegate at the Municipal Council, Vicente Perez 
Combina, and members of the Regional Committee of the FAI and fellow contributors 
to Ideas, José Xena and Severino Campos, along with other delegates from the localities 
and youth organisations. Earlier that evening members of the Barcelona city police, the 
Mossos d’Esquadra, had opened fire at the car carrying Federica Montseny, injuring her 
secretary and another passenger, while others were surrounding the home of Dionisio 
Eroles even as the meeting took place. Five of Eroles’s bodyguard had been taken out of 
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their homes and shot.127 It was therefore in an atmosphere of high tension that the 
meeting revealed the fault lines that the events of the previous days had brought to the 
surface in the Spanish libertarian movement. In that context, the leading figures of the 
organisations continued in their role as ‘fire-fighters’, attempting to calm spirits and 
stressing the need to avoid being provoked by the forces of law and order. 128 This 
attitude was summed up early on in proceedings by the National Secretary, Rodríguez 
Vázquez, who stated that ‘All problems have to be resolved one by one, with calmness 
and serenity, sacrificing part of our ideological concepts for the good of the common 
cause.’129  
Conflict arose at the meeting over the responsibility of the comités superiores for 
the repression that the newly arrived Assault Guards were unleashing in the Catalan 
region. The leadership had assured CNT members that the crisis would pass with the 
removal of the officials responsible for the assault on the Telefónica building, and yet, 
the area around the French border, until recently recognised as a zone of libertarian 
influence, had been ‘invaded’, averred the delegate Arenas, with the apparent 
acquiescence of the comités superiores. This delegate was almost certainly Juan 
Giménez Arenas, known as ‘the Quijote of Banat’, a town in the border region of 
Cataluña, who was secretary of the JJLL in Sants and a former combatant in the Durruti 
Column, who had taken part in the fighting in May.130 A heated argument took place 
between José Xena and the delegates of the border region.131 Xena, who had provided 
the only vote in favour of ‘going for everything’ at the famous Regional Plenum of 21 
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July 1936 discussed in Chapter One, had apparently maintained a position of radicalism 
from that point on. From May, however, we find him continuously demanding internal 
organisational discipline, part of a wider dynamic by which intermediate cadres whose 
relationship to state collaboration had been ambiguous found themselves continually 
facing down lower level activists from the suburbs and provincial towns. His first such 
test may have been in imposing demobilisation from within the expanded Regional 
Defence Committee discussed above. Given Xena’s prominent role among the radical 
advocates of socialisation in the previous months, his subsequent activity provides 
further evidence of the extent to which that campaign had obscured the divisions within 
the CNT, and which May 1937 would expose.  
Further disagreements arose over the question of disarmament and the release of 
prisoners taken by libertarians during the fighting. On the question of disarmament, José 
Manzana, another member of the expanded Regional Defence Committee, stated that:  
this morning we have spoken to the neighbourhood committees and these 
are resisting as far as possible… the voluntary hand-over of weapons. 
Naturally, if we impose ourselves they will do so, but that would be 
unjust given that we have spent twenty years inculcating rebelliousness 
and disobedience in the masses and cannot all of a sudden demand that 
they be obedient and disciplined… it is not right that a weapon that is 
worth a life and the sacrifice of several comrades be handed over like 
this.132  
The delegate for the Defence Section of the CNT explained the reluctance of the 
neighbourhood defence committees to release their prisoners, four hundred of whom 
had in fact been released the previous day by the defence committee of the Sants 
neighbourhood, without assurances that the same magnanimity would be shown the 
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imprisoned comrades of the CNT.133 This produced a heated debate with Miguel 
Barrachina, who had been a member of the defence committee of Gràcia in July 1936, 
who insisted on the need to obey the agreements taken by the organisation. To this the 
exasperated delegate for the Defence Section declared that ‘for the agreements to be 
obeyed they must be approved beforehand in consultation with the comrades’.134 It was 
clear, however, that for the comités superiores, further debate was to be avoided, and no 
further guarantees from the government or the PSUC were to be sought, still less 
wrested by force.  
While there can be no doubt that the leading cadres of the CNT saw the May 
insurrection as a disaster and a return to normality as desirable, their insistence on 
releasing prisoners with no sign that their enemies would follow suit is hard to explain. 
The priority of the organisation was to avoid culpability for a collapse of the anti-fascist 
front. The order of the day was to avoid provoking further disharmony, an attitude 
which extended to discouraging relatives of those who had been killed in the fighting 
from attending their funerals, for fear that they might ‘mount some sort of 
demonstration’.135 This was combined with complacency as to the power and political 
will of their rivals, particularly those in the security forces and in the PSUC. Sure that 
the provocative manoeuvre of May had ‘failed’, the National Committee of the CNT 
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evidently trusted that the show of strength on the streets would deter their opponents 
from further provocations.136 
Relevant in this regard is the discussion of the AAD at the meeting, whose leaflets 
were described as ‘weapons launched by the true disturbers of order’ to create ‘discord 
among those who must always be united’. Such intemperate language far exceeded what 
the comités superiores were prepared to use for the agents of state reconstruction, even 
behind closed doors. Yet more revealing, however, was the admission that the 
organisation would have to mount a campaign of propaganda to counter the Agrupación 
‘because the ideas that they express in these leaflets are well received in our ranks’.137 
Earlier that day, the AAD had distributed a manifesto that affirmed the revolutionary 
nature of the May days and which castigated the comités superiores: ‘The treachery is 
of an enormous scale. The two essential guarantees of the working class, security and 
defence, are offered on a plate to our enemies.’138 The leaflet went on to affirm that the 
Agrupación remained on a war footing and that its ‘indomitable spirit’ would be 
maintained. This was to prove particularly difficult, however, as the comités superiores 
moved quickly to crack down on the AAD. 
On 12 May, a plenary meeting of individual union leaderships authorised the 
Local Federation of unions in Barcelona to track down the leadership of the AAD and to 
demand an explanation from them for the leaflets printed during and after the May days. 
The following day, at an enlarged meeting of the Catalan Regional Committee, at which 
representatives from all branches of the libertarian movement were present, a campaign 
of slander was begun against Jaime Balius, a leading figure within the AAD and by then 
something of a veteran of the CNT. Attendees were warned that ‘we must have the 
                                                 
136 See the report in Brademas, Anarcosindicalismo y revolución, pp. 261-3. 
137 ‘Reunion extraordinaria del comité regional’. 
138 See AGRUPACIÓN “AMIGOS DE DURRUTI”, ‘Trabajadores’, PDLR, Fons DH, DH 6 (1), 4- 
Amigos de Durruti (CNT-FAI). The leaflet is reproduced in Guillamón, Los Amigos de Durruti, pp. 223-
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upmost care insofar as [the AAD] is concerned, because it is said that the secretary of 
the group is an old communist’.139 At a time when it was frequently averred that the 
AAD was composed of agents provocateurs, the subtle insinuation that Balius might 
still be serving the interests of ‘communists’ was a carefully chosen slur designed to 
cause the grouping the maximum possible discredit. The suggestion that the AAD 
contained agents provocateurs appeared in the CNT’s response to the leaflet distributed 
by the AAD during the May days.140 El Amigo del Pueblo, the mouthpiece of the AAD, 
appeared for the first time within a week of this meeting in a heavily censored edition 
that attempted to announce the beginning of a battle over the meaning and purpose of 
the CNT and the FAI with the headline ‘We are not provocateurs! We are the same as 
ever! Durruti is our guide! His flag is our flag! No-one will take it from us! Long live 
the FAI! Long live the CNT!’.141 Pressed to provide the Local Federation of unions with 
a list of the Agrupación’s members, the AAD instead responded with a letter advocating 
that their ideas should be debated at assemblies of unions and CNT activists.142 This, of 
course, was out of the question. At the end of the month, it was publicly declared that 
the AAD had been expelled from the CNT.143 
By the time that the Juventudes Libertarias of Cataluña met for a Regional 
Congress on 15 May, a whispering campaign had also begun against a leading figure in 
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both that formation and the AAD, Juan Santana Calero. It was suggested that Santana 
Calero had abandoned Málaga precipitously in the face of the fascist advance. His 
arrival in Barcelona, however, in February 1937, may have been owing to his 
participation at a rally of the JJLL. José Peirats recalls being told of Santana Calero’s 
apparent ‘cowardice’ in the aftermath of the May events, which suggests that it was a 
rumour deliberately concocted at this time.144 The second week of May had seen the 
appearance of Santana Calero’s flysheet, Esfuerzo, in Barcelona. Aside from the 
manifesto of the AAD, this was probably the first libertarian publication after the May 
events to offer an unequivocal defence of the revolutionary side in that conflict, likening 
the revolution’s defenders in Barcelona to those who fought fascism at the front and 
those who had defeated the mutiny in July.145 The edition called for the release of the 
revolutionary prisoners and the ‘revolutionary defence of the workers against their 
enemies’, and was also noteworthy in maintaining its pre-May attempts to divide the 
JSU and urging revolutionary unity.146 This strategy was not limited to Cataluña, as 
demonstrated by articles highlighting the lack of internal democracy in the JSU and its 
consequently anti-revolutionary policy in the organ of the CNT in the province of 
Granada, Hombres Libres.147 This position was, to an extent, echoed in a joint manifesto 
of the Catalan CNT, FAI and JJLL, made public on 11 May. Although lacking the 
stridency of Esfuerzo, this manifesto appealed to workers of the UGT to distance 
themselves, on the basis of class unity, from counter-revolutionary politicians.148 This 
tactic was to recede in all branches of the libertarian movement, however, and was to 
suffer an immediate blow at the Regional Congress of the JJLL.  
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Santana Calero’s call, in Esfuerzo, for ‘fraternisation and alliance among all 
young revolutionaries’ encountered an obstacle in the form of a policy proposal drawn 
up for discussion at the Congress, and published beforehand in Ruta.149 The signatories 
of this proposal had drawn a different conclusion from their experience of the events in 
May, and urged that relations with all ‘political elements’ be broken off, stating that 
‘Our contact with the so called Youth Front should be suspended’.150 Even after fighting 
on the same side of the barricades as the POUM, the purist current of the JJLL refused 
to make distinctions as to the efficacy of alliances with ‘Marxists’, and had been 
strengthened in their conviction that such ‘political’ tactics represented an 
‘abandonment of principle’.151 The rationale of this approach was explained at the 
Congress by the delegate for the socialised Espectáculos Públicos (show business) 
industry, who wondered: ‘how are we going to unify with young Marxists when they 
are fighting amongst themselves?’.152 The nuanced understanding of the leadership of 
the JSU as something other than ‘Marxist’, which had allowed Santana Calero among 
others to appeal to that organisation’s membership on the basis of a shared, 
authentically revolutionary, socialism, had clearly failed to convince all libertarian 
militants. Nevertheless, the FJR was defended on such terms by several delegates at the 
Congress. The delegate of the Distribution sector affirmed that the FJR was a vehicle 
through which to attack the JSU and attract ‘the amorphous masses’. The delegate of 
Premià de Mar went so far as to declare that the participation of the local JJLL in the 
FJR would continue regardless of the decision of the Congress.153 However, the fact that 
the delegate from Gràcia could support the purists’ proposal, even after the formation in 
that neighbourhood of a committee composed of anarchists and POUM members during 
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the May days and the promulgation of a manifesto that explicitly recognised the POUM 
as ‘authentic revolutionaries’, is demonstrative of the level of opposition to the FJR at 
the Congress. In spite of evident division, a majority eventually agreed to completely 
separate the JJLL from ‘political’ activity. The nineteen year old Ramón Liarte was 
named the new Regional Secretary, in place of Fidel Miró. 
Miró’s absence from the Congress may have inclined the balance towards the 
purist position. Detained during the May events, the outgoing Regional Secretary’s 
involvement was limited to a letter favouring the continuation of revolutionary unity. 
Also absent was the Vice Secretary, Alfredo Martínez, the Secretary of the FJR and its 
most prominent promoter within the JJLL, who was missing, presumably murdered. 
Aside from these absences and the traditional purist antipathy to ‘politics’, however, it 
should also be borne in mind that this Congress took place with a national governmental 
crisis as its backdrop. The crisis had been provoked by Communist determination to 
accuse the POUM of responsibility for the May events and to have the party declared 
illegal as a consequence. For the comités superiores, also happy for the POUM to take 
the blame, any association with the party was now toxic. Wilebaldo Solano, Secretary 
of the POUM’s youth section, the JCI, was therefore correct to perceive a confluence of 
interests among the comités superiores and the purist tendency of the JJLL at this 
Congress.154 There was an ‘extensive’ intervention by the Regional Committee of the 
FAI, which made reference to the ongoing ministerial crisis in Valencia, and bluntly 
stated that the JJLL lacked a Regional Committee ‘appropriate for the times’.155 Given 
that the Secretary of the JJLL was in prison and both the Vice Secretary and a further 
Committee member, the Uruguayan Juan Rúa, had disappeared, presumed murdered, 
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this intervention is illustrative of the kind of cynical opportunism Solano identified.156 
Although the avowed apoliticism of the purists clashed with the policy of the comités 
superiores and would provoke further divisions in the libertarian movement in the 
months to come, the intention of the former to return the JJLL to a role strictly limited 
to propaganda and education would have been preferable from the point of view of the 
comités superiores to an ongoing commitment to revolutionary unity with the POUM, 
with all the complications that might imply for the CNT on a governmental level. In 
their rejection of ‘politics’, therefore, the purists were, consciously or not, performing a 
political role. As Solano put it: ‘At that point, they [the comités superiores] did not have 
a replacement team within the JJLL that would carry out their policy and they turned to 
the most extreme faistas with whom they were in disagreement in order to change it’.157 
The voluntarist position, advocated by the likes of Santana Calero and in the May 
manifesto of the JJLL of Gràcia, could thus be side-lined. Miró, meanwhile, would find 
himself persona non grata at the headquarters of the regional JJLL on his release from 
prison, and would be coaxed into the national structure of the FIJL as a defender of 
collaborationist orthodoxy by Pedro Herrera, who was a fellow member of the affinity 
group Nervio, and Rodríguez Vázquez.158 The attentions of the comités superiores 
would then turn to disciplining the purists.   
Meanwhile, the governmental crisis ended when Largo Caballero refused to move 
against the POUM in the absence of any evidence linking them to the mobilisation of 
May. This precipitated the withdrawal of the Communist ministers, who were followed 
by the rest of the cabinet, with the exception of the CNT ministers, the UGT 
representative Ángel Galarza and Largo Caballero himself. In the resulting negotiations, 
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Rodríguez Vázquez made it clear on behalf of the CNT that the organisation would not 
participate in any government over which Largo Caballero did not preside. On 17 May 
it was officially announced that Juan Negrín would be the new Prime Minister. Negrín 
was a member of the Socialist Party who had already come into conflict with the CNT 
in his role as Finance Minister in the outgoing cabinet.159 Largo Caballero had been 
ousted from government, and with him went his allies in the CNT.160 On 18 May 
Solidaridad Obrera declared on its front page that ‘A Counterrevolutionary 
Government has been formed.’161 
The following day the Regional Committees of the Catalan libertarian movement 
met in an atmosphere of confusion and no little pessimism. Support for the National 
Committee’s unconditional and unwavering support for Largo Caballero was far from 
unanimous, but when Severino Campos, the delegate of the Regional Committee of the 
FAI, attempted to block approval of a national manifesto praising the outgoing Prime 
Minister, his objections were overruled. This disagreement was revealing of the 
bureaucratisation of the libertarian movement underway. Campos is recorded as 
complaining that ‘While it is true that it was agreed that the three Committees [JJLL, 
CNT and FAI] would work together, the [CNT] Regional Committee of Cataluña has no 
right to so praise a politician without respecting the vote against doing so of one 
Committee, which has as much right to express its opinion as any other.’162 The severity 
of the situation facing the libertarian movement was beginning to dawn on the comités 
superiores, but in spite of the demands of the delegate of the Regional Defence 
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Committee for ‘urgent measures’ to be taken, the Regional Committee of the CNT 
insisted once more that ‘no strikes or violent action’ were to be undertaken under any 
circumstances.163 Pérez Combina approached the heart of the matter when he stated that 
‘we are the masters of the economic situation, but the economy is useless if alongside it 
we have no arms… Do not think that we will be respected if we are disarmed’.164 The 
next day, the editorial on the front page of Ideas took up this theme with characteristic 
urgency and voluntarism: 
Workers! You have the opportunity to be free. For the first time in social 
history the arms are in our hands; do not release them… Always 
remember that it is planes, cannon and tanks that the fronts need to 
quickly overcome fascism… what all the politicians want is to disarm the 
workers… and take from them everything they have conquered at the 
cost of so much blood, of so many proletarian lives… Disarm those who 
want to disarm you.165  
As the May days had demonstrated, however, it was one thing to possess arms, 
another to use them. With a National Plenum of the libertarian movement approaching, 
the same edition of Ideas drew attention to the issues that would have to be confronted 
within the libertarian movement before any coordinated approach to the question of 
arms, and the attendant questions of power and the fate of the revolution, could be 
broached. ‘Am I to consider counterrevolutionaries to be my brothers?’ wondered the 
Argentinian painter Gustavo Cochet in one contribution, indicative of the bitterness that 
the demobilisation had generated:  
‘Cease-fire!’ was the cry… Very well, but what conditions were 
established for the cease-fire to take place? We were not defeated and we 
could have won, we had force and reason on our side, we had courage 
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and the consciousness of a revolutionary duty. I repeat: what conditions 
were demanded?166 
In the event, the National Plenum was a somewhat subdued affair. Although the 
apparently radical outcome ratified opposition to and non-collaboration with the 
‘Government of the Counterrevolution’, of more significance was the ongoing concern 
for internal discipline and refusal to countenance any further mobilisation ‘on the 
street’.167 The delegate for the Central region did envisage the possibility that, with the 
agreement of the organisation nationally, comrades in Cataluña and Valencia could 
‘move fully against the repressive governmental action’, but this intervention found no 
echo among the other delegates, least of all those from the regions in question. 
Crucially, the agreement not to collaborate did not extend to a withdrawal of the 
multiple councillors and municipal delegates of the libertarian movement working in 
various branches of state administration. Furthermore, it was based on a calculation that 
the UGT, under the influence of Largo Caballero, would continue in an attitude of 
hostility to the new government. The flaws in this calculation were becoming apparent 
even as the Plenum took place, and allowances were made in the agreements to revise 
the non-collaboration stance should the UGT position change.168 No critique or 
reflection on the experience of collaboration itself was made, and the criticism voiced 
by the Catalan delegates of the National Committee’s handling of the crisis were limited 
to the ingenuity with which the latter had tied the fate of the organisation in government 
to the person of Largo Caballero.169  
                                                 
166 Ibid. See below for a discussion of Santana Calero’s article in this edition. 
167 See ‘Acuerdos del Pleno Nacional de Regionales celebrado los días 23 y sucesivos de mayo de 1937’ 
included in ‘Circular 25-1937’ from the Peninsular Committee of the FAI, Barcelona, 31 May 1937, CNT 
(España) Archives (IISG), 49 A.  
168 The National Committee highlighted ‘the fact that strong nuclei of the UGT have manifested their 
adhesion to the current Government, against the position that the Executive adopted from the first 
moment’. See ‘Actas del Pleno Nacional de Regionales, extraordinario, del Movimiento Libertario, 
celebrado los días 23 y sucesivos de mayo de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG), 46 B. There was 
some opposition to making policy dependent on that of the UGT, but this was overcome with the 
bureaucratic assurance that any new position would be elaborated at a future Congress.  
169 Ibid. 
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In short, the Plenum did not reflect the division existent in the libertarian 
movement, its moment of controversy limited to the Andalusian delegates’ censure of a 
National Committee circular regarding Francisco Maroto.170 The circular, signed by 
Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez on 3 May 1937, was issued in response to a letter sent by 
Maroto, whose imprisonment had become a cause célèbre for the libertarian movement 
throughout the Republican zone. The circular implied that, contrary to widespread 
libertarian belief, Maroto – a veteran CNT member described variously in the circular as 
‘a kid’ and ‘a puppet’ – did indeed have a case to answer.171 Nevertheless, it was also 
clear that his true crime, as far as the National Committee was concerned, was to have 
publicly criticised the comités superiores. There was no sign at the Plenum of what the 
National Committee referred to in its circular as the ‘notorious irresponsible elements 
that abound in our ranks’.172 The expulsion of the AAD was ratified unanimously, and it 
was decided that Liaison Committees be set up in the regions (albeit with the prior 
consent of the committees in question) to further cohere the different branches of the 
libertarian movement.173 This latter measure had been proposed by the Catalan 
delegation to end ‘the lack of unity among the three branches of our movement’. These 
Committees were to focus on propaganda, defence and investigation, although both the 
delegation for the Central region and the National Committee also raised the possibility 
of creating an ‘organ of political direction’ within the movement.174 In the aftermath of 
the May events, the comités superiores were thus sketching out an institutional 
                                                 
170 See ‘Comité Nacional Circular Nº 7’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG), 46 B. 
171 At a Peninsular Plenum of the FAI in July, Maroto averred that this assertion could have been used 
against him by the authorities. The response of the Peninsular Committee of the FAI was to repeat the line 
of the National Committee of the CNT, that Maroto’s temperament had led him into a trap set by his 
political enemies. See Memoria del Pleno Peninsular de Regionales celebrado en Valencia los días 4, 5, 
6 y 7 de Julio 1937 (Valencia: FAI, 1937), pp. 25-31. 
172 ‘Comité Nacional Circular Nº 7’. 
173 See ‘Acuerdos del Pleno Nacional de Regionales’. 
174 See ‘Actas del Pleno Nacional de Regionales’. 
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framework by which the three branches of the libertarian movement could be 
transformed into a single, top-down entity.175 
Attempts to take up the challenge of the JJLL of Gràcia to replace those comités 
superiores ‘sealed off’ from the rest of the movement would thus face an uphill battle as 
the ‘bolshevisation’ of the CNT continued apace in spite of the organisation’s exit from 
central government, an event echoed at the regional level when the reorganisation of the 
Generalitat led to the ejection of the CNT at the end of June.176 It is possible that the 
departure from these governmental bodies in fact accelerated the process of 
bureaucratisation, as the majority of former Ministers and Councillors would 
subsequently be ushered into existing or newly established comités superiores. In his 
memoirs, Martínez Prieto alleges that the National Committee under the jurisdiction of 
Rodríguez Vázquez was ‘converted into a monstrous bureaucratic apparatus full of 
draft-dodgers and people who did little other than “hang around” and waste time’.177 In 
Ideas ‘Fontaura’, the veteran purist Vicente Galindo Cortés, wrote that ‘The 
bureaucracy is taking on terrifying proportions. Certain individuals are living in the best 
of worlds. They are “emancipated” from labour – because spending three or four hours 
chatting in an office cannot be called work - and they receive salaries such as they had 
never dreamed possible.’178 Although Galindo Cortés did not state clearly that the 
targets of his reproaches included activists of the CNT, in the chapters that follow we 
will see more evidence of grass-roots resentment at the proliferation of organisational 
committees in the libertarian organisations, the majority tasked with imposing internal 
discipline. In the same edition of Ideas, Santana Calero raised the alarm against 
enforced homogeneity in the libertarian camp, perceiving: 
                                                 
175 This observation is also made in Peirats, The CNT, Vol. 2, p. 184. 
176 The CNT had objected to the reduced influence that it would have in the reshuffled government 
Companys had initially presented to the organisation. ‘No longer strong enough to impose conditions’, 
the CNT was simply excluded: Pagès i Blanch, La Guerra Civil espanyola a Catalunya, p. 120. See also 
Lorenzo, Los anarquistas españoles, pp. 223-5, and Peirats, The CNT, Vol. 2, pp. 198-202. 
177 Prieto, Secretario General de la CNT de España en 1936, Tomo II, p. 184. 
178 Ideas, 20 May 1937. 
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an attempt to make of the press and of men, pieces that respond to one 
leadership, even when that leadership embodies fatal errors for the 
transformative process of the Spanish Revolution… What is attempted is 
to paralyse the vigorous offensive against this [collaborationist] line, the 
results of which have been so deplorable for the revolutionary 
movement.179 
Making a connection that would become increasingly clear to the ‘anti-statists’ he was 
addressing, the article accused the comités superiores of ‘threatening our principles and, 
what is worse, denying the consequences of our intervention in the state’.180 As we will 
see in the chapters that follow, it would be on the basis of a critique of this intervention 
that the radical sectors would attempt to alter the course of the libertarian movement in 
Spain. 
Conclusions 
 
The May rising in Barcelona was predicated on the prior crystallisation of a vanguard 
grouping around the neighbourhood defence committees, the JJLL and the Local 
Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups, organised in defence of a radical programme 
and mandated by a Plenum of the FAI to struggle against ‘the counterrevolution’. The 
mobilisation these bodies effected was so successful that it briefly appeared likely that 
the ‘error’ of July oppositional anarchists had identified would be rectified, and the seat 
of Catalan government, left standing during the short summer of anarchy, would be 
toppled in this springtime of the radicals. Nevertheless, the rising failed. The 
programme of the revolutionary conscience was not carried through to its ultimate 
conclusion. Worse for the radicals, by showing the limits of the hand they could yet 
play, they not only failed to mount a thoroughgoing offensive against their adversaries, 
but also left themselves open to further repression by the state.  
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It was not ideological scruples that had prevented the military victory of the 
revolutionaries but acquiescence to the assertion of the CNT and the FAI’s 
organisational hierarchy. The hypothesis presented here is that the radical anarchists 
rose on account of the mandate granted by the April plenum of the Barcelona FAI to the 
defence committees to undertake armed resistance to the ‘counter-revolution’. In that 
sense, we can only appreciate why both the mobilisation and the demobilisation 
occurred through an understanding of the participants as committed members of 
organisations whose internal mechanisms they respected. Whether the radicals would 
have been as prepared to accept the decision to demobilise had they known that the 
Regional Committee had altered the composition of the Regional Defence Committee is 
moot. Nevertheless, the addition of four prominent CNT members to this Committee at 
the regional meeting of 5 May is a significant discovery that enhances our 
understanding of how this demobilisation was enacted.  
Hitherto, explanations for the demobilisation have tended to depend on appeals to 
the ‘psychological factors’ discussed above. Without wishing to dismiss their 
importance, such explanations fail to overcome the logical inconsistency in this 
argument: that it was the defence committees who ordered both the mobilisation and the 
demobilisation. Can the abrupt change of tack from planning an all-out assault one day 
to ordering a demobilisation the next be explained by doubt and organisational loyalty? 
Perhaps, but it ought to be remembered that the co-ordinators of the initial mobilisation 
were respectful of the organisational norms of the libertarian organisation and believed 
the action to have been mandated by constitutional means. Alternative explanations, 
such as that of Helen Graham, that García Oliver and the comités superiores of the 
libertarian movement ‘saw the bigger picture: not only… in terms of the overriding 
imperatives of the war… but also in terms of the overall balance of firepower within 
Republican Spain’, fail to account for the fact that the plan of attack drawn up by the 
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defence committees was communicated to the barricades after García Oliver’s arrival 
and widely derided appeal.181 Even allowing for the existence of important 
‘psychological factors’ and residual respect for the increasingly ‘sealed off’ comités 
superiores, it would seem possible that the decision on 5 May to alter the composition 
of the Regional Defence Committee could have been decisive in tipping the balance. 
Merino and others co-ordinating the rising may have found themselves outnumbered, 
their recommendations contradicted, by the new additions with one foot in the Regional 
Defence Committee and one in the comités superiores. It is possible that this was not a 
conscious manoeuvre on the part of the regional comités superiores, but it would not 
need to have been in order to have an impact, and it follows an established pattern of ad-
hoc, bureaucratic resolutions taken behind closed doors undermining the initiative and 
resolve of those on the street. On the other hand, if it was a conscious manoeuvre then it 
was a logical one: the comités superiores recognised the limitations of their own 
influence over those on the barricades and took appropriate measures to instead change 
the composition of the Regional Defence Committee, whose authority certainly was still 
respected by the broader activist base, as is confirmed by the testimonies of Joan ‘Remi’ 
and Matías Suñer Vidal.  
The May days had demonstrated that the architects and promoters of the radical 
programme in Barcelona were far from isolated from the wider membership of the 
libertarian movement, and remained capable of mobilising broader community support. 
The participation of the CNT in government, and the maturation of anti-fascism as an 
emerging dominant ideology in Republican Spain, had not precluded the continued 
success of the anarchists’ anti-state project in Barcelona. When García Oliver entered 
the ‘Casa CNT-FAI’ and caught sight of Merino occupying a telephone booth, 
animatedly making and taking one call after another, it was clear that both the 
                                                 
181 Graham, ‘The Barcelona May Days’, p. 521.  
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governmental and radical wings of Spanish anarchism continued to stake a claim to the 
authority and resources of the libertarian movement. Following these events, it was 
evident to both sides that such co-existence was no longer possible.  
In May 1937, the two faces of Spanish ‘anarcho-Bolshevism’ had confronted one 
another. The revolutionary conscience mounted an insurrectionary mobilisation in order 
to defend the revolution and advance the radical programme. The comités superiores, 
identified by the radicals as ‘sealed off’ from the wider membership, saw this 
mobilisation as a disaster. Members of government in a time of war and leaders of an 
organisation that was responsible, to a great extent, for the continued ability of the war-
time economy to function, their perspective differed entirely from that of the street-level 
activists who saw in May an opportunity to halt the reconstitution of the state, and to 
‘go for everything’. To that extent, the comparison with Kronstadt is even more 
suggestive, as it pitted the revolutionary conscience against the previously revolutionary 
leadership: 
…what the rebels of Kronstadt demanded was only what Trotsky had 
promised their elder brothers and what he and the Party had been unable 
to give. Once again… a bitter and hostile echo of his own voice came 
back to him from the lips of other people; and once again he had to 
suppress it.182 
García Oliver, who had mocked Peiró and Pestaña for failing to take on the mantle of 
Lenin and Trotsky at the Madrid Congress of 1931, had himself shifted role from 
dashing strategist of revolutionary action to an increasingly authoritarian defender of the 
new state order. If May served to confirm this transition, it would become yet more 
evident in the months that followed. Condemned by the comités superiores, the Spanish 
revolutionary conscience only fell into line when the order to demobilise came from the 
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neighbourhood defence committees, themselves instructed by a delegate body whose 
composition had been altered by a bureaucratic manoeuvre. Organisational 
bolshevisation thus trumped the ‘anarcho-Bolshevism’ of vanguard initiative. 
May was the point at which the ambiguous nature of the CNT’s position was 
resolved definitively in favour of state reconstruction, even though the events 
precipitated the organisation’s exit from government. The mobilisation, which appears 
to have been at least partly co-ordinated from underneath the noses of the comités 
superiores inside the ‘Casa CNT-FAI’, also revealed to this leadership stratum that a 
tightening of internal discipline was required. In this process, formerly voluntarist 
anarchists would be relied upon as enforcers, in particular García Oliver, but also, as the 
regional meeting of 8 May revealed, those whose position as regards state 
reconstruction had hitherto been ambiguous, such as Xena and Eroles. For the anti-
statist conscience, by contrast, the success of the mobilisation vindicated the radical 
programme and convinced several voluntarists, not least Merino, of the capacity of the 
radicals to take on and defeat the state. In spite of the fact that they had ended in defeat, 
therefore, the radical perspective following the May events would be reaffirmed through 
a renewed effort to break with state collaboration, backed up with the threat of a return 
to the streets. While the context of increasing pressure from without and increasing 
polarisation within the libertarian movement presented new and difficult challenges to 
the radicals, therefore, the truly definitive nature of the defeat that May represented 
would only become clear after several more months of anarchist struggle against the 
state.  
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Chapter Four: ‘Permanent Effects of a Temporary Position’, June - July 1937 
 
After the events of May 1937, the space in which the oppositional currents of Spanish 
anarchism could operate was greatly circumscribed by a combination of violent police 
and military repression, the increasingly bureaucratised and hierarchical nature of the 
libertarian movement, and the extension of conscription in the Republican rear. Ever 
greater numbers of activists were absorbed by a war whose course gave little cause for 
optimism: Bilbao fell in June, Santander in August and Asturias in October. Meanwhile, 
in the rear, thousands of anarchists and POUM militants were jailed, above all in 
Cataluña.1 Local centres of the JJLL, the neighbourhood defence committees and those 
frequented by foreign revolutionaries were subject to police raids, registers and closure.2 
The targets of such actions were thus those same centres through which the libertarian 
mobilisation in May had been effected. Outside of Barcelona, in the Catalan provinces, 
anarchists complained of ‘reigns of terror’ being installed in areas formerly dominated 
                                                 
1 Between May 1937 and the end of summer 1938 around 4000 anti-fascists were imprisoned for varying 
lengths of time in Cataluña alone. The vast majority were members of the CNT. See the database of 
names compiled by François Godicheau, ‘Los Hechos de Mayo de 1937 y los “presos antifascistas”: 
identificación de un fenómeno represivo’, Historia Social, 3. 44 (2002), 39-63. The comités superiores 
tended to play down the quantity of CNT members in prison, but José Xena admitted at the Extraordinary 
Congress of the IWMA in December that ‘one and a half thousand’ were in jail as he spoke. See ‘Actas 
del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’, PDLR, Fons SA 5/5 (2). George Orwell reported in articles 
for the New English Weekly in July and September 1937, that: ‘When I left Barcelona in late June the jails 
were bulging; indeed, the regular jails had long since overflowed and the prisoners were being huddled 
into empty shops and any other temporary dump that could be found for them. But the point to notice is 
that the people who are in prison now are not Fascists but revolutionaries; they are there not because their 
opinions are too much to the Right, but because they are too much to the Left’: George Orwell, ‘Spilling 
the Spanish Beans’ (1937)  <http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/scw/orwell2.htm> [accessed 11 March 
2015].  
2 Within days of the May events, the building that housed the International Committee of Anti-fascist 
Emigrés in Barcelona was occupied and its inhabitants arrested, apparently by agents of the Soviet Union. 
See Kirschey, ‘A las barricadas’, pp. 175-6. The occupation and closure of the neighbourhood defence 
committee headquarters in Les Corts, housed in a former convent, took place in June at the hands of a 
squadron of Assault Guards. See Berenguer, Entre el sol, pp. 95-8. The social centre run by the 
Agrupación Los de Ayer y Los de Hoy was raided and the entire contents of its library removed. The 
Agrupación wryly commented that the quality of its enemies’ publications would surely improve as a 
consequence. See the Boletín de la Agrupación Anarquista Los de Ayer y Los de Hoy, July 1937. In 
August, the arts centre run by the Fine Arts and Liberal Professions union of the CNT was also raided and 
its contents confiscated. See María Eugenia Prece, ‘Barcelona y Guerra Civil’, 
<http://ccpe.org.ar/textos.pdf> [accessed 15 February 2016], part of a series of works related to Gustavo 
Cochet held at the Museo Gustavo Cochet.  
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by the CNT.3 In August the Regional Defence Council of Aragón was dissolved by 
government decree, whereupon troops of the 11th Division of the Popular Army under 
the Communist Enrique Lister broke up the region’s collectives and arrested hundreds 
of libertarians.4 
The refusal of the comités superiores of the libertarian movement to countenance 
an armed defence of the collectives and of the Council is revealing of the attitude that 
the oppositional anarchists would be confronted with throughout this period. According 
to César M. Lorenzo:  
… their passive attitude can be explained by their lack of concern for an 
organisation that had been constituted without their authorisation and by 
flouting internal discipline; it can also be explained by their desire to 
collaborate with Negrín, and consequently, to avoid provoking any 
serious conflict that would poison relations.5 
The radical anarchist programme was therefore opposed by the comités superiores on 
the grounds of both the challenge this posed to their own authority, and to its potential 
for disrupting their ongoing commitment to governmental collaboration. In such 
circumstances of external repression and institutional marginalisation, it is perhaps 
surprising that radicals were able to carry out any oppositional activity at all. Yet the 
example of Aragón also shows that some mid-level figures within the CNT and the FAI 
considered the question to be chiefly one of will: the revolution could yet be defended 
                                                 
3 This expression was used in a CNT report of 25 June in relation to Puigcerdà. The report states that 
rightist elements, including the former mayor, who had escaped after 19 July 1936 had returned and 
ordered that members of the CNT and the FAI leave the town. It further states that six anarchist militants 
had been murdered by the security forces on 10 June and their widows subsequently bullied and 
humiliated. See CDMH, PS Barcelona, 842/4, which contains similarly disturbing accounts from 
Amposta, Tortosa and Torelló.  
4 Lister himself claimed that somewhere in the region of 120 libertarians were arrested. See Enrique 
Lister, Nuestra Guerra. Aportaciones para una Historia de la Guerra Nacional Revolucionaria del 
Pueblo Español 1936-1939 (Paris: Colección Ebro, 1966), p. 155. In fact the figure was probably initially 
475, see Casanova, Anarquismo y Revolución, p. 273. On the dissolution of the Defence Council of 
Aragón, see ibid., pp. 264-97, Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 525-31, Díez Torre, Trabajan para la 
eternidad, pp. 216-20, and Walther L. Bernecker, Colectividades y revolución social. El anarquismo en la 
guerra civil Española, 1936-1939, trans. by Gustau Muñoz (Barcelona: Crítica, 1982), pp. 427-30.  
5 Lorenzo, Los anarquistas españoles, p. 249. 
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and the reconstruction of the state rolled back through armed action. As Joaquín Ascaso, 
the former President of the Defence Council of Aragón, reflected: 
We would have resisted, remaining at our posts and taking responsibility 
for all that might have occurred. In spite of the defeatist opinion of the 
CNT we would have defended our Council with arms in hand, as that is 
how we understand the Revolution, as we are today the same anarchists 
and revolutionaries that we were yesterday.6 
Whether this attitude was widespread in Aragón is hard to gauge, however. It is possible 
that the denouement of the Barcelona May days had convinced some influential 
activists of the futility of armed resistance to the forces of the state. This is the 
impression given by the testimony of Eugenio Sopena Buil, Secretary of the Committee 
of Collectives in Barbastro in Huesca, where troops came to take over the headquarters 
of the CNT: 
There were three divisions of the CNT on the Huesca front and… had 
there been a clash between those defending the building and… the 
government forces that attacked it, things would have gone as they did in 
Cataluña… I was one of those who said we should not put up resistance. 
There were many youths with weapons… We didn’t fire a single shot… 
I said: open the door… With that they arrested us all and took us to jail. 
There was no struggle.7 
Nevertheless, in Barcelona, where members of the defence committees were 
aware of how close they had come to gaining a victory over their opponents, the May 
events had not been accepted as a definitive defeat by the activists who had initiated 
them. In fact, we might surmise from the combative nature of the threats and statements 
issued over the months that followed, that they remained confident of their capacity to 
mobilise their forces. The exit of the libertarian movement from spheres of government 
                                                 
6 Taken from an interview with Joaquín Ascaso on his release from prison, first published in the Swiss 
review Le Réveil on 23 October 1937. Reprinted in Ascaso, Memorias, p. 189. 
7 Taken from a 1976 interview conducted by Frank Mintz, included as an appendix in Díez Torre, 
Trabajan para la eternidad, pp. 506-7. 
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was considered by some as an opportunity to employ extra-legal measures in defence of 
the revolution, while armed insurrection continued to be invoked as a viable option at 
Plenums as summer turned to autumn.8 Furthermore, resentment at the pacifying role of 
the comités superiores in May and at the apparent return to bourgeois normality in the 
Republican rearguard, embodied in the privileges of a minority at a time of generalised 
scarcity and the release of rightists and clergy from Republican jails, fuelled a 
continuous critique of CNT and FAI policy that would persist into 1938.9 
What remained at issue was the ongoing commitment to anti-fascist collaboration 
that had served to undermine the mobilisation in May. Considering this policy to have 
been responsible for the abandonment of the barricades, the radicals’ strategy over the 
summer of 1937 was to attempt to force the libertarian organisations to change course. 
In Cataluña, the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups (the Barcelona FAI) was 
central to the attempts to urge the withdrawal of anarchists from all official positions.10 
Such a withdrawal from state collaboration could only be countenanced if serious 
consideration was given to the question of whether to continue collaborating in the anti-
fascist war effort, and on what terms, and whether to forcibly confront the authorities of 
the Republican state, regardless of the impact this might have on the same. As this 
                                                 
8 As late as October, at Plenums of the Barcelona FAI, anarchists urged an insurrectionary response to the 
repression and marginalisation of the libertarian movement in Spain. This is discussed in greater detail in 
the following chapter. 
9 See the discussion of Anarquía below. Complaints about the release of fascist prisoners from their 
detention on Calle Santaló were aired at regional meetings of the CNT. See ‘Reunión del Comité 
Regional celebrada el día 8 de Julio de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 39 A. In August 1938 a 
letter of protest was written in the name of the Libertarian Movement of the neighbourhood of Armonía 
de Palomar (the name given to the Barcelona suburb of Sant Andreu during the war), which read: ‘While 
it seems that those who are considered the foremost figures of our movement are treated with a certain 
consideration by the official elements of other parties and organisations, this is not the case for the 
immense majority of our activists who are persecuted, jailed and even murdered, as in the worst times of 
counterrevolutionary repression. Nevertheless we are yet to witness a single virile gesture on the part of 
our Committees or our most representative men to prevent such abuses.’ The letter was signed by the 
defence committee (by then known as a comité de coordinación – coordination committee), anarchist 
agrupación and various youth and cultural associations of the neighbourhood. See CDMH, PS Barcelona, 
842/17. 
10 The debates within the Catalan FAI in this period have been referred to by historians but have not been 
discussed in as much detail as below. See Godicheau, La Guerre D’Espagne, pp. 332-5 and Amorós, La 
Revolución Traicionada, pp. 315-9 and 324-6. A recent exception to this rule is Guillamón, La represión 
contra la CNT, especially pp. 198-231. 
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chapter will discuss, the radicals did not shirk from confronting these questions, but 
were nevertheless incapable of forcing through the change of direction they considered 
necessary.  
The ‘anarchist ship back on course’? Debating collaboration outside of 
government 
 
A National Plenum of the libertarian movement held at the end of May 1937 arrived at 
apparently radical agreements, which affirmed that the libertarian organisations ‘would 
not collaborate directly or indirectly’ with the new ‘Government of the 
counterrevolution’ and would instead carry out ‘propaganda criticising [its] work’.11 
Nevertheless, the temporary renunciation of collaboration in central government 
occasioned by the premiership of Juan Negrín did not imply a reassessment of state 
collaboration in principle. On the contrary, CNT councillors in local and municipal 
government were instructed to remain at their posts, while the erstwhile anarchist 
Ministers publicly defended their records at rallies.12 Barely had the agreements of the 
National Plenum been publicised when, on 3 June, the National Committee of the CNT 
found itself obliged to issue a note to the press denying that it had offered its support to 
Juan Negrín’s administration.13 The previous day, the CNT mouthpiece Solidaridad 
Obrera had published on its front page the news that the National Secretary of the 
organisation, Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez, had met with the new Prime Minister of the 
Republic, under the headline: ‘Before the difficulties of the moment, the CNT offers its 
support to the Government’.14 In its denial of the following day, the National 
                                                 
11 ‘Acuerdos del pleno nacional de regionales celebrado los días 23 y sucesivos de mayo de 1937’, CNT 
(España) Archives (IISG) 49 A.  
12 See ‘Actas del pleno nacional de regionales extraordinario del movimiento libertario celebrado los días 
23 y sucesivos de mayo de 1937’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 932/4. 
13 Solidaridad Obrera, 3 June 1937. The National Committee reported to a National Plenum that it had 
received the impression from Negrín that there was little enthusiasm within the new government in regard 
to possible collaboration from the CNT, see ‘Acta del Pleno Nacional de regionales celebrado los días 2 y 
sucesivos de junio de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 46 B.  
14 Solidaridad Obrera, 2 June 1937. 
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Committee insisted that the meeting had only dealt with the possible conditions required 
for any future collaboration. 
Such ambiguity met with the scorn of several notable anarchists in France. The 
revolutionary syndicalist publication, Le Combat Syndicaliste, commenting on the 
apparent contradiction between the agreements of late May and the behaviour of the 
comités superiores, stated that the latter ‘must be made aware that this revolution will 
be defended, in spite of them, against their errors and against their deficiencies’.15 Le 
Combat Syndicaliste was the journal of the French affiliate organisation of the IWMA, 
the Confédération Générale du Travail - Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire (The General 
Confederation of Labour – Revolutionary Syndicalist - CGT-SR), formed in 1926, 
whose secretary, Pierre Besnard, was a well-known veteran of the movement, and the 
then General Secretary of the IWMA.16 The Fédération anarchiste de langue française 
(Francophone Anarchist Federation – FAF), a tiny organisation whose role relative to 
the CGT-SR was intended to be analogous to that of the FAI and the CNT in Spain, had 
already agreed on 19 May that its fund-raising activity in solidarity with the Spanish 
anarchist movement would from then on be directed towards the ‘oppositional’ 
anarchists of that country.17 Such voices, emanating from a small organisation, 
nevertheless disturbed the leadership of the CNT, unable to ignore its critics abroad 
because, on the one hand, they shared an international organisation, the IWMA, and on 
                                                 
15 Le Combat Syndicaliste, 11 June 1937. 
16 The size of the CGT-SR in 1937 was probably around 5000 members, while Le Combat Syndicaliste 
had a circulation of around 6000, although it is likely that it was read by ‘two or three times that number’, 
see David Berry, A History of the French Anarchist Movement, 1917 to 1945 (Edinburgh: AK Press, 
2009), p. 151. 
17 See ‘Informe sobre las actividades de las organizaciones y de algunos anarquistas franceses, en relación 
con la lucha antifascista española’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 523/13. On the FAF, see Berry, The French 
Anarchist Movement, p. 248. 
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the other, because of the danger that such criticisms would find an echo among their 
own rank and file.18 
That radicals in Spain shared a similar perspective to those in France was to 
become increasingly clear, however, and was signalled by the appearance of a new 
oppositional publication in June. Frente y Retaguardia was the newly-established 
mouthpiece of the JJLL at the front and in the rear at Huesca, and would provide 
support to the ‘purist’ line of the Catalan and Aragonese JJLL until its closure was 
ordered by the comités superiores at the end of the year. It mocked the ‘order’ that had 
been imposed on Cataluña and Aragón, echoing Rosa Luxemburg’s famous ‘Order 
Prevails in Berlin’ in ironically reporting certain declarations of Joan Comorera, ‘the 
shoe-shine boy of the Catalan bourgeoisie’, to the effect that victory had been obtained 
over the ‘fascists and provocateurs’ within the ranks of Spanish anarchism.19 A further 
article affirmed that Barcelona remained ‘a battle ground’, and that the struggle had not 
yet been given up.20 José Peirats, in an article entitled ‘Permanent Effects of a 
Temporary Position’, made a connection comparable to that drawn in Le Combat 
Syndicaliste between state collaboration and the calibre of the CNT as a revolutionary 
organisation:  
Many of the youth already think like perfect Communists or republicans, 
although they do so in the name of the CNT. Therein lies the danger. 
That of taking seriously a purely theatrical and transitory role. These are 
the permanent effects of a temporary position.21 
An attitude of ambivalence towards state collaboration was also in evidence 
among veteran libertarians on the Aragón front, where attempts on the part of the newly 
                                                 
18 The international aspect of oppositional anarchism was a continual preoccupation of the comités 
superiores and is discussed in more detail in this and the following chapter. 
19 Frente y Retaguardia, 26 June 1937. ‘Order Prevails in Berlin’, the last known piece of writing by Rosa 
Luxemburg, may be found at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1919/01/14.htm> [accessed 
10 March 2015]. 
20 Frente y Retaguardia, 26 June 1937.  
21 Frente y Retaguardia, 26 June 1937.  
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created Comisión Asesora Política (Political Advisory Commission - CAP) to have 
telegrams sent from majority libertarian divisions of the army protesting the CNT’s 
ejection from the Generalitat met with short shrift.22 The delegate sent to the front 
reported that Gregorio Jover had declared himself ‘very happy that the CNT was no 
longer collaborating and therefore would not even consider sending telegrams of 
protest’.23 The CAP, whose secretary was García Oliver, had been set up at a Regional 
Plenum of the Catalan libertarian movement in June with the aim of co-ordinating the 
branches of the movement in the region.24 It was viewed with some suspicion by 
Catalan anarchists, not least because its stated function of co-ordination was supposedly 
already being carried out by the regional Liaison Committee, established following the 
agreement of the National Plenum in May, discussed in the previous chapter. At a 
meeting of the Regional Committee of the Catalan CNT on 2 July, Pujol, the delegate 
for the metal and steel industry, commented on the acronym meaning ‘head’ in Catalan, 
and on the apparent desire of its members to place themselves above the norms of the 
libertarian organisations.25 On 12 July complaints were made about the multiplicity of 
committees, along with the suggestion that ‘many comrades want to quit work in order 
to pretend that they are looking after the organisation’.26 
That such ‘co-ordination’ was in any case required was demonstrated by the 
stance adopted by the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups in Barcelona, 
which constituted a serious challenge to the CNT’s continued commitment to state 
collaboration. This body felt compelled to respond to a statement issued on 14 June by a 
joint plenum of the Catalan regional CNT unions and FAI affinity groups which 
                                                 
22 See ‘Reunión del Comité Regional y demás comités responsables celebrado el viernes día 2 por la tarde 
del mes de julio de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 39 A.  
23 Ibid. 
24 On the role of García Oliver in the CAP see the recollections contained in Paz, Viaje al pasado, pp. 
196-8, and Peirats, De mi paso, pp. 349-51.  
25 ‘Reunión del Comité Regional y demás comités responsables celebrada el viernes día 2 por la tarde del 
mes de julio de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 39 A. 
26 ‘Reunión del Comité Regional de Cataluña celebrada el día 12 de julio de 1937 estando presentes casi 
todos los miembros del mismo’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 39 A.   
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favoured continued collaboration in the Catalan Generalitat on the terms that had 
operated hitherto.27 The response, which was probably written by Merino, called for a 
Regional Plenum of affinity groups to discuss such matters, and made a thoroughgoing 
critique of governmental collaboration and the rhetoric with which libertarians had 
justified this policy:  
In order to collaborate we not only interrupted the impetuous rhythm of 
the struggle against the rotten apparatus of the State, but also, dominated 
and obsessed by the degenerative atmosphere of the political world, we, 
the irreconcilable enemies of that oppressive mechanism ‘had to’ accept 
the paradoxical and ironic ‘mission’ of re-evaluating its functions as a 
regulatory apparatus of human activities and repressor of individual and 
collective liberties, and were thereby ‘nobly’ condemned to sterility and 
to the failure of our struggles and possibilities in the interests of a 
washed-out and outmoded antifascism and a war that is not for true 
freedom.28   
The notion of a ‘re-evaluation’ of the state was possibly in reference to García Oliver, 
whose speech in defence of his record as the Minister of Justice had tacitly 
acknowledged the role of the CNT in reconstructing a Republican state that had been all 
but toppled.29 Whether or not this was the case, the statement of the Local Federation 
clearly identified state collaboration as the factor by which libertarians had become the 
agents of their own repression. Even more striking was perhaps the first public 
reconsideration of the character of the Spanish civil war from an anarchist perspective, 
as a war that was ‘not for true freedom’. This was to be taken up again at the Regional 
Plenum of Barcelona Anarchist Affinity Groups in July, and is discussed in more detail 
                                                 
27 See ‘Dictamen que presenta la ponencia nombrada por el pleno regional de sindicatos de la CNT y 
federaciones de grupos de la específica, celebrado en Barcelona el día 14 del corriente, para dictaminar el 
tercer punto del orden del día’, Federación Anarquista Ibérica Archives (IISG) 17 B. 
28 ‘Federación Local de Grupos Anarquistas de Barcelona, Circular Nº 11’, Federación Anarquista Ibérica 
Archive (IISG) 49 A.  
29 ‘Until the Government created new organs of justice, incorporating the People’s Tribunals and the 
normal jurisdiction… the people had had to fulfil this role and they had done so’, Juan García Oliver, Mi 
gestión al frente del Ministerio de Justicia, p. 9.  
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below. Following the May days, during which Merino had played a key role, there was 
a feeling that a reorientation of the FAI could steer the CNT away from its postures of 
collaboration and compromise. The statement of the Local Federation was the opening 
salvo in this battle of ideas, and Merino would be among the most vocal advocates of a 
more combative policy within the Catalan FAI over the following months.  
Under his stewardship, the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups was at 
the forefront of attempts to both publicise and oppose repression, as well as to renovate 
the libertarian movement and force a break with the policy of collaboration. As early as 
January 1937, it had been rebuked by the Peninsular Committee of the FAI for 
undertaking independent activity in solidarity with interned anarchist prisoners without 
first seeking the approval of Dionisio Eroles.30 In late June it carried out a fact-finding 
mission to Puigcerdà, which resulted in a report on the repression the CNT was 
undergoing in the town.31 It was also responsible for the publication Anarquía, the first 
number of which appeared in Barcelona on 1 July 1937. This was an underground or 
‘clandestine’ publication, which was not submitted to the state censor. Godicheau 
considers that Anarquía was probably connected to the first Comisión Jurídica, a new 
body set up by the CNT to take over the role of the comité pro-presos, the traditional 
prisoner support group of the Confederation.32 Although the Comisión Jurídica had 
been set up as a formal alternative to the highly politicised and direct-action focussed 
prisoner support committees, the new approach was only reluctantly adopted, and was 
in fact rejected by certain sections of the movement inside and outside the prisons.33 In 
spite of such misgivings, the first Comisión Jurídica, which in any case proved too 
radical in its methods for the comités superiores, was thus allied to the Local Federation 
of Anarchist Affinity Groups, demonstrating the continued centrality of prisoner 
                                                 
30 See the letter of 21 January 1937, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 944/7. 
31 See ‘Informe sobre los sucesos de Puigcerdà’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 842/4. 
32 Godicheau, ‘Los periódicos clandestinos’, pp. 186-8.  
33 See Godicheau, No callaron, pp. 52-5. 
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solidarity work to anarchist activism during both the peace and war years of the Second 
Republic, excepting only the ‘short summer of anarchy’, when it was unnecessary. 
That the first Comisión Jurídica came into conflict with the comités superiores is 
unsurprising when we consider that the new body immediately made a point of 
denouncing the Code of Justice drawn up by the erstwhile minister, García Oliver. At 
the Regional Plenum of Catalan Anarchist Affinity Groups in July, the delegate of the 
affinity group Convicción y Firmeza, Alfons Miguel Martorell, a member of the action 
group Los Solidarios alongside García Oliver as far back as the 1920s and a close and 
trusted collaborator of the latter until at least the autumn of 1936, made the acid 
observation that ‘Franco would sign up to the Code of Justice elaborated by García 
Oliver’.34 The Comisión Jurídica, meanwhile, claimed that it was gaining ground as 
best it could, ‘given that it was an activist of our own organisation that has put so many 
obstacles in our way in a juridical sense’.35 During the civil war, initiatives undertaken 
in defence of anarchist prisoners in Spain were invariably connected to oppositional 
currents, and threatened to embarrass the comités superiores. So it was that relations 
between the CNT and the IWMA were even further damaged when on 23 July Besnard 
announced the formation of a committee in solidarity with the ‘victims of the Spanish 
counterrevolution’.36 The non-Spanish sections of the IWMA and the Comisión Jurídica 
were also united in their particular concern for foreign anarchist activists in Spain due to 
be deported in the wake of the May events, an issue that would be brought up at the 
Paris Congress of the IWMA, discussed in the following chapter. There, the comités 
superiores would show a lack of interest in the fate of their international comrades that 
was entirely at variance to the ‘enormous value’ their continued presence in Spain was 
                                                 
34 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. On Martorell, see ‘Anarcoefemèrides del 
20 de febrer’ <http://www.estelnegre.org/anarcoefemerides/2002.html> [accessed 3 December 2014].  
35 See ‘Informe de la Comisión Jurídica a los comités locales y regionales’, 19 June 1937, CDMH, PS 
Barcelona, 842/4. 
36 See Le Combat Syndicaliste, 23 July 1937. The CNT responded with a circular addressed to French 
anarchists calling on them not to give their support to this new committee. On the widening rift between 
the CNT-FAI and the CGT-SR, see Berry, The French Anarchist Movement, pp. 244-50. 
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considered to represent by the Comisión.37 Prisoner solidarity was thus united to a spirit 
of internationalism and was inseparable from opposition to the policy of the comités 
superiores in this period, a connection that was embodied by the Local Federation of 
Anarchist Affinity Groups in Barcelona and its work in the Comisión Jurídica and its 
publication, Anarquía, which affirmed its opposition to collaboration over the course of 
July. 
The third issue of Anarquía echoed Gregorio Jover in welcoming the CNT’s exit 
from government, commenting that ‘at least [the organisation] will be able to breathe 
fresh air’.38 The fourth edition went further, considering the moment to be particularly 
propitious for the movement to reassert its traditional anti-statism: 
In opposition, and even underground, the CNT, returning to the anarchist 
fold - albeit a return forced by circumstances – can, once again, be itself, 
propagate its positions from the unions, moralise its atmosphere, which 
has become somewhat strained in these times of collaboration, purge its 
ranks and recover the respect and sympathy of the workers… through a 
new and clear activity, free from alien and disturbing influences that 
destroy or falsify it.39  
If, the author continued, this prognosis was to prove over-optimistic, if the ‘anarchistic 
personality’ of the CNT’s leaders had been ‘completely lost amidst the cosy 
complacency of the ministerial or councillor’s armchair’, then other, ‘new and 
upstanding activists’ would have to take their place, and put the ‘anarchist ship back on 
course towards the longed for freedom’.40   
The editorial of the same edition made clear both the practical and ideological 
reasons for opposing state collaboration, in terms suggestive of Merino’s involvement: 
                                                 
37 ‘Informe de la Comisión Jurídica’. 
38 Anarquía, 12 July 1937.  
39 Anarquía, 18 July 1937. 
40 Ibid. 
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We contest collaboration on the grounds of both principles and interests. 
Principles, because through collaboration we struggle against our own 
ideals. Interests, because even the most ardent supporter of collaboration 
must have been convinced that we have gained nothing by it and lost 
much… Through collaboration, in addition to granting prestige to the 
forms of Government… it has been made clear that our convictions are 
not very firmly rooted in our consciousness. The worst of all is that: after 
the fact of collaboration; after many comrades and the Committees have 
sung its virtues, with what moral authority, with what force can they now 
combat it?41 
In other words, the renovation of anarchism and the affirmation of anarchist ideas would 
require the renovation of the comités superiores if such an affirmation was to have any 
credibility. Similar conclusions could be drawn from an article published at the end of 
the previous month in Frente y Retaguardia by Vicente Rodríguez, a prominent 
member of the JJLL and founder of the FECL, who had until June co-edited Acracia 
with José Peirats. Rodríguez critically evaluated the notion that the limitations of the 
Spanish revolution revealed a fundamental flaw in anarchism itself, affirming on the 
contrary that ‘The regime of collectives and socialisation has only failed when obstacles 
have been deliberately placed in its way by politicians and bourgeois elements, who 
have been respected by a revolution that has not known how to arrive at its ultimate 
consequences.’42 It was the dilution of anarchism, rather than the ideas themselves, 
which had led to the current impasse: 
The current situation in Spain corroborates our affirmations. Liberty will 
not be achieved through authoritarian means…Anarchism stuck inside 
authoritarianism, had necessarily to fail… The failure of authoritarianism 
as the solution to the vital problem of society is the most palpable 
evidence that we anarchists can give to affirm that only a federalist 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Frente y Retaguardia, 26 June 1937. 
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regime animated by mutual aid and solidarity… will provide the true 
solution to the social problem… We can also affirm that the failure of 
certain individuals who have distanced themselves from the fundamental 
principles of anarchism does not imply the failure of the ideas that such 
people claim to represent… Have the ideas failed? No; men have.43 
The Catalan section of the JJLL would also make plain this critique within the 
national plenums of the FIJL. There its delegates would be joined by representatives 
from the Aragón front such as Amador Franco, who declared at a Regional Congress of 
the JJLL of Aragón in July that:  
…if we commit the error of continuing this [political] policy, of 
accepting its constitution, its customs, its collaboration, we will soon find 
ourselves trapped in a spider’s web that will prevent us from making any 
gesture in defence of our dignity.44 
In reference to the agreement of the CNT and the FAI to wage a propaganda campaign 
against the Communist Party, one of the Catalan delegates to the National Plenum of the 
FIJL held in Valencia at the beginning of August affirmed the need for any such 
campaign to be framed within a wider renunciation of collaboration, in a clear echo of 
the arguments advanced in Anarquía, cited above: ‘if after uncovering the abuses and 
errors of the Government we then reveal our own desires to collaborate we would be 
doing nothing more than contradicting our anarchist theories’.45 
Against such appeals, however, the Peninsular Committee of the FIJL declared 
that the question of whether or not the libertarian movement collaborated in 
governments was beyond the prerogatives of the FIJL and should be left to the 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Quoted in Fernández Soria, Cultura y libertad, pp. 58-9.  
45 ‘Actas del pleno de regionales de la FIJL celebrado en Valencia los días 2 y 3 de agosto de 1937’, 
CDMH, PS Barcelona, 237/01. 
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judgement of the CNT and the FAI.46 In any case, the Catalan section was in a minority 
within the national youth organisation, and its strategic or ideological interventions 
were necessarily limited. Rather, it was frequently restricted to defending the right of 
the section to maintain a line that was at variance to the rest of the FIJL.47 As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the outcome of the May Plenum of the Catalan JJLL, where 
divisions between the ‘purists’ and the supporters of the FJR had led to the 
abandonment of the latter organisation, could be read as a form of tactical retreat. This 
is because the rupture with the POUM’s youth organisation, the JCI, occasioned by the 
exit from the FJR, broke one of the bonds of solidarity that the mobilisation of the May 
days had appeared to confirm.48 The weeks subsequent to this, which had seen the 
appearance of Anarquía and the statement of the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity 
Groups, suggested that this retreat need not be permanent. Clearly, there was a unity of 
criteria among the anarchists of the JJLL and those of the affinity groups responsible for 
Anarquía with regard to state collaboration. Side-lined within the FIJL, the anarchists of 
the Catalan and Aragonese JJLL would now have the opportunity to take their 
arguments to the Regional Plenum of the FAI, where the potential for co-operation 
between ‘voluntarist’ and ‘purist’ anarchists must have been apparent.  
The editorial of Anarquía cited above may be seen in this light, and it would 
appear that Merino, its probable author, was once again consciously attempting to 
provide a bridge between the voluntarist and purist wings of radical anarchism that 
would enable strategic co-operation. This was in evidence at the Regional Plenum of the 
                                                 
46 ‘Actas del pleno de regionales de la FIJL celebrado en Valencia los días 2 y 3 de agosto de 1937’. 
47 The question of federalism and the radical anarchist resistance to the homogenising pressure of the 
comités superiores is addressed in the following chapter. 
48 Although, as late as July, delegates to the Plenums of the FIJL continued to advocate the maintenance 
of the FJR as a device with which to expose the counterrevolutionary nature of the JSU (see ‘Federación 
Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias. Acta de la sesión cuarta del día 2 de Julio de 1937’, CDMH, PS 
Barcelona, 237/1), the dissolution of the FJR had been announced two months previously in the 
newspaper of the JCI, Juventud Comunista, 27 May 1937. Following the proscription of the POUM on 16 
June, libertarian co-operation with that party was necessarily limited to public declarations of support and 
circumstantial acts of solidarity such as offering sanctuary to its activists. 
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FAI at the beginning of July, discussed below. As has been stressed throughout this 
thesis, the categories of voluntarism and purism were not fixed, but can be usefully 
applied to the different approaches of radical anarchists to the question of state 
collaboration. At this time, the purist tendencies could be seen to affirm the integrity of 
anarchist principles, in the statements of the Catalan JJLL and in the pages of Ruta and 
Frente y Retaguardia, whereas the ‘voluntarist’ current, which in the summer of 1937 
found a voice in Anarquía and the publication of the AAD, El Amigo del Pueblo, placed 
greater emphasis on the working class as the agent of revolution and on the need for 
anarchists to exit the organs of the state and return to the unions and affinity groups. 
The wording of the Local Federation’s statement which called for a Regional Plenum, 
cited above, also seems to have been carefully chosen in this respect: making state 
collaboration the chief target of its polemic, it also affirmed that it was necessary to 
‘maintain the purity of anarchist principles’ and to elaborate a proactive response to the 
failures of state collaboration. The statement acted as a clarion call to all anarchist 
opponents of state collaboration to recognise an ally in the Local Federation of 
Anarchist Affinity Groups, and set the tone for the stormy debates at the Regional 
Plenum when it took place: 
It is necessary that the healthy reaction that…has begun against these 
procedures [of state collaboration] spreads throughout our organisations 
and strengthens our resolve to pulverise our eternal adversaries with the 
unity, action and power of our movement… It is indispensable that we 
react with firmness once and for all against this morbid apathy that 
breaks our morale and wounds our own interests… Out with political 
collaboration, everyone to the affinity groups and the unions… You must 
keep in mind… that while the union organisations and many affinity 
groups of the region consider that we must and can collaborate, we the 
Affinity Groups of Barcelona maintain different criteria.49  
                                                 
49 ‘Federación Local de Grupos Anarquistas de Barcelona, Circular Nº 11’. 
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That discontent was widespread among Catalan anarchists throughout the summer 
of 1937 is evidenced by the embattled tenor of the meetings of the committees. At a 
meeting of the Regional Committees of the libertarian movement on 9 June it was 
admitted that ‘the criticisms made against the Committees are the same for everyone, 
the hostile mood against us is everywhere gaining momentum’.50 This mood was also, 
albeit rarely, explicitly expressed in the anarchist press. On 8 July, Anarquía published 
a short article for which it was subsequently censured by the Peninsular Committee of 
the FAI, which read, in part:  
In the name of the Law, the ‘guardians of order’ commit outrages, loot 
the unions, destroy the constructive labour of the CNT and the FAI, tread 
on and tarnish the revolutionary economy, manifested in the collectives, 
broken up by the uniformed hordes. And all this with the consent of 
the… responsible Committees of the CNT. For shame! … An end must 
be put to this chaos.51 
At a meeting on the following day, the affinity group Germinal agreed to write to the 
Local Federation demanding that the author responsible for this article be sanctioned 
and that the weekly publication’s title and use of the FAI’s name be rescinded. The 
affinity group further agreed to push for Merino’s removal as Secretary of the Local 
Federation, suggesting that he was associated with the publication of such critiques.52 
                                                 
50 ‘Reunión del Comité Regional celebrada el día 9 de junio de 1937, estando presentes los demás comités 
responsables.’ CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 95 B.  
51 Anarquía, 8 July 1937. Following the intervention of the comités superiores, the subsequent issue 
claimed that the article had been published by mistake and that it was not ‘in the spirit of Anarquía to 
attack any responsible Committee’ and that, on the contrary, its pages were open to any member of said 
committees, see Anarquía, 12 July 1937. In the meantime, at the Peninsular Plenum of the FAI held in 
Valencia earlier in the month, the delegate of the National Committee of the CNT had brought the 
Plenum’s attention to the appearance of the publication, a ‘libellous broadsheet’, which questioned the 
policies of the ‘Confederal committees’. The Plenum subsequently instructed the Catalan Regional 
Committee of the FAI to disavow the publication. See ‘FAI Comité Peninsular, Circular 36-1937, 
Barcelona 12 de Julio de 1937’, Federación Anarquista Ibérica Archive (IISG) 49 A and Memoria del 
Pleno Peninsular, p. 52. 
52 See ‘Acta de la reunión del grupo ‘Germinal’ celebrada el día 9 de Julio con asistencia de cinco 
compañeros’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 1312 / 2. 
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The comités superiores saw it as their duty to check the hostile mood; on 22 June 
the new Regional Secretary of the Catalan CNT, José Juan Domènech, reported back 
from a meeting with the Catalan President Lluís Companys, at which the former 
acknowledged that ‘what worried him [Domènech] most was the atmosphere of hatred 
that was growing in the wake of these [repressive post-May days] events, to such an 
extent that he feared that the day was coming when the Committees would be unable to 
hold back the natural desire for revenge among those affected’.53 The Local Federation 
of Anarchist Affinity Groups, by contrast, declared that ‘for the good of the movement’, 
this hostile mood make itself felt where it might have most impact, urging in the 
statement discussed above that an end be put to the ‘street and café criticisms of the 
compañeros and the Committees’, because ‘everything that has to be said can and must 
be said in the unions, in the activist meetings, in the meetings of the affinity groups’.54  
The fruits of this perspective were felt at the Regional Plenum of Catalan 
Anarchist Affinity Groups held from 1 to 3 July. This assembly would reveal the depth 
and extent of the radical critique of the policy of the libertarian organisations that was 
being advanced by Catalan anarchists at this time, as well as unease as to the purpose 
and meaning of the war and the role of the FAI, and also suggested a confluence of the 
perspectives and tactics advanced by purist and voluntarist elements. It would further 
reveal, however, how seriously this opposition was taken by the comités superiores, 
which mobilised its most recognisable and respected figures to prevent the strategy 
advanced by the anarchist grupos from resulting in any concrete agreements or activity.  
Anti-militarism, anti-nationalism and the ‘war that is not for true freedom’ 
 
                                                 
53 ‘Reunión del Comité Regional de Cataluña, celebrada el día 22 de junio de 1937. Estando presentes los 
demás Comités responsables’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 39 A. 
54 ‘Federación Local de Grupos Anarquistas de Barcelona, Circular Nº 11’. 
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The central drama of the Regional Plenum of Catalan Anarchist Affinity Groups in July 
was the attempt on the part of the radicals to adopt, as the official policy of the Catalan 
FAI, the withdrawal of anarchists from all ‘official positions’, which is discussed in the 
final subsection of this chapter. The fact that such a move would undoubtedly have a 
negative impact on the war effort helps to explain why this attempt was ultimately 
unsuccessful. However, in order to understand why such a move could be countenanced 
by so many members of the Catalan FAI it is necessary to look again at how anarchist 
attitudes to the war were changing during this period. Previously, the social content of 
the war had been emphasised by even the most radical anarchists, in opposition to the 
characterisation of the conflict as a war of national liberation fought in defence of 
democracy. José Alberola had articulated the radical perspective in a speech given in 
March 1937: ‘It is said that we must renounce our ideas in order to win the war. If what 
they call war was nothing more than that we would have to be deserters. But it is 
principally a social conflict’.55 By the summer of 1937 there were ample signs that this 
perspective could no longer be sustained, not least because of the participation of 
sectors of the anarchist movement in the recasting of this ‘social war’ as one of national 
independence.  
As discussed above, anarchists in Spain and abroad had linked the ‘error of 
participation’ in government to a concomitant degeneration in the ideology professed by 
prominent activists. An article in Terre Libre, the mouthpiece of the FAF, averred that 
some could no longer claim to be anarchists because ‘they promote l’union sacrée, 
patriotism, nationalism and so on’.56 As we have seen, however, anarchist collaboration 
in the reconstruction of the Republican state drew on pre-existing ambiguities within the 
                                                 
55 Alberola, Interpretación anarquista de la revolución, p. 13.  
56 Terre Libre, May 1937. The article was almost certainly authored by Voline (pseudonym of Vsevolod 
Mikhailovich Eikhenbaum), who had been instrumental in setting up the first soviet of St Petersburg in 
1905 and who had later fought in Nestor Makhno’s anarchist army of the Ukraine during the Russian 
Civil War, before being expelled from the Soviet Union in 1921. 
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movement that were identifiable not only in its gradualist, but also its purist and 
voluntarist sectors. There were thus parallels between the rhetoric of Montseny in 1931 
and 1936, when the Republic was defended as the ‘progressive’ and more ‘civilised’ 
alternative facing the Spanish working class.57 Nevertheless, it is evident that war and 
state collaboration served to accelerate the process by which concepts of nationhood and 
an intermingling of the categories of ‘people’ and ‘proletariat’ became prevalent in 
Spanish anarchist discourse.58 Relevant in this regard is the presence on the editorial 
board of Solidaridad Obrera of Salvador Cánovas Cervantes, a proponent of a ‘racial’ 
understanding of Spanish anarchism who had been ejected from the CNT after standing 
for election during the Second Republic.59 A particularly egregious example of this 
trend was provided by an editorial in Solidaridad Obrera on 26 May, the front page 
headline of which read ‘Our revolution must be Spanish!’.60 Although a thinly veiled 
attack on Soviet intervention in Spain, the nationalist rhetoric employed in this article 
stressed the ‘Iberian, independent and national’ character of the Spanish proletariat, 
‘unconnected to any foreign influence’, and opposed the ‘purely Spanish, purely 
Iberian, purely peninsular’ position of the CNT and the FAI to those of the ‘parties of 
exotic origin’ in Spain, a position ‘which can be summarised in the phrase: Spain for the 
Spanish’.61  
Such positions were characterised as ‘national anarchism’ by Alexander Schapiro, 
an anarcho-syndicalist veteran of the Russian revolution, writing in Le Combat 
Syndicaliste: ‘To eulogise racism and disparage “exoticism” are two simultaneous and 
                                                 
57 See Chapter One. 
58 See Angel Smith, ‘Los anarquistas y anarcosindicalistas ante la cuestión nacional’, in Izquierdas y 
nacionalismos en la España contemporánea, ed. by Javier Moreno Luzón (Madrid: Editorial Pablo 
Iglesias, 2011), pp. 145-6. 
59 See Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, ¡Fuera el invasor! Nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la Guerra 
civil Española (1936-1939) (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006), pp. 71-2, and Martin Baxmeyer, ‘“Mother 
Spain, We Love You!”: Nationalism and Racism in Anarchist Literature during the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-1939)’, in Reassessing the Transnational Turn: Scales of Analysis in Anarchist and Syndicalist 
Studies, ed. by Constance Bantman and Bert Altena (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 205 
60 Solidaridad Obrera, 26 May 1937. 
61 Ibid. 
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complementary phenomena that indicate, to say the least, an anti-revolutionary state of 
mind.’62 It was not only foreign anarchists who found fault with this tendency, however. 
Six months later, in the JJLL publication Faro, discussed in the following chapter, 
which published contributions from the international anarchist movement, Antonio 
Morales Guzmán, former secretary of the Local Federation of the CNT in Granada, 
provided one of the more coherent statements of anarchist internationalism to appear in 
this period, stressing that anarchists must combat:  
all borders, all dividing lines and every division of race, class or sect. 
The young libertarians know well enough that beyond those borders our 
brothers and sisters live in hunger, poverty and exploitation. Our war, the 
war of all peoples who struggle to free themselves from the yoke of 
tyranny, is not Spanish, and still less nationalist.63 
Traditionally, such anarchist antipathy towards nationalism had gone hand in hand 
with anti-militarism, a commitment that was also tested in this period.64 Already, at a 
Regional Congress of the JJLL on 17 April 1937, the delegate from Puigcerdà had 
lamented the consequences of the military ‘pose’ adopted by García Oliver.65 This was 
in reference to a speech in March in which the then Minister of Justice had urged those 
entering officer training in the Republican army ‘to bear in mind that enlisted men 
“should cease to be your comrades and become the cogwheels of our military 
machine”’.66 The delegate noted the opprobrium with which French comrades had 
greeted such language, providing further evidence of the international nature of the 
critique of state collaboration, which in turn contributed to the worsening of relations 
between the comités superiores and the CNT’s critics abroad.  
                                                 
62 A translated copy of Schapiro’s article, ‘¿Nacional-Anarquismo?’, was included in a dossier of 
offending articles and persons relating to anarchists in France that was compiled by the National 
Committee of the CNT over the summer: ‘Informe sobre las actividades de las organizaciones y de 
algunos anarquistas franceses’. 
63 Faro, 19 November 1937. 
64 On the connection between Spanish anarchist anti-nationalism and anti-militarism, see Smith, ‘Los 
anarquistas y anarcosindicalistas’, p. 142. 
65 ‘Congreso Regional de las JJLL celebrado el día 17 de abril de 1937’. 
66 Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, p. 328. 
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At a tempestuous Plenum of the IWMA in Paris on 11 June, the CNT delegates 
were made to suffer what they regarded as the indignity of attacks on their conduct from 
miniscule and in some cases barely operative sister organisations, and were unable to 
prevent the anti-collaborationist motions passed at this meeting being reported to the 
young purists of the Quijotes del Ideal affinity group in Barcelona by the Portuguese 
anarchist Vivian Fragua, who had attended as a delegate of the Argentinian anarcho-
syndicalist organisation, the Federación Obrera Regional Argentina.67 The indignities 
continued. At a fund-raising rally held in Paris later that month, scuffles broke out in the 
crowd when García Oliver and Montseny were met with shouts of ‘murderers!’ and 
‘what about Camilo Berneri?’.68 ‘Must we continue, impassive, putting up with and 
collaborating with these “comrades”? Can we continue in the IWMA, when the IWMA 
in its assemblies does nothing but censure and admonish us?’ wondered Rodríguez 
Vázquez in a circular of 26 June. In July, he took to the pages of Solidaridad Obrera: 
‘What right have they to censure us? With what authority do they speak to us of 
intangible or immaculate principles?...Work, like us, for the unity of the proletariat, to 
destroy fascism, our enemy number one, and you will continue to be anarchists, doing 
honour to the ideal. If you are not capable of that, shut up. Do not mention Anarchy, 
which is too pure to be stained by stupidity and fanaticism.’69 The National Secretary’s 
article was in turn responded to by Schapiro: ‘Did comrade Berneri, murdered by your 
allies in Barcelona, have the right to criticise you? In any case he did so, and you 
ignored his warnings!... through your so-called “anti-fascist” alliances you are, without 
                                                 
67 See Paz, Viaje al pasado, p. 214. 
68 See ‘Comité Nacional (Circular nº 12) A la Regional de Cataluña’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 463/5. The 
CNT’s delegation to the Plenum of the IWMA included David Antona, who reported that the Spanish 
delegates had met with the ‘systematic opposition’ of the CGT-SR, which had attempted to make IWMA 
support for the CNT conditional on a commitment to never again participate in government. The principal 
delegate for the CGT-SR was Schapiro, who alleged that the CNT ‘had dragged its history and its 
principles through the mud’. See ‘Notas sobre el último Pleno de la AIT que acaba de celebrarse en 
Paris’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 46 B.  
69 Solidaridad Obrera, 6 July 1937.  
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wishing to and without even realising it, helping construct a red fascism to fight the 
white one’.70  
In June, delegates from the Durruti Column voiced similar unease as to the 
political character of the rearguard in a meeting with the Regional Committee of the 
Catalan CNT. Whether this would lead them to question the fundamental cause for 
which they believed themselves to be fighting was unclear, but the delegates stressed 
that the anarchist combatants were: ‘sacrificing their health and their life for an ideal, 
which they believe they will see implanted very soon on the Iberian peninsula; and now 
they find that they have enemies both at the front and in the rear.’71 On 4 June, at a rally 
held in the Olympia theatre in Barcelona to pay homage to the defenders of Madrid and 
the Basque country, a delegate speaker who had arrived from the Spanish capital asked 
the assembled throng: ‘“Do you want to win the war?” and the crowd, one hundred per 
cent revolutionary, barely answered the question. One person shouted out “What we 
want is to win the revolution!”’.72  
The statement issued by the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups later 
that month, in which the war was characterised as being a struggle that was ‘not for true 
freedom’, was therefore the culmination of growing libertarian unease as to the meaning 
of the war, the fate of the revolution, and the militarist and nationalist positions adopted 
by the comités superiores. Such sentiments were again in evidence at the Regional 
Plenum of Anarchist Affinity Groups of Cataluña in July, where during the second 
session Merino urged the FAI to confront its enemies in the rearguard, ‘forgetting for a 
                                                 
70 See Le Combat Syndicaliste, 23 July 1937. Schapiro was a close and long-standing friend of the veteran 
CNT militant Eusebi Carbó i Carbó, who, following his exit from the first Economic Council of the post-
19 July Generalitat had been working in the Propaganda Commission of the CNT’s National Committee. 
This may have been another cause of concern for the latter body. See Margarita Carbó and Eusebi Carbó i 
Carbó, Vida i Militancia. Un anarquista al servei de la Generalitat de Catalunya (Valls: Cossetània 
Edicions, 2014), pp. 28 and 42. 
71 See ‘Pequeña reunion celebrada entre una Delegación, de la División de Durruti, y algunos compañeros 
del Comité Regional, Comisión de Guerra y Comité de Relaciones del frente y de la retaguardia’, CNT 
(España) Archives (IISG) 39 A. 
72 Amanecer. Órgano de la Escuela de Militantes de Cataluña, May-June 1937. 
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moment that fascism is in Aragón’.73  This frank admission that, in order to regain 
hegemony in the rear, Spanish anarchists would need to temporarily ‘forget’ the war 
against fascism, was complemented in the following session by the analysis of Simón 
Tapia Colman, who was to become a musician of world renown during his post-war 
Mexican exile, who was speaking as a delegate of the affinity group Hispania:  
There is absolutely nothing for us to do in this war, since it has been 
transformed from a workers’ war into an imperialist war. We must say 
that we are prepared to lose everything except our anarchist movement, 
which cannot compromise before a bourgeois war. We must set a 
deadline for the Government to make an immediate rectification, 
otherwise we must withdraw all support from the war effort.74 
This was thus the second intervention at the Plenum to call for attention to be diverted 
from the war effort to face the enemy in the rearguard. It is further remarkable for its 
qualification of the war as ‘imperialist’ in nature.75 The reference to losing ‘everything 
except our anarchist movement’ is a clear allusion to the phrase wrongly but widely 
attributed to Durruti, that Spanish anarchism ‘renounced everything except victory’, 
echoing in turn Lucía Sánchez Saornil’s defiant ‘for the war everything, except liberty’, 
discussed in Chapter Two. These sentiments were to be reiterated in Anarquía later that 
month, which declared that: ‘everything can be done except that which endangers our 
principles’.76  Tapia Colman evidently placed the integrity of the movement above the 
                                                 
73 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña celebrado el día 1 de julio de 1937 y 
sucesivos’, Federación Anarquista Ibérica Archives (IISG) 17 B. 
74 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
75 The notion that the war was originally a social conflict that then became an imperialist war is chiefly 
associated with the small group of Italian left Communists (about 30 in number) who had fought at the 
front at Huesca in the International Lenin Column controlled by the POUM. They left the front in 
opposition to militarisation in October 1936. See Agustín Guillamón, ‘La Izquierda Comunista  (“los 
bordiguistas”) en la Guerra de España (1936-1939)’, Balance. Cuaderno de historia, 1 (1993) (corrected 
and updated in February 2008), pp. 14-24. It is clear from the interventions recorded here that several 
anarchists had also arrived at this position. 
76 Anarquía, 12 July 1937. On the invention of the Durruti quote, see Paz, Durruti, p. 727. The phrase 
was used by the comités superiores, who also attributed it to their fallen comrade. See Federica 
Montseny’s speech of 21 July 1937, El mitin del Olympia en Barcelona 21 de Julio de 1937 (Barcelona: 
Talleres Gráficos Bosch, 1937), p. 22, and ‘La FAI al pueblo: “Renunciamos a todo, excepto a la 
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anti-fascist war effort, a position that was immediately hailed by another delegate, on 
this occasion that of the affinity group Rebeldes, who declared that, for Tapia Colman’s 
proposal to have an effect, it was necessary to:  
arrive at the agreement that those in official positions withdraw from 
them, as the way that the war is going endangers us. The moment has 
arrived to confront our political enemies, and not to allow, as has 
happened up to now, the organisation to prevent us from saying the truth 
about the war.77 
Such characterisations of the war as were voiced at this Plenum were to find an 
echo in the days and weeks that followed. At a meeting of the Catalan region of the 
CNT on 5 July a delegation from the Aragón front complained of the effect on morale 
that the political intrigue and frivolity of the rearguard had on the comrades on the 
front-line. Pujol, the delegate from the steel and metal industry used this opportunity to 
link the character of the war with the question of the revolution and the purpose of the 
libertarian movement: 
To my mind the war has been corrupted. It is no longer the struggle of 
the libertarians against oppression. It has been converted into a struggle 
between two fascisms, the red and the black, and that is why the 
Confederal combatant is alienated: He sees clearly that he is fighting for 
a cause that is not his own… In my opinion it is necessary to hold, not a 
limited meeting of this or that Committee, but a meeting of the entire 
organisation in Spain, so that it might determine whether the war should 
be continued with or not, and we must initiate the true revolution.78 
                                                                                                                                               
victoria”’, statement of the Peninsular Committee of the FAI, 1 October 1937, CNT (España) Archives 
(IISG) 49A. 
77 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
78 ‘Reunión del Comité Regional celebrada el día 5 de julio de 1937. Presidida por el compañero 
Laborda’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 39 A. Pujol  may have been Higinio Pujol, who had been a 
member of the revolutionary committee of Poble Sec in July 1936. 
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The same delegate would report a week later of a generalised reluctance to mobilise for 
the front among workers in his industry, an attitude that was attributed to the absence of 
Confederal divisions organised according to libertarian characteristics.79  
Considering the war to be for a cause that was ‘not their own’, ‘not for true 
freedom’ or even that was fought on behalf of ‘red fascism’, the radical wing of the 
libertarian movement thereby rejected the priorities of the comités superiores, who 
considered the anti-fascist war to take precedence over the revolution, and the armed 
defence of the latter to be undesirable, or even impossible.80 The representatives of 
these committees responded to this challenge with both rhetoric and methods familiar 
from times of war. At the Regional Plenum of the FAI in July, the delegate of Diego 
Abad de Santillan’s Nervio group, José María Lunazzi, an Argentinian teacher known 
as ‘El Gringo’, denounced the aforementioned characterisations of the conflict as 
‘sowing defeatism, creating confusion and encouraging activities that represent 
treachery to the war against fascism, upon the victory of which we must build a new 
world’.81 It was also upon accusations of ‘defeatism’ that the purist anarchist 
publication Frente y Retaguardia was shut down by the comités superiores at the end of 
the year.82 Such interventions shed light on what the delegate of the Rebeldes group had 
meant when he referred to the organisation preventing anarchists ‘from saying the truth 
about the war’. Prior to its suppression, Frente y Retaguardia had also come into 
conflict with the Catalan School of Activists, set up under the auspices of the CNT 
                                                 
79 ‘Reunión del Comité Regional de Cataluña celebrada el día 12 de julio de 1937, estando presentes casi 
todos los miembros del mismo’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 39 A. 
80 At a meeting of the National Committee on 30 June, the National Secretary of the CNT, Mariano 
Rodríguez Vásquez had affirmed that the organisation in Cataluña was not capable of ‘resorting to force’, 
see ‘Reunión del Comité Nacional del 30 de Junio de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 68 C. 
81 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
82 See the letter to the Liaison Committee of Lleida from the Defence Section of Cataluña, 16 December 
1937 which urged that future publication of the review was to be prevented ‘at all costs’, CDMH, PS 
Barcelona, 512/8. Nevertheless, within a month a new clandestine publication, El Incontrolado, had 
appeared, written by young libertarian soldiers, which was similar in content and tone. On El 
Incontrolado, see Godicheau, ‘Periódicos clandestinos’, pp. 194-5, which does not, however, link its 
appearance to the suspension of Frente y Retaguardia. 
187 
 
veteran Manuel Buenacasa as a training centre for libertarian activism, after featuring an 
article in which it urged the school ‘not to become a political institution, preparing the 
new deputies of the FAI’. In response, it was announced that the School would report 
the purists’ aspersions to the Regional Committees of the CNT and the FAI, ‘so that 
they might make the appropriate decisions’.83  
Still more troubling for the libertarian conscience than the censorship by the 
comités superiores of what they regarded as ‘defeatism’, was the willingness of the 
same to accept the use of courts-martial to impose military discipline on anarchist 
combatants. This became evident when, on 15 July, a battalion of the 25th and 26th 
Divisions, operating on the Aragón front, refused orders to enter into battle. The 
Regional Committee of the Aragonese CNT declared that it would ‘accept the sentence 
pronounced’, provoking the opposition of radicals in Cataluña. Again it was Pujol, the 
delegate of the steel and metal industry, who raised a protest at the meeting of the 
Regional Committee, declaring that he was ‘unwilling to give his approval to this grave 
event about to take place’, and asking that his opposition be noted in the minutes: 
It is not for the Organisation to take on the role of executioner of those 
who have perhaps acted according to the dictates of their conscience, 
which opposes all authoritarianism and discipline, [an attitude] that we 
ourselves have inculcated in them!84 
Pujol’s intervention was seconded by the delegate from the construction industry, while 
that of the Local Federation of unions suggested that the case was related to the fact that 
the libertarian combatants had to face two enemies, one in the front and one in the rear. 
A delegate from the Liaison Committee drew the attention of those present to the 
‘contradiction’ implied by comrades who had accepted militarisation now wishing to 
                                                 
83 Amanecer. Órgano de la Escuela de Militantes de Cataluña, December 1937. 
84 ‘Reunión del Comité Regional de Cataluña efectuada el día 19 de Julio de 1937, estando presentes las 
delegaciones siguientes: Luz y Fuerza, Sanidad, tres miembros del Comité de Enlace, Alimentación, 
Construcción, Fabril, JJLL, FL, dos de la CAP, Artes Gráficas, Distribución y Siderometalúrgica’, CNT 
(España) Archives (IISG) 39 A.  
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reject military discipline, a cynical remark given that militarisation had been imposed in 
the teeth of much anarchist opposition. The meeting eventually agreed to urgently 
contact the authorities in Valencia and Aragón requesting clemency.85  
Such appeals to authority were a compromise between the acceptance of military 
discipline on the part of the comités superiores, who would even threaten to impose 
martial discipline on oppositional anarchists in the rear in the summer of 1937, and the 
tactics being argued for at the base of the Catalan FAI.86 At the Regional Plenum of that 
organisation in July, radical interventions abounded. During the third session, the 
affinity group Amor y Verdad urged the withdrawal from official positions, a boycott of 
and systematic opposition to the state and the ‘return to a new 19 July’.87 The group was 
represented at the Plenum by the delegate José Viladomiu, a founder member of both 
the FAI and the CNT in Gironella, who had fought in the Tierra y Libertad column 
before abandoning the front in March 1937 in opposition to the militarisation of the 
column.88 So we might speculate that, just as the radicalisation of the Barcelona FAI 
prior to the May days appears to have been influenced in part by the return to the 
rearguard of recalcitrant elements of the Gelsa section of the Durruti Column, so the 
radical policies advocated by Catalan anarchists in this period, and their refusal to 
subordinate the fate of the revolution to the demands of the war, was likewise informed 
by the presence among them of respected figures who had made plain their own 
priorities through the abandonment of the frontline.89 As Alberola had indicated, the 
revolutionary, social content of the war had been integral to radical anarchist 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 On the threatened use of military discipline in the rear, see the intervention of García Oliver at the 
extraordinary meeting of 10 August discussed in the following chapter.  
87 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. The Amor y Verdad affinity group was 
based in the Catalan municipality of Gironella, where prior to the war it had been active in opposition to 
‘treintismo’, see the introduction, by Josep Cara Rincón, Jordi Jané Roca and Josep Quevedo García to 
Luz y Vida. Una publicació obrera de Gironella. Edició Facsímil, 4/11/1932 – 24/11/1933 (Barcelona: 
Ajuntament de Gironella i Centre d’Estudis Josep Ester Borràs, 2003), pp. 13-21. 
88 See Iñiguez, Esbozo de una enciclopedia, pp. 630-1. 
89 As suggested in Chapter Two, Merino may also have returned from the front due to his opposition to 
militarisation. 
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participation. Once this became harder to perceive, anti-nationalism and anti-militarism 
returned to the forefront of the libertarian conscience, informed by both the strident 
denunciations of veteran anarchists exiled in France and the reports and deserters 
arriving in Cataluña from the front. ‘Forgetting for a moment’ that fascism was in 
Aragón, anarchists in Cataluña attempted to reassert the revolution in the rear in order to 
revive the revolutionary content of the war. 
‘Ships without honour’: the Regional Plenum of the Catalan FAI 
 
The statement through which the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups in 
Barcelona had convoked the Regional Plenum of July had made government 
collaboration the fundamental issue to be discussed at the Plenum. There, several 
affinity groups would propose radical alternatives to the policy, and Merino’s objections 
would be further elucidated, alluding to both the undemocratic methods by which the 
policy of collaboration had been arrived at, and its ineffectiveness in advancing the 
libertarian cause: 
The comrades were duty bound to recognise that Companys, Largo 
Caballero and Azaña could not stop being bourgeois. That is why we 
said before a much disputed majority, that this was not the way… In the 
economic sphere, the CNT and the FAI have made progress that has not 
been consolidated, because in the governments of Valencia and Cataluña 
our ministers have done nothing to consolidate it.90 
The initial exchanges at the opening session of the Regional Plenum reflected disquiet 
at the situation the anarchists found themselves in. Suffering repression at the hands of 
‘a microscopic enemy that had become gigantic’, the question of who was to blame for 
this state of affairs resulted in the censure of the Regional Committee of the FAI and, 
opposed to this, a wider self-criticism that affirmed that ‘the responsibility belongs to 
                                                 
90 See ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’.  
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everyone, and each of us must accept our part’.91 The intervention in this question of the 
affinity group Devenir, to which Juan Santana Calero belonged, affirmed that the 
Regional Committee, whose secretary was Severino Campos, had proved itself 
inadequate but that ‘we cannot call the comrades traitors nor call for them to be shot’. 
This was an attempt to distance the affinity group from the second manifesto of the 
Agrupación Amigos de Durruti (AAD), issued while Santana Calero was under arrest, 
and for whose content he was being made to answer as a member of the Agrupación. 
The relatively muted role of the delegate from Devenir at this Plenum suggests that the 
bullying campaign to which he was being subjected may have had some effect.92 
During the second session of the Plenum the attendees became more specific in 
their critique and in proposals for a change of direction. The delegate from Pla de Besós 
lamented that the FAI, on uniting itself with the CNT, had changed its character and that 
‘in this way, we have made ourselves accomplices in the absorption of anarchism by the 
union organisation’.93 This was a widely felt position, and was to become a frequent 
complaint among the anarchists of Barcelona over the remainder of 1937. The 
complaint was confirmed in its essentials by Severino Campos on behalf of the 
                                                 
91 The quotes here are from the affinity groups Cultura y Acción and Amigos, respectively.  
92 See the previous chapter for the whispering campaign begun against Santana Calero in this period. 
When the young activist attended a National Plenum of the CNT on 2 June, he was summarily dismissed 
from the assembly by Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez, see ‘Acta del Pleno Nacional de regionales celebrado 
los días 2 y sucesivos de junio’. Moving on to the National Plenum of the FIJL that was being held 
concurrently, his presence was again questioned, this time by Severino Campos, attending not as a 
delegate but as a representative of the Regional Committee of the Catalan FAI. Although the purpose of 
such non-delegate representatives was to oversee the greater internal coherence of the Spanish libertarian 
movement, Campos, who was soon to resign as Regional Secretary of the FAI, evidently felt conflicted in 
this role, accepting Santana Calero’s protestations and further defending him at a meeting of the Catalan 
region of the CNT, see ‘Acta del Pleno Nacional de Regionales Extraordinario celebrado los días 1 y 
sucesivos de junio de 1937’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 239/03 and subsequent discussion at ‘Reunión del 
Comité Regional de Cataluña, celebrada el día 4 de Pradial de 1937. Estando presentes los Comités, Local 
y Regional de la FAI. Local de la CNT, Comarcas, El consejero Más, el compañero Fábregas’, CNT 
(España) Archives (IISG) 39 A. 
93 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. Pla de Besós was the name given to the 
Barcelona suburb of Sant Adrià de Besòs for the duration of the civil war. Its delegate at this Plenum was 
Antonio Bonilla Albadalejo, who had fought in the Durruti Column and contributed to the AAD 
mouthpiece, El Amigo del Pueblo. See ‘Antonio Bonilla Albadalejo – anarquista de la columna durruti’ 
<http://puertoreal.cnt.es/bilbiografias-anarquistas/4329-antonio-bonilla-albadalejo-anarquista-de-la-
columna-durruti.html> [accessed 7 March 2015]. Bonilla was one of those most convinced that José 
Manzana had been responsible (whether deliberately or not) for the death of Durruti. See Gimenólogos, 
En busca de los Hijos de la Noche, pp. 405-6.  
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Regional Committee, who reported that the joint regional conferences of the libertarian 
movement to which the FAI had been invited had in fact side-lined the latter 
organisation, with the representatives of the CNT dictating events. Then, when Catalan 
delegates spoke at a national level, the National Secretary of the CNT had refused to 
acknowledge the separate character of the regional FAI, as the Catalan libertarian 
movement was now supposed to speak through one voice.94  
Towards the end of the second session of the Plenum, Julián Merino, speaking as 
the delegate of the Cultura y Acción affinity group, made a lengthy intervention that 
also located the problems of Spanish anarchism in the fact of the FAI’s reduced role: 
We have doubts as to the efficacy of this Plenum... It would seem that 
there is a deliberate interest in preventing the FAI from arriving at fixed 
positions with regard to questions of importance. We have taken the 
wrong road… If we were to go over the mistakes made in Spain, this 
Plenum would go on forever. Mistakes that no one has wanted to put 
right. As Campos said, the anarchist movement is influenced by hidden 
powers… We have always posited the FAI as the vanguard of the CNT, 
but since 19 July it has tailed behind the Confederation. 
Offering a voluntarist solution to the situation, Merino continued: 
We are not enamoured of grandiloquent gestures or crazy actions, but of 
restoring prestige to the movement… Due to a lack of political vision we 
have enabled the moral victory of certain gentlemen who are determined 
to bury our organisation… Everything is endangered by this activity and 
it must be put right. To that end we propose: 
1. That all those with official responsibilities should withdraw from 
them and return to the unions. 
                                                 
94 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. This outcome confirms the observation 
made in the previous chapter as to the role of the Liaison Committees between the different libertarian 
organisations in the ‘bolshevisation’ of the movement. The Regional Committee of the FAI had included 
observations to this effect in its report prior to the Plenum, see ‘Comité Regional de GGAA de Cataluña. 
Informe que presentamos a los grupos de nuestra actuación a partir del primero de abril del año en curso’, 
CDMH, PS Barcelona, 1335/10.  
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2. That in order to confront the repression, the FAI should put itself 
at the head of the struggle, forgetting for a moment that fascism is in 
Aragón.95 
Following this intervention, which was enthusiastically seconded by the affinity group 
Los Mismos, the Plenum broke to attend the unveiling of a plaque honouring Durruti.96 
When the Plenum reconvened, several newly arrived delegates presented their 
credentials. Given the turn that the Plenum was to eventually take, it is plausible that the 
break in proceedings had been taken advantage of in order to alert senior figures of the 
libertarian movement to what was taking place, and that the arrival of the new delegates 
reflected concern on their part. Campos, José Xena, Federica Montseny and García 
Oliver all spoke at the unveiling of the plaque, as reported in Solidaridad Obrera on 2 
July 1937. The same edition, appearing on the second day of the Plenum, bore on its 
front page the headline ‘The CNT will collaborate with the Government to win the 
war’.97 Given that this was not accompanied by any new development or public 
agreement on the part of the CNT, we may speculate that it was published as a 
deliberate attempt to influence the debate at the Plenum. Voices defending the position 
of the comités superiores were scarce in the early sessions of the July plenum. The 
intervention of the group Z, to which Fidel Miró belonged, urged that the committees 
‘be given a margin of trust so they might act with the rapidity that the present moment 
demands’, but this was responded to by a point of order stating that the Local 
Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups did not recognise this affinity group.98 
After the Peninsular Committee called for unity of action, affirming that ‘the FAI 
must formulate a minimum programme to be obeyed by all’, the delegate for the group 
                                                 
95 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
96 Members of Los Mismos included José García Perpina of the Agrupación Faros and José Pascual San 
José, of the Transport Workers’ Union. 
97 Solidaridad Obrera, 2 July 1937. 
98 The reason why the affinity group Z did not officially belong to the Local Federation in Barcelona is 
not provided in the minutes. It is interesting to note, however, that the Local Federation was not above 
using bureaucratic methods to silence its critics. 
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Humanidad observed that there were two currents present in the hall: that represented 
by the Plenum and that represented by the Peninsular Committee. A working group was 
formed to elaborate a position paper synthesising the mood of the Plenum that would be 
discussed at a later session. Thus, after a further, fourth session in which the discussion 
was again dominated by oppositional voices urging a settling of accounts with the 
enemies in the rear and a vanguard role for the FAI in the libertarian movement, the 
Plenum reconvened to hear and discuss the position paper presented by the working 
group. It had been drawn up by seven delegates, amongst whom three had already made 
radical interventions: Tapia Colman, Merino and Viladomiu, with another oppositional 
anarchist, José Peirats, on behalf of the group Irreductibles, ensuring a majority against 
the line of the Peninsular Committee. This combination also suggested an alliance 
between the combative voluntarism of Merino and the purist scruples of Peirats. It is 
likely, given the content of the paper presented, that José María Lunazzi provided the 
lone voice in opposition to the radical measures proposed.99 The paper began with a 
‘purist’ affirmation reminiscent of Peirats’s intervention at the National Congress of the 
CNT in May 1936: ‘The Iberian Anarchist Federation reaffirms its fundamental 
principles and affirms that it is not a class organisation but one of a widely libertarian 
and iconoclastic spirit.’100 It went on to suggest, ‘in keeping with the spirit of the 
Plenum’, the following concrete proposals: withdrawal from all official positions, a 
public declaration that the ‘counterrevolutionary repression’ must cease immediately or 
the FAI would take the lead in combatting it ‘regardless of the situation of the war 
(which we, more than anyone, desire to win)’, ‘integral collectivisation’, socialisation 
‘of all those activities that the workers deem appropriate’, and the creation of 
Confederal warehouses to oversee exchanges with the collectives in order to put an end 
                                                 
99 The other members of the group were F. Alberola, of the Asturias group, and Pedro Serra Tubau, of the 
Agrupación A, from Gerona. 
100 For Peirats’s intervention at the National Congress in Zaragoza, see Chapter One. 
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to speculation.101 In essence then, this paper was a restatement of the radical programme 
that had developed prior to May and a reaffirmation, despite the assurance that the 
anarchists ‘more than anyone’ desired victory in the war, of the will to fight ‘the 
counterrevolution’ regardless of such considerations.  
Although the paper was a faithful reflection of the mood of the Plenum up to that 
point, it was subjected to further discussion. No sooner had it been read out than one 
delegate, representing the agrupación of Vilafranca, insisted that it not be made 
publicly available. Further delegates opposed the withdrawal of comrades from official 
positions for a variety of reasons, not least because of the implication that this would 
have for the production of arms, a source of particular pride to the libertarian movement 
in Barcelona, given the notable role of anarchists in creating a viable war industry in the 
city.102 Since ‘official positions’ potentially ranged from ministries of government and 
municipal councillors to commissions of industry or workplace-based positions of 
authority, it was possible for delegates to agree with the withdrawal of some comrades 
and not others, and this was reflected in the discussion. There was further disquiet with 
regard to the fact that most members of the FAI who held official positions did so in the 
name of the CNT, in accordance with the agreements of the latter organisation; there 
was unease at the possibility that accepting this proposal would mean breaking the 
famous trabazón between the libertarian organisations as well as provoking a mass 
exodus of anarchists from positions of responsibility at all levels. The potential 
implications of the position paper may have influenced the apparent volte face on the 
                                                 
101 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
102 The CNT had collaborated with the Comissió d’Indústries de Guerra (War Industries’ Commission) 
from its creation on August 7 1936. The body had come under the jurisdiction of García Oliver during his 
tenure as Councillor of War in the CCMA, and also involved the notable participation of Eugenio Vallejo 
Isla, a leading member of the metalworkers’ union affiliated to the CNT. See Javier de Madariaga, ‘Les 
Indústries de Guerra. La fabricacció, distribució, adquisició, control i experimentació de material bèl·lica’ 
in Breu Història de la Guerra Civil a Catalunya, ed. by Josep M. Solé Sabaté and Joan Villarroya 
(Barcelona: Edicions 62, 2005), pp. 317-28. 
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part of the delegate of the group Los Mismos, who warned that ‘we must be very clear 
about what this Plenum agrees to, or we will have cause to regret it very soon’.103  
If the opening remarks with regard to the paper suggest a change in the mood of 
the Plenum, this was to be reinforced by the intervention of García Oliver who, given 
that this is the first time he appears in the minutes, must surely not have been present 
prior to this session. While previous delegates had been censured by the chair when 
straying from the point or making overly long contributions, the same rule did not apply 
to the man who had until recently been, in the name of the CNT, the Spanish Republic’s 
Minister of Justice, and was now Secretary of the CAP in Cataluña. His speech to the 
Plenum took in references to the Russian and French revolutions, the economic situation 
in Spain and various recollections relating to the early days of the struggle, causing the 
secretary responsible for the minutes to admit defeat and stop recording his intervention. 
While lacking an engagement with the issues as they had been expressed hitherto, it is 
possible that his words had an effect on wavering delegates, particularly when declaring 
that the anarchists ‘must not and cannot abandon any position but on the contrary must 
take more every day’.104 
As the debate dragged on into a sixth session, further important figures of the 
anarchist movement made an appearance, defending the record of state collaboration 
and urging the need for libertarian unity. Among the speakers were an unnamed 
representative from the National Committee of the CNT, Federica Montseny, ‘Isgleas’, 
who was probably Francisco Isgleas Piarnau, the former Minister of Defence in the 
Generalitat, and José Xena, the majority of whom were speaking not as delegates to the 
Congress but as observers with an ‘informative’ role (Xena may have been an exception 
in this regard). Montseny had in fact been sent by the National Committee of the CNT 
                                                 
103 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
104 Ibid. 
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on an explicit mission to intervene in the Plenums of the Catalan libertarian 
movement.105 
José Peirats had made an impassioned defence of the oppositional position in 
response to García Oliver, declaring that it would be preferable to have ‘honour without 
ships than ships without honour’ and that: ‘If it is necessary to use violence let us use it, 
between the violence of our enemies and that of ourselves the latter is preferable, and if 
it is necessary to reinforce our positions by unleashing another 19 July then so be it.’106 
This call for anarchist violence was somewhat uncharacteristic on the part of Peirats and 
a further example of the contemporary confluence of purist and voluntarist perspectives 
among radicals. Peirats also asked that, if the paper presented by the working group was 
rejected, it be ‘recorded in the minutes, so that it may be archived and recognised as a 
historical document of the current revolutionary movement’. However, this tone of 
defiance was itself indicative of the direction that the debate was taking. The Plenum 
finally approved the following proposals of the group Germen: 
1. To reject the paper of the working group due to the grave 
situation that would result from closing the way to future possibilities and its 
disparity with regard to the agreements taken by the Regional Plenum of the 
CNT; 
2. To accept the proposals and orientations agreed to at the Plenum 
of the CNT with regard to collaboration; 
3. On collaboration and participation in government in the future, 
that the Committees be given the authority to work in accordance with the 
circumstances of the moment, paying attention to the national agreements, as 
                                                 
105 Montseny was accompanied by Manuel Amil Barcia. See ‘Reunión del Comité Nacional del 30 de 
Junio de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 68 C. On Amil Barcia, see the biography in Iñiguez, 
Esbozo de una enciclopedia, p. 40. 
106 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. Peirats was alluding to the phrase ‘Spain 
prefers honour without ships to ships without honour’, attributed to the nineteenth-century Spanish naval 
officer Casto Méndez Núñez. 
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exceptional procedures correspond to exceptional situations, thereby regaining 
and surpassing the positions lost.107 
A Plenum that had threatened to expose the divisions in the libertarian movement 
through the adoption of proposals that would have marked a complete rupture with the 
policy of its comités superiores thus resulted in what was in effect the only alternative 
outcome: a timid renunciation of the autonomy of the Catalan anarchist affinity groups 
and a voluntary ceding of decision-making responsibility to the movement’s leadership. 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that this was consequent upon the flooding of 
the Plenum by non-delegate libertarian grandees. Although not wishing to claim that the 
radical anarchists formed an absolute majority within the Catalan FAI, the abrupt 
change in the direction of the Plenum evinced by the minutes suggests that the radicals 
and the positions they defended were sufficiently persuasive as to dictate the tenor of 
assemblies, but only up until the point at which they were trumped by the appearance of 
the comités superiores.  
The comités superiores had thus shown themselves capable of blocking any 
attempt on the part of the recalcitrant anarchists to elaborate an alternative strategy to 
state collaboration. Many radical anarchists would soon leave the rearguard to 
participate in an anti-fascist war whose purpose they were now beginning to question.108 
For the comités superiores, meanwhile, the Plenum of July 1937 had provided the fig-
leaf of democratic approval for their continued exercise of executive decision-making 
power. As we shall see in the following chapter, the chief consequence of this retention 
of executive power was the surrender of the remaining strategic outposts controlled by 
the CNT in Barcelona. However, the extent to which this power could truly be brought 
to bear in making the libertarian movement a homogeneous organisation was limited, 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 Among those who did so were José Peirats and Juan Santana Calero. See Ealham, Living Anarchism, 
p. 113. 
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and would be tenaciously contested by the same anarchists that had attempted to 
elaborate an alternative to state collaboration.  
Conclusions 
 
In spite of being ejected from the Ministries and Councils of government in Valencia 
and Cataluña, the libertarian movement in Spain remained important to the 
administrative functioning of the Republican state, and its most prominent 
representatives remained committed to the Republican war effort, accepting the 
nationalist and militarist corollaries of state collaboration during war-time. In opposition 
to them, those currents representing the conscience of the Spanish revolution attempted 
to advance a different policy in the aftermath of the May events, demonstrating in the 
process the continued confluence of perspectives among voluntarist and purist radicals. 
While several voluntarists and purists of the pre-war period had become ardent 
supporters of collaboration, amongst the oppositionists we find many veterans of the 
struggle against treintismo, who shared a vision of the FAI as the radicalising agent or 
anarchist vanguard of the CNT. Those mentioned in this chapter include Merino, Pujol, 
Viladomiu, Peirats and Martorell. This shared vision enabled voluntarists and purists, 
including several members of the JJLL, to advance a unified perspective at the Regional 
Plenum of Anarchist Affinity Groups in July 1937. This anti-collaborationist tendency 
was therefore made up of the same ‘categories’ of Spanish anarchism that had 
successfully allied to unseat the moderates from their positions of responsibility during 
the Second Republic and, as before, was composed chiefly by mid-level CNT activists 
and union delegates who also belonged to the FAI.109  
As for the category of ‘treintismo’, it persisted insofar as it continued to be used 
as a derogatory term for those anarchists who appealed to exceptional circumstances to 
                                                 
109 On the role of such union delegates in the radicalisation of the CNT during the Second Republic see 
Ealham, Anarchism and the City, pp. 96-101. 
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justify collaborating with Republican politicians.110 During the civil war, this category 
was swollen by militants who were neither ideologically nor temperamentally 
‘moderate’, but who nevertheless had become convinced of the need to prioritise anti-
fascism over the social revolution. Their positions in governmental bodies or even in the 
comités superiores gave this prioritisation a professional imperative, while the course of 
the war gave it a moral urgency that brooked no disagreement. Consequently, those 
influential anarchists who had become convinced that the importance and grandeur of 
the Spanish libertarian movement was such that its intervention in the direction of the 
anti-fascist state was both necessary and potentially decisive, would spend much of the 
summer and autumn of 1937 engaged in a tireless propaganda campaign whose chief 
objective was to persuade their former comrades to no longer behave like anarchists. 
For this they were labelled ‘treintistas’ regardless of their activity prior to 19 July. In 
October, Merino would recall the ‘struggles against the FAI in 1931 on the part of the 
reformists of those days’, noting that ‘it is precisely today, in the midst of a 
revolutionary period when it would seem that those reformist intentions have been 
achieved’.111 
By contrast to the ideological battle waged against the ‘treintistas’ earlier in the 
decade, when a wave of insurrectionary strikes had radicalised the CNT, the period 
since 19 July had seen the libertarian movement, as one anarchist put it, ‘invaded’ by ‘a 
moderate spirit’.112 A large proportion of the libertarian movement’s leading figures 
now occupied positions of responsibility in state-controlled industries, in municipal 
government, and in the increasingly bureaucratised libertarian organisations, while a 
great many members of the CNT in the rearguard had joined after 19 July 1936. 
                                                 
110 See the denunciation of the Regional Committee of the Catalan CNT in El Amigo del Pueblo, 19 May 
1937. 
111 ‘Primera sesión del pleno anarquista, celebrado el día 17 de octubre de 1937, para tratar de la nueva 
estructuración de la FAI’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 1335/08.  
112 See the remarks made by the delegate of the Humanidad affinity group, ‘Acta del pleno de G.G.A.A., 
celebrado en Barcelona el día 21 de septiembre de 1937’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 1307/7. 
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Whereas once the radical anarchists had ridden a wave of popular militancy to confront 
a gradualist tendency that they were able to present as out of touch and out of time, they 
now had to confront a different set of questions contextualised by obligatory union 
membership and the partial absorption of the libertarian movement into a militarised, 
anti-fascist state. 
In this chapter I have set out how the radical anarchists of Barcelona responded to 
this challenge. The problem of the relationship to the state would be dealt with by 
withdrawal from official positions, that of the anti-fascist war by a readjustment of 
priorities that would see the counter-revolution met in armed confrontation in the 
rearguard, and that of the moderation of the CNT by a renovation of the comités 
superiores and a reaffirmation of the vanguard role of the FAI. Evidently, this would 
have supposed a complete break with the trajectory undertaken by the comités 
superiores up to this point. In opposing such proposals, the comités superiores 
employed bureaucratic measures to shut down oppositional voices at National Plenums 
and to censor the anarchist press. They also, however, did their utmost to persuade 
wavering activists, to defend their activity and to win votes at fractious Local and 
Regional Plenums. That they were able to do so may indicate, to an extent, their 
ongoing prestige within the movement and the limits of the radicals’ appeal. We might 
also cite the experience of defeat in May and the ongoing repression of the libertarian 
movement, as well as the losses at the front, as being conducive to fatalism, a tendency, 
discussed in the following chapter, that can be seen in the choice of radicals to enlist in 
the army. 
The struggle of the radical anarchists to alter the course of their organisations bore 
some resemblance to that of the left oppositionists in the Soviet Union in the early years 
of the revolution. This is true not only in terms of shared grievances, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, but in terms of the energy with 
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which their respective leaderships opposed them, employing a variety of methods. 
Confronting the crisis of 1921, the Bolshevik leadership, in addition to measures of 
outright repression, strained ‘every effort in appealing for unity in the party ranks 
against external dangers and internal difficulties’ so that they might win votes at 
meetings of local party branches.113 The upshot of such ‘victories’ was that, in Spain as 
in Russia, the official pronouncements, policies and press of the revolutionary 
organisations bore little relation to the defining features and principles of the respective 
revolutions. Having lost the battle to change the strategy of the libertarian movement, 
therefore, the radical anarchists in Spain turned their attention towards ‘salvaging the 
prestige’ of anarchism, a struggle analysed in the following chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                 
113 See Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, p. 139. 
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Chapter 5: ‘Let us be worthy of Anarchy.’ Autonomous action and the defence of 
federalism, July – December 1937 
 
It could be objected, and the living realities that have befallen us in this 
period of war confirm it, that we are moving with giant steps towards 
state capitalism, which for the proletariat will take the form of a new 
system of dependence; that the worker will only be valued as the stuff of 
the workshop or factory, and his personal liberty will be completely cut 
off… It is dangerously fatalist to accustom oneself to the state of things 
as they are in the belief that they cannot be changed, or to simply wrap 
oneself up in the played-out and imported cliché of the ‘circumstances’. 
Let us reject that fatalism and return to our previous, so regrettably 
forgotten line of conduct. Let us be worthy of Anarchy.1 
The above passage is taken from an article signed by Tomás Cabot that appeared in 
Esfuerzo, a publication resuscitated as an organ of the Catalan JJLL in the autumn of 
1937.2 It is immediately notable for the sophistication of its critique, particularly in the 
identification of ‘state capitalism’ as the emerging dominant tendency in the economy 
of the Spanish Republic. This phrase was chiefly associated with ‘ultra-left’ and 
anarchist analyses of the decline of the Russian Revolution, and was used within a year 
of the Soviet takeover by the group around the short-lived newspaper, Kommunist. This 
publication expressed similar concerns to those of Cabot, warning that the Soviet 
Republic was threatened by an ‘evolution towards state capitalism’: ‘The introduction 
of labour discipline in connection with the restoration of capitalist management of 
industry… will diminish the class initiative, activity and organisation of the proletariat. 
It threatens to enslave the working class’.3 In August 1918, the First All-Russian 
                                                 
1 Esfuerzo, 7 October 1937. 
2 The title had formerly appeared, prior to June 1937, as a flysheet, edited by Juan Santana Calero. See 
Chapters Two and Three. Santana Calero was also heavily involved in the later publication, although its 
official editor was Ramón Liarte. I have not been able to find any information regarding Tomás Cabot 
aside from his contributions to Esfuerzo. 
3 Taken from the first issue of Kommunist, published in April 1918 by the ‘Left Communist’ St. 
Petersburg Committee and the St. Petersburg Area Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour 
Party (the Bolsheviks), cited by Lenin in N. Lenin, ‘“Left-Wing” Childishness’, a series of articles 
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Conference of the Anarcho-Syndicalists pledged to struggle ‘for emancipation from 
state capitalism’.4 Oppositional anarchists in Spain recognised the parallels with what 
had unfolded in Russia. Amador Franco wrote in Esfuerzo: 
If we analyse what happened in that [Russian] movement, walking in the 
footsteps of the epic struggle of the Kronstadt sailors and in the struggles 
of the peasants in Ukraine, the stages undergone by that people, in its 
fight against global capitalism and the armies of its interior, seem to us to 
be the same as in our struggle, save for differences of time and 
characteristics… Furthermore, the partisans of true communism had to 
confront those who, in the name of the proletariat, in fact operated 
behind its back.5  
The parallels are instructive; both in Russia in 1918 and Spain in 1937, the 
revolutionary changes in daily working life had been truncated, and dissident currents 
confronted revolutionary leaderships, Bolshevik and anarcho-syndicalist, who 
considered the increasing state control of industry to be inevitable, if temporary, steps 
on the path to victory.6 
On the part of the CNT, this was made clear in no uncertain terms at the 
Extraordinary Congress of the IWMA, held in Paris in December 1937, which is 
discussed in detail in the final sub-section of this chapter. There, Alexander Schapiro 
characterised the economic conceptions put forward by the CNT in advance of the 
organisation’s Economic Plenum to be held in January 1938 as representing ‘a retreat to 
the well-known ideas of [corporative] or reformist unionism’.7 Far from suggesting an 
                                                                                                                                               
published in Pravda in May 1918, available at 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/may/09.htm> [accessed 13 May 2015].  
4 See ‘Three Resolutions’ in The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution, ed. by Paul Avrich (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1973), p. 117. 
5 Esfuerzo, 24 October 1937. 
6 Lenin declared that ‘state capitalism would be a step forward as compared with the present state of 
affairs in our Soviet Republic. If in approximately six months’ time state capitalism became established in 
our Republic, this would be a great success and a sure guarantee that within a year socialism will have 
gained a permanently firm hold and will have become invincible in our country’, Lenin, op. cit.  
7 The minutes in fact record Schapiro as referring to the ideas of ‘co-operative’ unionism, which I assume 
to be a misunderstanding or mistranslation of his words. 
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organisation of the economy that would satisfy revolutionary objectives, the CNT’s 
proposals incorporated techniques commonly employed by bourgeois democracies and 
even totalitarian states.8 The ‘new system of dependence’ envisaged by Cabot, in which 
the worker ‘will only be valued as the stuff of the workshop or factory’, seemed to be 
given credence by the declarations at the Congress of the National Secretary of the 
CNT, Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez, who indicated that workers’ control of industry, and 
assembly-based workplace democracy, even amongst CNT members, were now 
anathema to official CNT policy: 
The times in which we live do not permit either abundance or equality. 
They demand from everyone an elevated contribution of sacrifice that is 
hard to agree to, and which is even harder to demand of those who have 
joined the organisation more out of self-interest than idealism. That is 
why we must compromise with reality. We cannot allow workers to 
determine for themselves the mode of their salary; we cannot give a 
blank cheque to everyone, especially not the arrivistes… in such a 
situation it is highly natural that the complicated problems of the 
libertarian movement be reserved for the old guard, of absolute solidity.9 
With ‘the old guard’ in charge and a ‘dependent’ workforce robbed of any 
decision-making power, workplace relations were thus established along traditional 
lines, a shift that had been reinforced after May 1937 by an increase in injunctions from 
the CNT hierarchy to the Spanish workforce to increase productivity and leave 
questions of living standards until after the war.10 For Schapiro, described by Martínez 
Prieto as ‘the greatest enemy of the CNT’, such arguments rested on the ‘sophistry of 
capitalism that has always been employed to oppose the demands of the proletariat’.11 
                                                 
8 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. An example of such measures was the introduction 
of workers’ record books or certificates, which were used in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and had been 
defended by Lenin. See the discussion in Mintz, Anarchism and Workers’ Self-Management, pp. 116-8. 
9 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. 
10 See Monjo and Vega, Els treballadors i la guerra civil, pp. 164-8; Mintz, Anarchism and Workers’ 
Self-Management, pp. 116-24, and Seidman, Workers Against Work, pp. 132-42. 
11 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. For this description of Schapiro, see Prieto, 
Secretario General de la CNT de España en 1936, Tomo II, p. 148. 
205 
 
In other words, the CNT leadership had positioned itself as an opponent of proletarian 
demands, and was prepared to buttress itself with capitalist ideology in order to do so. 
This explained why it now faced its own members from a position of power and 
authority, a process that Schapiro did not hesitate to describe as ‘bolshevisation’:  
As regards the moral distinction between the ‘idealistic’ representatives 
of the masses and the masses themselves, this invariably results in the 
transformation of the activists into leaders and these end up making their 
own caste interests prevail over those of the supposedly ‘selfish’ 
masses.12  
The two related concerns revealed in the above citation from Tomás Cabot, that 
the Spanish revolution had not led to a lasting emancipation of the working class, and 
that it was the duty of anarchists to resist a fatalist acceptance of this state of affairs, 
were now unambiguous dividing lines between radical anarchists and the comités 
superiores of the CNT-FAI, who were wedded to both the increasing centralisation of 
work-places under state control and to a fatalist, or ‘tragic’, reading of the Spanish 
revolution. References to the ‘tragic’ nature of the Spanish conflict were commonplace, 
and provided the famous German anarchist Rudolf Rocker with the title of his 
contemporary work, The Tragedy of Spain.13 Leon Trotsky, who in 1920 had referred to 
the situation of the Soviet Union as ‘in the highest degree tragic’, used the same 
formulation as Rocker for the title of an article on Spain in 1939.14 Through recourse to 
such a reading, the CNT representatives attempted to make their positions immune to 
criticism by presenting them as inevitable adaptations to the drama of the civil war, 
declaring at the Paris Congress that: ‘No-one must be allowed to speculate over our 
                                                 
12 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. 
13 Rudolf Rocker, The Tragedy of Spain (New York: Freie Arbeiter Stimme, 1937). 
14 Leon Trotsky, ‘The Tragedy of Spain’, Socialist Appeal, 19 February 1939. For the context of his quote 
on the tragic situation of the USSR, see Lars Lih, ‘“Our Position is in the Highest Degree Tragic”: 
Bolshevik “Euphoria” in 1920’, in History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism, ed. by Mike Haynes 
and Jim Wolfreys (London: Verso, 2007), p. 118. 
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tragedy. It is a question of justice and morality.’15 As the above citation from Esfuerzo 
shows, however, such enjoinders rang hollow when directed at CNT members in Spain 
who were, after all, actors in the same drama. Consequently, the internal opposition, the 
existence of which the CNT’s comités superiores denied to the world, voiced its 
rejection not only of ‘state capitalism’, but also of the denial of its agency, its 
revolutionary will.16   
By the autumn of 1937, however, the oppositional anarchists of Spain had to face 
the fact that their attempts over the course of the summer to force a change in the 
official policy of the libertarian movement had failed. Radicals lamented that ‘neo-
anarchism has won the battle over true anarchism’.17 This was a term employed by a 
delegate at the Regional Plenum of Anarchist Affinity Groups in July and in the pages 
of Frente y Retaguardia to refer to anarchists whose anti-statism did not extend to 
democratic states. On 23 October, Alerta…!, a new underground publication, appeared 
in Barcelona, produced by the city’s defence committees. It also declared itself ‘tired of 
paradoxes. Anarchist ministers… anarchist governors… anarchist mayors and 
councillors…. Anarchist police… anarchist jailors… Climb the ladder if that is your 
ambition… but do not call yourselves anarchists’.18 Oppositional anarchists now 
appeared to assert that the divisions within the libertarian movement were such that they 
could no longer claim to share the same ideological tradition. As much was also 
asserted by veteran anarchists abroad, and is discussed in greater detail below. 
Alerta…! provided sombre, if defiant, reading for partisans of the Spanish 
revolution. Under the headline ‘The proletariat has gained nothing’, the editorial of its 
first issue drew up a critical balance sheet of the revolution’s trajectory: 
                                                 
15 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. 
16 In this respect too there are parallels with the Left Communists of Russia, who were scolded by Lenin 
for insisting on a ‘determined class policy’ and a ‘determined policy of socialisation’: ‘Dear “Left 
Communists”, how determined they are, but how little thinking they display.’ In Lenin, op. cit. 
17 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
18 Alerta…!, 23 October 1937. On Alerta…!, see Godicheau, ‘Los periódicos clandestinos’, pp. 190-4. 
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We have lost thousands and thousands of comrades, the flower of our 
activist base… Of the Revolution barely anything remains, and what 
little that does is not consolidated. We will have to go back, to find the 
spirit of 19 July, to raise it up again and keep it strong, without trusting 
in anybody, without paying attention to any commonplace slogans.19 
By the time that this editorial was published, nearly six months had passed since the 
May days, when the defence committees, alongside their allies in the Catalan JJLL, 
anarchist affinity groups and various unions of the CNT, had mobilised their forces in 
an attempt to recover on the streets of Barcelona the ‘spirit of 19 July’. Since May, two 
further opportunities had presented themselves, in August and September, to begin 
where they had left off, but on both occasions, discussed in detail below, their initiatives 
were nipped in the bud by the libertarian hierarchies. 
This chapter will analyse the activity of radical anarchists during the late summer 
and autumn of 1937, their defence of federalism and initiation of autonomous actions in 
the face of the ‘bolshevisation’ of the libertarian movement. As a consequence of their 
activity, these tendencies, embodied respectively in the Catalan JJLL and the affinity 
groups and defence committees of Barcelona, were marginalised by the regional 
organisations of the CNT and FAI, and by the end of the year, there were signs of 
bitterness and despair among all but the most indefatigable of radicals. With defeat 
came fissures in the alliance effected during the course of this battle between purist and 
voluntarist anarchists. There were signs of a retreat into ideology and introspection on 
the part of the former tendency, while the attempts at independent armed activity on the 
part of the latter led to their being threatened in the most violent of terms by senior CNT 
members. The Congress of the IWMA in December, analysed in the final part of this 
chapter, confirmed that the crisis of the libertarian movement, born in the Spanish 
conflict, had become a global crisis of organised anarchism, as the CNT moved to 
                                                 
19 Alerta…!, 23 October 1937. 
208 
 
silence what it referred to as ‘uncontrolled groups’ on the international plane.20 
Nevertheless, for all their disparity in method and temperament, radical anarchists were 
united, within and beyond the borders of Spain, in their concern for the dignity and 
integrity of anarchism.  
Federalism in defiance of ‘neo-anarchism’ 
 
This impulse to defend the integrity of Spanish anarchism was consequent upon the 
defeat of practical proposals intended to reorient the strategy of the libertarian 
organisations. This was made apparent at the Regional Plenum of Anarchist Affinity 
Groups in Barcelona in July 1937, the first sessions of which are discussed in the 
previous chapter. Following the voting down of radical anarchist proposals to withdraw 
from state collaboration, the Peninsular Committee of the FAI sought to advance the 
‘legalisation’ of the specifically anarchist organisation; that is to say, its formal 
constitution as a political organisation. This was intended to facilitate its participation in 
state bodies and thereby increase the libertarian presence in organs of collaboration.21 
Legalisation also provided the Peninsular Committee with an opportunity to alter the 
internal organisation of the FAI along the lines that had been discussed as far back as 
December 1936 and which implied, as far as many radical anarchists could see, the 
adoption of a party political structure.22 The principal point of contention in the 
restructuring of the FAI was the proposed replacement of the affinity groups, the 
‘grupos’, by larger ‘agrupaciones’, based on geographical locality and open to all self-
declared anarchists, as the basic unit of the organisation. The question was brought 
                                                 
20 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. 
21 See ‘Comité Regional de GG/AA/ de Andalucía. Circular Urgentísima’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 11/10, 
which contains the relevant report of the Peninsular Committee: ‘In many town halls, provincial councils 
and other organisations, the participation of our specific organisation on equal terms with the Communists 
and Socialists has been prevented, owing to the allegation that it is not a normally constituted 
organisation’. It had been worrying for the comités superiores that Manuel Irujo, the Basque Nationalist 
Minister of Justice under Negrín, had used the FAI’s continued ‘illegality’ as an excuse to eject the 
organisation’s delegates from representation in the running of the judiciary.  
22 See, for example, Santana Calero, Afirmación en la marcha, p. 8: ‘The FAI has been converted into a 
political party through a restructuring that was also imposed by “circumstances”’. 
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forward for discussion at the aforementioned Regional Plenum in Barcelona no sooner 
than had the defeat of the radicals’ practical proposals been confirmed, and was debated 
late into the night of 3 July, at the end of days of increasingly bitter argument.23  
For Julián Merino, secretary of the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity 
Groups, speaking on behalf of the affinity group Cultura y Acción, legalisation 
represented the ultimate indignity. He declared that ‘the FAI has never required 
legalisms for its development, and its value has always been based upon acting outside 
of legalisation… every anarchist should be ashamed that this subject can even be 
discussed’. He accused the Peninsular Committee of wanting to turn the FAI into a 
political party and, when this was denied, retorted that ‘if that is what you want then say 
so without euphemisms’. In spite of the angry tone of his intervention, however, it is 
apparent that Merino did not consider the debate to have been lost. ‘As we do not know 
what they want to do with the FAI’, he concluded, ‘legalisation cannot be accepted’.24 
By contrast, there were signs of fatalism amongst other delegates, as the Plenum’s 
highly contentious decision to ratify governmental collaboration earlier in the 
proceedings cast a shadow over the debate on status and structure. The delegate of 
Pompeyo Gener observed that ‘we are wasting our time, when neo-anarchism has won 
the battle over true anarchism’ and that, ‘if we are to be consistent with what we have 
accepted with regard to collaboration we must also accept legalisation’.25 The 
sentiments of this delegate were echoed by Simón Tapia Colman, on behalf of the 
Hispania affinity group, who had adopted a radical position at the Plenum on the 
question of collaboration and the war effort, but who now stated that, having failed to 
                                                 
23 The question had not appeared on the original agenda of the Plenum, but the Peninsular Committee had 
included this item on its agenda for the Peninsular Plenum of the FAI that was to take place in Valencia 
shortly after. It was therefore discussed with a view to providing a mandate to the Catalan delegates to the 
Peninsular Plenum. See ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
24 ‘Acta del pleno regional de grupos anarquistas de Cataluña’. 
25 Ibid. It is unknown whether this delegate belonged to an affinity group named ‘Pompeyo Gener’ or 
whether this was a delegate of the rationalist school of the same name.  
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rectify the FAI’s line of conduct, ‘if we have approved collaboration, it would be 
contradictory not to legalise the FAI’.26  
Other delegates expressed concern for the integrity of Spanish anarchism, which 
was considered to be worth preserving regardless of circumstance. The terms of the 
debate thus foreshadowed what was to be the crux of the struggle within the libertarian 
movement over the course of the autumn: a fatalist submission to circumstance or a 
prioritisation of the dignity of anarchism. The delegate of the affinity group Móvil 
declared that ‘if we legalise ourselves, the FAI will lose its prestige, as our colossal 
strength is due to the activity that we have undertaken since before 19 July’, while other 
delegates considered legalisation to represent the ‘negation of ourselves as anarchists’.27 
Although several speakers spoke in support of the line of the Peninsular Committee, 
viewing legalisation as an opportunity to increase anarchist influence among the 
Spanish working class, the motion to legalise the FAI was defeated by 43 votes to 27, 
with a high number of abstentions.28 Thus when a delegation of the Catalan FAI made 
its way to Valencia the following day to participate in the Peninsular Plenum of the 
organisation, it was without a mandate to approve legalisation and the concomitant 
restructuring of the FAI. 
The Aragonese affinity groups had likewise viewed the Peninsular Committee’s 
proposal with scepticism. In Valencia, their delegate made a case indicative of both 
purist and voluntarist concerns. The delegate for Aragón referred to the struggle that the 
political parties were waging against the anarchists and averred that ‘the political 
situation has not yet been resolved in such a way as to suggest the abandonment of 
tactics appropriate for underground activity’ and that, furthermore, ‘if the FAI is turned 
                                                 
26 Ibid. Tapia Colman attempted to elaborate on the change in his thinking but was cut short by the chair, 
José Xena, for straying from the agenda of the Plenum. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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into an organisation of the masses it will lose its specific content’.29 Remarkably, 
despite faithfully relaying the arguments of its affinity groups, the Aragonese delegation 
put its signature to the position paper elaborated at the Peninsular Plenum in which the 
new structure was detailed. That it did so may have been in response to pressure exerted 
by the Catalan delegation, which also reneged on the mandate with which it had been 
entrusted. This latter delegation, which included Juan Manuel Molina, nominated by 
García Oliver, and Simón Tapia Colman, of the Hispania group, read a statement 
explaining their actions that the Aragonese delegation also adhered to: 
The Catalan delegation, in view of the unanimity of the Plenum, accepts 
its part of the working group and signs the position paper, explaining its 
vote by reference to the fact that certain of the organisational procedures 
that form the new structure are already practised in the region. Its vote is 
nevertheless conditional upon the final resolutions of the region that it 
represents.30 
The unanimity referred to here was entirely illusory as the Plenum was in fact divided, 
with three regions, Levante, Andalucía and the Centre, mandated to favour restructuring 
and two, Cataluña and Aragón to oppose it, representing a total of 615 affinity groups 
and 775 affinity groups, respectively. 
In spite of being rejected at the Regional Plenum in July, therefore, the 
restructuring of the FAI was returned to the agenda of the Catalan anarchist groups at a 
Plenum in Barcelona the following month. Once again, prominent figures within the 
libertarian movement such as García Oliver, Montseny and Rodríguez Vázquez were in 
attendance. On this occasion, several purists of the JJLL left the hall midway through 
proceedings, crying out ‘Long live anarchy!’. A meeting hastily arranged in Valencia in 
an attempt to avoid a split took place soon after, with Xena acting as mediator between 
                                                 
29 Memoria del Pleno Peninsular de Regionales, pp. 15-7. 
30 Ibid., p. 44.  
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Peirats, a representative of this faction, and Montseny, of the Peninsular Committee, but 
came to nought.31 According to the Confederal press, the sticking point was the freedom 
of the oppositional affinity groups to remain outside of the restructuring process and 
therefore not be grouped into larger agrupaciones according to locality.32 According to 
Peirats, however, the problem was rather the new declaration of principles that 
accompanied the restructuring, which implied that the FAI was no longer committed to 
a struggle against all states, but only against the establishment of ‘a dictatorship of caste 
or party’.33 That this was the crux of the issue for purist anarchists was reaffirmed in an 
article in Frente y Retaguardia: 
There cannot remain the least doubt that, on declaring themselves 
enemies of the ‘totalitarian state’, the ‘neo-anarchists’ also know how to 
distinguish, as has always been the skill of Marxists and republicans, 
between the democratic state and the state per se… What remains of the 
classic anarchist criterion that attributes totalitarian properties to every 
state, considering its supposed moderation as a temporary affair 
dependent on the degree of resistance or conformity of its subjects?34 
The determination of the comités superiores to press ahead with the restructuring 
of the FAI according to these ‘neo-anarchist’ principles resulted in an impasse. No 
delegation was sent from the Catalan region to attend the Peninsular Plenum of the FAI 
in August. There the Catalan region’s proposal that a National Congress be held to 
determine the structure of the FAI was read out. While it was agreed that such a 
Congress should be held ‘when circumstances permit’, it was nevertheless considered 
opportune to immediately press ahead with the restructuring given that it was agreed to 
‘unanimously by all the regions represented in the Plenum’.35 The illusion of unanimity 
                                                 
31 See the recollections of Peirats, De mi paso, pp. 346-8. 
32 Solidaridad Obrera, 12 October 1937. 
33 Ibid., p. 348. See also ‘Estatutos generales de la Federación Anarquista Ibérica’, Federación Anarquista 
Ibérica Archive (IISG) 49 A. 
34 Frente y Retaguardia, 1 September 1937. 
35 See ‘Actas del Pleno Peninsular de Regionales’, Federación Anarquista Ibérica Archive (IISG) 49 A. 
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once again served to grant legitimacy to a process designed to silence oppositional 
voices by removing the mechanisms by which libertarian organisations had formerly 
ensured federalist practices. If radicals could not be silenced by the regional 
organisations, then those regions would simply be ignored by the national body. The 
same process occurred in the libertarian youth organisations. The continued opposition 
of the Catalan JJLL to the National Committee of the FIJL on the question of state 
collaboration led to the JJLL’s right to continue defending and propagating their 
position being brought into question.  
At the National Congress of the FIJL, held in July, a compromise was reached 
according to which the Catalan JJLL agreed not to participate in national rallies of the 
youth organisations and that, in the section’s press, affiliates would ‘do no more than 
provide an exposition of their ideas so as not to give the impression that we are in 
disagreement with the rest of the peninsula’.36 The same Congress requested a written 
document from the Catalan JJLL explaining their position, and on 9 July a manifesto 
was produced in which the Catalan JJLL stated that the unity of the FIJL must be 
achieved on the basis of fidelity to anarchist ideas. The manifesto justified the ‘purely 
anarchist tendency’ of the JJLL on the assumption that the ‘circumstantialism’ of the 
CNT and the FAI was transitory and that it was reasonable to expect ‘a return to these 
[purely anarchist] principles, tactics and objectives in the more or less near future’ but 
that this could only be assured by ‘maintaining in the sector most susceptible to 
reformist contamination the anarchistic spirit that has always informed our libertarian 
activities’.37 The manifesto thus directly challenged the sincerity of the appeal to 
circumstances routinely made by the libertarian defenders of state collaboration. Aside 
                                                 
36 See ‘Federación Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias. Acta de la sesión cuarta del día 2 de Julio de 1937’, 
CDMH, PS Barcelona, 237/1. 
37 See ‘Exposición ampliada del punto de vista del movimiento juvenil libertario de la regional catalana 
según la ponencia aprobada en su último congreso de juventudes libertarias celebrado en Mayo’, CDMH, 
PS Barcelona, 238/5. 
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from such ideological questions, however, the manifesto of the JJLL justified their right 
to maintain a different line to that of the FIJL as a whole, alleging that the Catalan 
section had a peculiar character: ‘when the JJLL decided to enter the FIJL they did so 
on the basis of continuing with their classic structure as the Section of Culture and 
Propaganda of the FAI… a proposal of autonomy that is perfectly respectable among 
anarchists’.38  
At the National Plenum held the following month, where the need to ‘resolve the 
Catalan problem’ was openly stated, this question of autonomy was the crux of the 
debate.39 The General Secretary of the FIJL was now Fidel Miró, the former secretary of 
the Catalan JJLL whose exit from the latter post was decided at the same Congress in 
May at which the organisation had affirmed its ‘purist’ stance. At the Plenum, Miró had 
the backing of the delegates from Aragón, the Central region and Andalucía, all of 
whom wondered whether the Catalan JJLL accepted the ‘law of majorities’. Peirats, 
speaking as the delegate of a Catalan section which had declared itself ‘concerned with 
what is fundamental and permanent about anarchist ideas and not with what is 
politically convenient’, affirmed that it was federalism that gave the movement its 
‘exhilarating uniqueness’, and that this had to be more than just a theory.40 Miró 
countered that ‘above everything else there is a responsibility which has a national 
character, and therefore one must not confuse a diversity in criteria with a diversity in 
positions adopted’.41 The Plenum ended with the Catalan delegation agreeing to call a 
further Congress of the regional JJLL in order to fix its position. 
                                                 
38‘Exposición ampliada del punto de vista del movimiento juvenil libertario’. 
39 See ‘Actas del pleno de regionales de JL celebrado en Valencia los días 2 y 3 de Agosto de 1937’, 
CDMH, PS Barcelona, 237/1. 
40 See ‘Exposición ampliada del punto de vista del movimiento juvenil libertario’ and ‘Actas del pleno de 
regionales de JL celebrado en Valencia los días 2 y 3 de Agosto de 1937’, respectively. 
41 Ibid. It is clear from his memoirs that Miró did not consider the Catalan JJLL to have been a section of 
the regional FAI: ‘Although the JJLL were known as the “young eagles [aguiluchos] of the FAI”… the 
reality was that no real organic link existed between them, so that our [the JJLL’s] autonomy was total 
and absolute and consequently we never acted, even during the civil war, according to the decisions or 
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Prior to this Congress, which would not be held until 10 October, three new 
publications appeared from within the ranks of the Catalan youth organisation. El 
Quijote was a weekly produced under the auspices of the affinity group Los Quijotes del 
Ideal in Clot. Purist in tone, its first issue declared its intention to be ‘somewhat 
removed from the terrible “today” in which we live’.42 Evolución was the organ of the 
FECL, edited by Ada Martí, who wrote a critique of democracy in its first issue that 
would have been anathema to the ‘neo-anarchists’.43 Diego Camacho, a member of Los 
Quijotes del Ideal, recalls being shown the first issue by Martí, who told him that it had 
a print run of four thousand editions: 
It’s not much… but it is important to say what we are saying. It is painful 
to read the official press of our movement. What is worse: with the 
commonplace of the circumstances they are justifying anti-anarchism. 
With our voice and that of others we intend to unmask the falsifiers.44 
The other new publication to emerge was the revived Esfuerzo. Submitted to, and duly 
decimated by, the state censor, the editorial line of Esfuerzo stressed the need for unity 
among the libertarian youth, a unity that it considered possible only through adherence 
to anarchist ideas and the rejection of external alliances. Although Esfuerzo would 
publish several articles that were optimistic or voluntarist in their interpretation of the 
moment, these new publications indicated the growing level of alienation of the Catalan 
JJLL from the rest of the Spanish libertarian movement. 
Having failed in their attempts, alongside other radical anarchists in Cataluña, to 
alter the trajectory of the FAI, by the autumn of 1937 there was an identifiable tendency 
amongst purists in the JJLL to close ranks. As an article in Frente y Retaguardia put it, 
‘Let us set our own house in order, learn those ideas that we extol… let us stand guard 
                                                                                                                                               
slogans of the FAI and nor did we ask their approval for the projects we organised.’ See Miró, Vida 
intensa, p. 134. 
42 El Quijote, 11 September 1937. 
43 See Fernández Soria, Cultura y libertad, p. 57. 
44 Paz, Viaje al pasado, pp. 218-9. 
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over the purity of our movement.’45 Meanwhile, in El Quijote, Vicente Rodríguez, an 
influential member of the JJLL, indicated a preparedness to break entirely from the 
libertarian organisations: 
The organisation as such is worthy of our efforts depending on the 
quantity of ideas that we perceive in it or are able to inject into it. 
Organisation for the sake of organisation is no different to violence for 
the sake of violence… What is more, if our continued presence in a 
given organisation must imply the renunciation of our own methods in 
terms of the diffusion or practice of the ideas that sustain us, then we can 
never justifiably remain in it. The only work that could be carried out in 
such circumstances would be that of disintegration and discord, a work 
that is acceptable as long as disintegration and discord is applied to the 
traditional enemy: authoritarianism. And all those who, having lost faith 
in the constructive capacity of the masses, shield themselves in their 
supposed superiority in order to convert themselves into a directing elite, 
are authoritarians.46 
Given that radical anarchists were normally at pains to state that they did not want a 
split in the movement, this article is remarkable for outlining how such a split could be 
justified. Rodríguez stopped short of openly advocating sabotage of the libertarian 
organisations, affirming that the Spanish masses, infused with an anarchistic spirit, 
would oblige them to return to their true path. Whether or not such optimism was truly 
felt by the author, the article concluded in far less sanguine terms: ‘backed into a corner 
whereby either the organisation or the ideas must perish, we would always prefer the 
disappearance of the former over the latter, as ideas give rise to organisation while an 
organisation without an ideological base cannot give rise to ideas’.47 This prioritisation 
of principles over organisation became something of a commonplace at this time and 
was a clear response to the attempted homogenisation of the movement according to the 
                                                 
45 Frente y Retaguardia, 1 September 1937. 
46 El Quijote, 11 September 1937. 
47 Ibid. 
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criteria of the comités superiores. It would be expressed at the Congress of the IWMA 
discussed below, and was also at the root of a row between the Catalan School of 
Activists and José Peirats. Peirats, a close friend and comrade of Vicente Rodríguez, 
had refused to deliver a talk at the School on the subject of how to organise a Congress, 
objecting that he would only be prepared to talk about ‘ideas’.48 
Affirmations such as that of Rodríguez cited above as to the supposedly innately 
anarchistic characteristics of the Spanish people appeared frequently in the libertarian 
press, but were somewhat contradictory when enunciated by figures within the Catalan 
JJLL. On the one hand because they indicated the accommodation of the libertarian 
movement to the nationalist aspect of Republican state-building.49 On the other, because 
they clashed with the purists’ insistence on the need for education and opposition to 
organisations of a specifically anarchist character having a mass membership. For if, as 
one contributor to Esfuerzo put it, ‘a profoundly libertarian and individualist 
spirituality’ was ‘characteristic of the Spanish people’, why would so many of the JJLL 
express concern both for the lack of understanding of libertarian principles among the 
organisation’s own members and for attempts to turn the FAI into a mass 
organisation?50 An article in Frente y Retaguardia was typical in declaring that ‘Our 
movement can never be, as is intended, a movement of the masses… How many of the 
youth in our ranks are ignorant of the ideas!’.51 The appearance of essentialist tropes 
regarding the supposed character of the Spanish people within the oppositional anarchist 
press indicates something of a blind spot among elements of the JJLL as to the role that 
such myth-making played in the reconstruction of a Republican state that had left these 
revolutionaries marginalised and vulnerable to police raids, harassment and even 
                                                 
48 Amanecer. Órgano de la Escuela de Militantes de Cataluña, November 1937. 
49 On examples of racism and nationalism in the literary output of Spanish anarchists during the civil war, 
see Baxmeyer, ‘“Mother Spain”’, pp. 197-206. On the partial acceptance among anarchists of the idea 
that anarchism formed an essential part of a specifically Spanish character, see Álvarez Junco, La 
ideología política del anarquismo español, p. 254, and Smith, ‘Izquierdas y nacionalismos’, p. 147. 
50 Esfuerzo, 7 October 1937. 
51 Frente y Retaguardia, 1 September 1937. 
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murder. Nevertheless, it may also be the case that appeals to the ‘libertarian spirit’ of 
the Spanish people were a form of denial brought about by the disastrous course of the 
war and the disenchantment occasioned by the disappearance of anarchist ideas from the 
libertarian organisations. As such, they were symptomatic of the retreat from the 
‘terrible “today”’ indicated by El Quijote. 
November 1937 saw the appearance of a new publication of the JJLL, Faro, 
edited by the tireless Juan Santana Calero. Like Esfuerzo, its editorial line defended the 
position of the Catalan JJLL and, as with his previous endeavours, through Faro 
Santana Calero attempted to bring together purist and voluntarist criticisms of the 
official libertarian movement. What is also striking about this publication, however, is 
the self-conscious way in which it situated itself within the international anarchist 
movement. Its first number, in a heavily censored editorial, affirmed that: 
In the face of perverted adulterations of anarchism, situated in a tendency 
that is yet to be convincingly refuted, we stand by… the robust 
ideological content affirmed in the position paper approved at the 
Extraordinary Congress in May… The JJLL of Cataluña are not 
determinists. They believe in the efficacy of the will… In a time of 
confusion and ideological decay typical of sceptics, the JJLL must show 
themselves to be compact and strong, motivated by a single ambition: to 
offer their responsibility and rootedness in the ideas to international 
anarchism.52 
In spite of its appeal to ‘will’, itself typical of Santana Calero, Faro did not indicate in 
its pages how acts of will might renew the Spanish revolution or recover for the 
libertarian movement its former spirit. Instead, its focus was on preserving the integrity 
of anarchist ideals, a task that, as the above passage indicates, was of international 
scope. This commitment to internationalism was further demonstrated by the 
publication’s hosting of articles by Alexander Schapiro and the French anarchist teacher 
                                                 
52 Faro, 12 November 1937. 
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Lucien Barbedette, as well as the stridently anti-nationalist article of Morales Guzmán, 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
While Faro focussed on the endurance of anarchist principles, to highlight this 
propagandistic and ‘idealistic’ labour is not to suggest that members of the JJLL 
withdrew from practical activity. Their continued endeavours in the field of education 
and in struggling to resist the militarisation of popular culture and children’s activities 
are also abundantly attested to in the pages of their press: 
The free education that children were promised has become a slave of the 
state… Children are given the same educational materials as before the 
war. While it is true that they are now proffered material of a coarsely 
anti-fascist hue it is nothing more than this: anti-fascist… And, in greater 
numbers, people with neither scruples nor the most elemental of 
pedagogical sentiment, cultivate, with publications of the worst kind, a 
war-like spirit in the young.53  
In this sense, the anarchists of the JJLL and the affiliated students’ organisation, the 
FECL, had ‘returned’ to their ‘previous line of conduct’ as they had been urged to by 
Tomás Cabot in the pages of Esfuerzo; fostering an oppositional, parallel culture to that 
of the Republican state in much the same way as they had done before the war began. In 
so doing, they were also defending the autonomy of the spaces they had conquered in 
the summer of 1936, maintaining the spirit of rational education against the 
encroachments of the dominant ideology of statist anti-fascism.54  
Although the JJLL’s activity was inspired by what had formerly been the 
priorities of organised anarchism, by 1937 such activity was no longer conceived of as 
auxiliary to that of the FAI and the CNT, but as defiant testimony to the continued faith 
                                                 
53 Faro, 26 November 1937. 
54 I am indebted to Hugo García for his insights into the emergence of anti-fascism as a dominant culture 
in the imagined community of civil-war era Republican Spain. 
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of the JJLL in anarchist ideas, in conscious contrast to the other branches of the 
libertarian movement. As a contribution from Benito Milla put it: 
Although it may upset those who justify their sell-outs by reference to 
the Iberian tragedy, we continue to maintain and affirm the practicality 
and permanence of anarchist conceptions, regardless of the 
circumstances and opportunism that signify nothing less than the implicit 
recognition and reproduction of the Marxist concept of the political 
struggle.55 
By affirming the anarchist emphasis on will as opposed to fatalism, and associating the 
latter with Marxism, Faro echoed the attacks on gradualism that had been a feature of 
Tierra y Libertad in the early years of the Republic, and attracted contributions from 
other militants of the CNT and the FAI who had become alienated from or isolated 
within these organisations, such as Morales Guzmán, former secretary of the Local 
Federation of the CNT in Granada, and Severino Campos, former secretary of the 
Regional Committee of the Catalan FAI. In a front page article, the latter made no 
attempt to hide his scorn for those in positions of responsibility in the libertarian 
organisations:   
Where there were ideas these ideas remain. Those who say that they 
sacrificed them never had them… They spend their days on a slippery 
slope. From the centre of the political whirlwind they breathe putrefied 
air that withers and numbs them… individuals that puff themselves up, 
believing themselves to be great men that influence ‘the realities of the 
moment’… are nothing but ambitious and conceited pygmies.56 
This pessimism as to the leading tendencies of the major libertarian organisations 
was shared, as we have seen, by many members of the JJLL, with the result that, 
following their walkout from the Regional Plenum of the Catalan Anarchist Affinity 
                                                 
55 Ibid. Benito Milla Navarro was a founder and secretary of the JJLL in the Durruti Column who would 
remain active in the libertarian movement for many decades, see Iñiguez, Esbozo de una enciclopedia, p. 
405. 
56 Faro, 12 November 1937. 
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Groups in August, the most notable affinity groups associated with the youth 
organisation would be absent from subsequent developments in the Catalan FAI. In fact, 
following the Regional Congress of the JJLL beginning on 10 October, where the purist 
principles agreed to in May were ratified, it was further agreed to break the 
organisation’s link with the FAI, due to the latter’s restructuring, ‘which provides 
evidence of a fundamental alteration of anarchist principles’.57 Nevertheless, even in the 
absence of the purists of the JJLL, the attempted conversion of the FAI in Cataluña into 
a ‘movement of the masses’ would be bitterly contested. Their absence did mean, 
however, that it would be the voluntarist rather than the purist current that was most 
notable in taking up the cudgels against the ‘neo-anarchists’ in the Catalan FAI. The 
concerns of these militants were chiefly practical, based on prisoner support and union 
control over resources, issues linked to the fighting capacity of the affinity groups and 
defence committees, which they considered necessary to maintain if the fatalist drift of 
the libertarian movement was to be arrested by action. 
‘Nothing practical can be done’: Autonomous activity and the role of the FAI 
 
Following the abandonment of the barricades in May, several voluntarist anarchists had 
hoped that a showdown with the counter-revolution could yet be won, and the 
revolutionary spirit of 19 July recovered. To prevent this, throughout the late summer 
and autumn of 1937 the security forces dismantled the networks of youth ateneos and 
neighbourhood defence committees that had facilitated the uprising in May, in 
operations that were consented to by the Catalan Regional Committee of the CNT in a 
spirit of bureaucratic fatalism. So it was that in July 1937 the Committee rubber 
stamped the abandonment of the head-quarters of the defence committee of Sants in the 
Plaça Espanya, which it understood was soon to be the target of an assault by the forces 
                                                 
57 See Fernández Soria, Cultura y libertad, p. 38, and Esfuerzo, 14 October 1937. 
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of the Generalitat.58 Those militants who considered that the hegemony previously 
enjoyed by the libertarian movement in Cataluña could yet be recovered by force 
realised that, sooner or later, the ongoing operations of the security forces would make 
any such strategy untenable.  
Such was the reasoning of activists in the CNT affiliated Transport Workers’ 
Union of Barcelona when in August they prevented police from carrying out a register 
of their union headquarters. Summoned to defend its actions at a meeting of the 
Regional Committee of the CNT on 10 August, at which García Oliver, Xena and 
Dionisio Eroles were all in attendance, Julián Merino, speaking on behalf of the Union’s 
Junta (council), declared that the Union was responding to the provocations of its 
enemies: ‘We are losing our conquests piece by piece. We have lost almost all of the 
centres of production that we gained in the heat of the revolution.’59 The Union, he said, 
had already handed over garages, cars and tanks to the police, with the result that its 
functions had been disrupted and its members had gone unpaid: 
These and many other abuses have so disheartened the activists, who 
suspect that everything is gradually being lost and, fearing the moment 
when defending ourselves will have become impossible, they have risen 
in anger and agreed to the self-defence for which we are being so 
criticised. All that the Junta has done is to take on board the agreements 
arrived at by the majority of the members.60   
This little-recorded event provides a fascinating example of how individual CNT 
unions were able to arrive at the kind of bold resolutions that the intervention of the 
                                                 
58 See ‘Reunión del Comité Regional celebrada el día 8 de julio de 1937’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 
39 A. 
59 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada el día 10 de Agosto de 1937; por el Comité Regional de Cataluña; 
estando presentes los delegados siguientes, Artes Gráficas, Alimentación, Productos Químicos, 
Transporte, Secretario, Más, Luz y Fuerza, Eroles, Isgleas, García Oliver, Siderometalurgia, y la Junta del 
Sindicato de Transporte’, CNT (España) Archives (IISG) 39 A.   
60 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada el día 10 de Agosto’. 
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comités superiores had obstructed over the summer at the Plenums of the FAI.61 But it 
was precisely this isolation from the rest of the libertarian movement that was invoked 
by José Juan Domènech, former Councillor of Supplies in the Generalitat and then 
Regional Secretary of the CNT, when he demanded that the Junta abandon its stance:  
Only two options remain: either the attitude of the Transport Workers’ 
Union will be supported by the other unions of the Organisation, and 
then the Organisation as a whole; or the Union, after this act of violence, 
will find itself isolated and abandoned by its comrades and therefore 
outside of the Organisation. 
It seems clear that only the second option was conceivable to the Regional Secretary, 
and the possibility of an armed movement of the whole of the CNT against the counter-
revolution arising from the bottom up can only have been disingenuously entertained 
given the role of the comités superiores when faced by such a movement the previous 
May. In fact, the comités superiores dreaded a repetition of the May events, and 
suspected that the security forces in Barcelona were intent on provoking an 
altercation.62 The intervention of José Xena at this meeting suggests that this fear was 
far from groundless: 
Yesterday the Union was prepared, with arms in hand, to prevent the 
Civil Guard from carrying out a register [of the headquarters], and the 
affinity groups and neighbourhood committees were aware of this 
attitude, and were also prepared to come out in support of this grand 
movement, something that should have been made known to the Liaison 
Committee, which is [the organ that] must control all such movements 
when they are necessary.63 
                                                 
61 The proceedings of this meeting have recently been referred to in Guillamón, La represión contra la 
CNT, pp. 318-20. 
62 On the intentions and activity of the security forces in this period, see Godicheau, No callaron, pp. 83-
4.  
63 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada el día 10 de Agosto’.  
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More remarkable than the wilful self-deception implied by Xena’s suggestion that 
the Liaison Committee could head up rather than quash any such initiative, is the 
admission here that the libertarian networks that had mobilised in May had maintained 
their channels of communication and capacity for autonomous action in spite of the 
heavy repression they had undergone. The fact that these were the means by which this 
new mobilisation was to be effected and that Merino, as Secretary of the Transport 
Workers’ Union and the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups, provides a 
point of continuity between the events of May and those of August, adds weight to the 
interpretation of the May mobilisation offered in Chapter Three. García Oliver, whose 
memoirs accord Merino a key role in the mobilisation of May, intervened at length at 
the meeting in August in a tone of extraordinary ferocity: 
At the front much greater events are occurring than here, and any 
comrade that steps out of line is tried and shot… the Transport Workers’ 
Union was not unconnected to the propaganda carried out against 
government collaboration… and these tactics are inappropriate and 
deceive the people. Whosoever inspires these movements is a TRAITOR 
and if there are ten who are behind them there are ten TRAITORS. The 
people do not show as much support for us as we would like. If we take 
to the streets and lose then our loss would be THE GREATEST 
BETRAYAL OF ALL TIME…. you present us as reformists, but we are 
no less revolutionary than anyone else… If the situation is as Xena has 
described, Popular Tribunals will certainly be necessary TO PUNISH 
THE INSTIGATORS.64 
This remarkable speech demonstrates, perhaps as much as any other single 
document, the transformation that the experience of state collaboration and the anti-
fascist war had imposed upon the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Spain and the 
divisions this had given rise to. García Oliver had once been the chief theoretician and 
practitioner of that impetuous anarchist voluntarism that he now considered an act of 
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treachery worthy of the harshest punishments. He went on to ask Merino whether he 
had any reason to know why Aurelio Fernández, a leading member of the Catalan CNT 
and former Secretary of the Generalitat’s Junta de Seguridad Interior (Council of 
Internal Security), had found himself questioned by the police. The Secretary of the 
CAP concluded that ‘everything that is going on is influenced by our enemies who want 
to break the alliance or pact between the CNT and the UGT and there is therefore no 
alternative but to create a Revolutionary Tribunal, and that whomsoever deserves it, let 
[justice] be meted out to him WITHOUT QUALMS.’65 
Aurelio Fernández had been questioned by police in relation to an attempt on the 
life of Andreu i Abelló, President of the Palace of Justice in Barcelona. He would later 
be arrested, imprisoned and acquitted only to have his release prevented by new charges 
relating to his alleged role in the murder of forty-two Marist Brothers in August 1936, 
when he had worked at the head of the Patrullas de Control and the Generalitat’s 
Council of Internal Security (JSI). We can only speculate as to why García Oliver 
brought the subject up at this meeting. Perhaps he intended to insinuate that Merino 
was, or knew who was, responsible for the attack on Andreu i Abelló. François 
Godicheau has posited that the attempted assassination may have been undertaken on 
the initiative of the Comité Pro-Presos operating within the Modelo Prison in 
Barcelona.66 Merino certainly had contacts in the prison at the time, as one of the 
inmates that had threatened a hunger strike at that institution in June was Antonio 
Cristobal Remacha, who belonged to the same affinity group, Cultura y Acción, as 
Merino.67  
                                                 
65 Ibid. In his capacity as Secretary of the CAP, García Oliver would also make vague but equally 
ominous threats to the oppositionists Santana Calero and Peirats. See Ealham, Living Anarchism, p. 112. 
66 See Godicheau, No callaron, p. 74. 
67 See ‘Relación nominal de compañeros que se encuentran en esta prisión celular en concepto de 
Gubernativos y procesados y que el martes día 22 de los corrientes empezarán la huelga de hambre por 
las causas que en la ajunta ponencia se expresan’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 842/7. 
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García Oliver’s threats did not have the desired effect, however, as the minutes 
record that the delegates of the Transport Workers’ Union demanded proof of what had 
been alleged against them and ‘remained unconvinced of the need to change their 
attitude’, while Merino, ‘deeply hurt by García Oliver’s insinuations, demanded that he 
clarify what he wanted to say in order to clear him [Merino] of responsibility; as he did 
not want any doubt to remain that he had intervened even remotely in the persecution of 
Aurelio Fernández; on the contrary he did not want anyone to be imprisoned’.68 The 
meeting ended with the representatives of the comités superiores expressing the wish 
that an assembly of the various Juntas of the Barcelona unions due to take place that 
afternoon would succeed in convincing the representatives of the Transport Workers’ 
Union to drop their combative stance. 
It is likely that this meeting also ended in stalemate, as the state of tension was to 
continue into the following month, with police raids on JJLL headquarters and anarchist 
centres culminating in the assault on the building known as ‘Los Escolapios’ on 20 
September. This former religious school was the head-quarters of the cultural grouping 
Agrupación Faros, the Food and Supplies Union and the city centre defence committee. 
The activists present in the building in the early hours of the morning refused to open its 
doors to a detachment of Assault Guards, who returned with artillery and tanks. The 
CAP was charged with mediating between those inside the building and the police, and 
were informed that the building would be subject to aerial bombardment if it was not 
abandoned within ten minutes.69 Nevertheless, those inside submitted to the demands of 
the CAP that they abide by ‘the agreements taken in previous Plenums’ rather than the 
threats of the police.70 While some of those already wanted by the authorities for their 
                                                 
68 ‘Reunión extraordinaria celebrada el día 10 de Agosto’.  
69 See ‘Acta del Pleno de GGAA’, also Godicheau, No callaron, pp. 83-4, and Guillamón, La represión 
contra la CNT, pp. 402-12.  
70 See ‘Acta del Pleno de GGAA, celebrado en Barcelona el día 21 de Septiembre de 1937’, CDMH, PS 
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involvement in the May days were able to escape from the building, those who handed 
themselves in were to have their fate decided by the newly formed Tribunales 
Especiales de Espionaje y Alta Traición (Special Tribunals of Espionage and High 
Treason).71 
The meeting of anarchist affinity groups that took place in the wake of these 
events saw similar sentiments expressed to those aired at the Regional Plenum of 
Anarchist Affinity Groups in July and the extraordinary meeting of the Regional 
Committee of the Catalan CNT on 10 August, discussed above. The delegate of the 
group Dinamita Cerebral (possibly Teodoro García of the Metalworkers’ Union) 
denounced the CNT leadership for allowing ‘all the conquered positions to be snatched 
from us bit by bit… Another 19 July is coming and we must prepare ourselves if we do 
not want to succumb’.72 However, there was an increasing sense of desperation in the 
interventions of delegates and an acknowledgement of a certain amount of impotence 
and isolation. The delegate of the affinity group Convicción y Firmeza noted bitterly 
that ‘we have lost one of the most important strategic points of the city, but it does not 
matter, because we are a political party.’ He had seen, he claimed, ‘battle-hardened 
comrades in tears’, but this ‘cannot be taken into account because it is the organisation 
itself that is authorising everything that is happening’.73 Censure of the Regional 
Committee of the CNT was universal, and there were calls for its removal, with the 
delegate of the Móvil group declaring that it was ‘high time that we begin to expel the 
irresponsible elements’, while other delegates questioned the role of García Oliver, 
Secretary of the CAP. The delegate of the group Afinidad, in reference to García Oliver 
                                                 
71 See Godicheau, No callaron, pp. 85-9. The prisoners were eventually released in the early part of 1938.  
72 See ‘Acta del Pleno de GGAA’. 
73 Ibid.  
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and José Juan Domènech, wondered whether ‘we are communists’ and that, if not, ‘then 
we must not allow a certain number of individuals to determine what goes on’.74 
In the absence of a leadership that would stand up for the persecuted anarchists of 
the rank and file, the delegate of the affinity group Humanidad found it ‘perfectly 
natural that a defence committee [had] rebelled and acted of its own account’. Noting 
that the Local Federation of unions had come to an agreement with Ricardo Burillo, 
Director General of Security in Cataluña, which allowed the police to carry out registers 
of union buildings, the delegate went on to observe that ‘either the Organisation has 
been bought off or else it is happy to take on all the responsibility for what is 
happening’.75 The references of this delegate to ‘the Organisation’, meaning the CNT, 
as opposed to only the comités superiores of the organisations, may not be significant in 
itself, as the terms were occasionally used synonymously, but this Plenum did see 
grievances aired that suggested that the problems experienced by the radicals were not 
entirely reducible to the composition of the comités superiores. 
Certain questions went to the heart of what kind of organisation the FAI should, 
or could, be. If it were to be the vanguard of the libertarian movement, could the affinity 
groups of Barcelona remain beholden to regional and national leaderships that quashed 
any autonomous initiative? The delegate of the Sagitario group, protesting ‘the conduct 
of the Organisation’, declared that it was time for ‘the FAI to act of its own accord and 
not merely tail the CNT’.76 This, however, led to a debate, as delegates defended the 
traditional role of FAI members with regard to the unions. The delegate of the Rebeldes 
group located the weakness of the FAI in the fact that its activists had:  
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76 The Sagitario group included Martín Gibel, Vicente Serna and Miguel Garrofe (their FAI membership 
cards can be found in CDMH, PS Barcelona, 1793/1).  
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… situated themselves outside of the unions, either due to negligence or 
because the majority of comrades occupy positions in other places. This 
cannot continue. We must go directly to the unions and take on 
responsible posts so that we can, in this way, guide the unions according 
to the perspectives of the FAI.77  
This was also the position expressed by Merino in his capacity as Secretary of the Local 
Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups.78 However, the delegate of the Sagitario group 
explained that there were difficulties in influencing the unions owing to the ‘continuous 
offensive that comes from the arrivistes’, saying that he had been elected president of 
his union but that he was ‘boycotted shamelessly by other elements from the same 
union’.79 In reality, these arguments were not contradictory: the influence of the FAI as 
a specifically anarchist voice within the Spanish labour movement had been diluted on 
the one hand by the official duties ‘in other places’ of many of its members and on the 
other by the influx of new recruits to the CNT after 19 July 1936. It was such 
circumstances that led to the phenomenon described as the bolshevisation of the 
libertarian movement, a process that, through the new structures adopted at the Valencia 
Plenum, now threatened to engulf the Local Federation of the Barcelona FAI.  
On 17 October, an assembly was called in Barcelona that was open ‘to all 
anarchists… whether affiliated to the FAI or not’, in order to constitute the Agrupación 
Anarquista de Barcelona (Barcelona Anarchist Grouping - AAB), in accordance with 
the new structure of the FAI, in spite of the fact that this was opposed by a majority of 
affinity groups in the city.80 As a consequence, ‘a good number of anarchist affinity 
groups and individuals’ were present at the ‘Casa CNT-FAI’, with several speakers 
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commenting on the impressive number of attendees.81 The assembly had been called by 
the new secretary of the Local Federation, Alejandro Gilabert, in the hope that a 
‘harmonious conclusion’ could be arrived at with the recalcitrant affinity groups. He 
was to be swiftly disabused of this notion, however.82  
Many attendees defended the traditional structure of the FAI based on affinity 
groups, with the delegate from the Sagitario group judging the AAB to be ‘doomed to 
failure’, while Grau declared that ‘there has been an attempt made to destroy the affinity 
groups, but in spite of everything these groups remain the nerve centre of our 
movement’.83 One Martínez averred that ‘perhaps it will soon be the affinity groups 
who must re-conquer our freedoms on the street’. Iglesias, who also raised the question 
of insurrectionary activity on the street, declared that ‘Gilabert and other comrades have 
said that those who accept the new structure do so with the intention of saving our 
movement’ but he believed that it would have the opposite effect, and that:  
… the only means by which the situation might be saved is through an 
insurrection of workers and soldiers… anarchists cannot collaborate with 
any Government or political party, as with them we cannot make the 
revolution nor win the war, and if we want to save the revolution it is 
necessary to return to the principles that we have abandoned.84 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Julián Merino, whose resignation as 
Secretary of the Local Federation and withdrawal from the FAI did not prevent him 
                                                 
81 In spite of the open convocation, there were questions raised about the credentials of one attendee who 
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from dominating the assembly’s first session. As far as he was concerned, the new 
structure was a manoeuvre of reformists, which had ‘the “virtue” of breaking up [the] 
movement’. In an apparent reference to the Argentinian anarchists, such as José Maria 
Lunazzi, José Grunfeld, Jacobo Prince and Jacobo Maguid who had arrived in 
Barcelona under the patronage of Diego Abad de Santillán and who were supportive of 
the centralising tendencies within the FAI, Merino denounced the ‘importation of 
comrades from abroad who, when they come to Spain, know nothing of our Confederal 
or Specific organisation but, wanting to intervene and to occupy posts as soon as they 
arrive, have wrecked the CNT and the FAI’.85 Here, Merino used language reminiscent 
of Rodríguez Vázquez in his denunciations of foreign critics of CNT policy. Earlier in 
the session, Merino had appealed to such critiques from abroad in support of his 
rejection of the FAI’s new structure. Given that he was at the forefront of attempts to 
arrest the retreat of the revolution through extra-legal measures, it is unsurprising that 
Merino laid the blame for what was happening on ‘those elements that ensure that 
nothing practical can be done’, but it was inconsistent to draw attention to their 
geographical origins, particularly when there was no shortage of either foreign-born 
radicals in Spain or home-grown impediments to the methods favoured by the 
oppositionists. 
Had the supporters of the new structure hoped that an opening up of the FAI to 
new members might drown out oppositional voices, the minutes of this assembly, which 
testify to the radical interventions of individuals attending apparently not as delegates of 
affinity groups, suggest that it had the opposite effect. The newly constituted AAB did 
                                                 
85 Maguid had arrived in February to take on the editorship of Tierra y Libertad. Grunfeld had arrived in 
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not, in fact, generate much enthusiasm. Formed with an initial number of thirty-seven 
members, including several of the most notable grandees of Catalan anarchism, it would 
end abruptly in September of the following year.86 In the meantime, the absence of its 
members from Plenums of the Local Federation meant that there were effectively two 
FAIs in Barcelona during this period, a fact that was tacitly admitted at one such 
Plenum in December.87 The outcome of this was that, at the same time as the Peninsular 
Committee of the FAI reaffirmed its commitment to government collaboration, the 
organisation of affinity groups in Barcelona passed a motion unanimously at that same 
Plenum that declared its intention to take to the unions the ‘suggestion that the FAI, in 
accordance with its agreements, withdraw from all political lines and from all the 
collaborationist organisations, nor intervene in any anti-fascist committee while anti-
fascists are persecuted, jailed and massacred’.88 It further affirmed its autonomy relative 
to the national organisation at this Plenum by constituting its own, extra-legal, ‘Comité 
Pro Presos’, ‘constituted as they used to be before 19 July’, in opposition to the newly 
restructured Comisión Jurídica.89 The Plenum ended with Merino once again urging his 
comrades to return to their unions and ensure the influence of the FAI in the workplace. 
Merino certainly did his best to lead by example in this regard. Within days of this 
                                                 
86 Initial members of the AAB included Montseny, Toryho, Miró, Escorza, Abad de Santillán, Grunfeld, 
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Plenum he was to be found at a Plenum of unions proposing the formation of a ‘Comité 
Pro Presos’ alongside the delegate of the Food Supplies Union.90 
Bolshevisation Abroad: The Extraordinary Congress of the IWMA 
 
The reversals and defeats suffered by the Spanish libertarian movement had distressed 
and divided its international comrades. Throughout 1937, the CNT’s official 
pronouncements, as discussed in the previous chapter, had dealt scathingly with any 
publicly expressed disappointment in or criticism of the CNT that emanated from the 
international anarchist press and organisations. The revolution had, of course, initially 
offered a beacon of hope to anarchists in a world that was everywhere succumbing to 
reaction. Emma Goldman, perhaps the creed’s most famous contemporary proponent, 
wrote in July 1937, in the preface to a reprint of Now and After: The ABC of Anarchist 
Communism, that, had the book’s author, her companion Alexander Berkman, lived 
beyond June 1936, ‘how gratifying it would have been to him to see the Spanish people 
evince such profound feeling and understanding of Comunismo Libertario – how that 
would have rejuvenated our comrade and given him new strength, new hope!’.91 By 
December, however, writing from Paris where the CNT had called her to attend the 
Extraordinary Congress of the IWMA, she reflected sadly: ‘I no longer regret he is 
gone. I only regret that I am not in his place.’92  
Goldman’s qualified defence of the CNT had brought her into conflict with those 
members of the international anarchist movement whose criticisms she considered too 
harsh. Prior to the Congress, Goldman had written to one such critic, Alexander 
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Schapiro, one of several anarchists based in France who had been singled out for 
criticism by the CNT’s National Committee, that:  
If I believed in the efficacy of prayer I would pray most devoutly that the 
conference of the [IWMA] will not end in a break up. It would really be 
a great disaster if our people will not be large enough to set aside their 
misunderstandings for the bigger issue of maintaining and strengthening 
morally at [sic] the supreme importance of the CNT regardless of what 
the committee may be guilty of or not. I dread to think there might be a 
split.93 
It was precisely the ‘supreme importance’ of the CNT that eventually ensured the 
effective silencing of its international critics following this Congress, as the 
organisation was able to wield its financial clout in order to bring its sister organisations 
to heel. Schapiro, one of several anarchists to perceive the ‘bolshevisation’ of the 
Spanish libertarian movement, would witness the process first hand in Paris. Relations 
between Emma Goldman and Schapiro had cooled considerably after the former 
accused Schapiro in the spring of 1937 of being quicker to condemn the CNT than he 
had been to break with the Bolsheviks.94 Schapiro replied that it was one thing to defend 
Bolsheviks when they claimed to do ‘anarchist work’, and another to defend ‘anarchists 
doing bolshevist work’:  
…whatever I, or any other Anarchist did or said in Russia, our 
organisations never gave to anybody any mandates and none of us ever 
represented them in governments or political bodies… Our experiences 
in Russia showed us we were right to keep our organisations outside 
political intrigues and responsibilities.95  
The Paris Congress had been called by the CNT with the intention of fixing the 
IWMA’s position in regard to the Spanish experience. A lengthy and fractious affair, it 
                                                 
93 Letter to Alexander Schapiro, 2 December 1937. Emma Goldman Papers (IISG), 144. 
94 See Goldman, Vision on Fire, pp. 112-3. 
95 See the letter to Emma Goldman, 20 March 1937, Emma Goldman Papers (IISG), 144. 
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would see the CNT accused of using tactics reminiscent of the Comintern in its bid to 
silence the radical critics of its policy. The delegation sent by the CNT was composed 
of Rodríguez Vázquez, José Xena, David Antona and Horacio M. Prieto, and was 
charged with removing Pierre Besnard as General Secretary, obtaining from the 
international sections a commitment to entering anti-fascist alliances, and securing the 
continued preponderance of the CNT in the IWMA through a system of proportional 
votes. The delegation set out its stall from the moment of its arrival, declaring its 
distance from and superiority to the other attendees in national, political and emotional 
terms:  
As Spaniards we have a different mentality and we are participating in a 
struggle of a racial character that concerns ourselves alone… What is at 
stake is the destiny of a revolution, and not personal opinions or the 
small-minded moaning of refugees grouped in ghost sections.96  
Such nationalist language had already been subject to critique from veterans of the 
anarchist movement, both in exile and in the pages of Faro, which had served as a 
platform for both Spanish and international anarchists in the period preceding the 
Congress. 
The affinities between the CNT’s internal and external critics alarmed the comités 
superiores. In October, the passage of a motion proclaiming its solidarity with the CNT 
by the French organisation the Union Anarchiste had been hailed in the pages of 
Nosotros, the formerly radical mouthpiece of the FAI in Valencia now taken over by the 
Peninsular Committee, as ‘giving the lie to those here who boast of the support of 
libertarians abroad, and use it to continue in their stupidity and dedicate themselves to 
trivialities in their tedious scrawlings’.97 It was thus Besnard’s alleged support for the 
                                                 
96 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. 
97 Quoted in Gimenólogos, En busca de los Hijos de la Noche, p. 492. Two former combatants in the 
Durruti Column, Charles Ridel and Charles Carpentier, opposed the motion and argued in vain for the 
Union Anarchiste to criticise the policy of the comités superiores. 
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CNT’s internal opposition that was to be central to the case brought by the Spanish 
delegation against the General Secretary in Paris.  
There, the representatives of the CNT attempted to simultaneously maintain that 
no such internal opposition existed, but that it was nevertheless intolerable for the 
IWMA to have associated with it.98 Rodríguez Vázquez declared to the Congress that it 
would have to decide between the person of Besnard and the continued affiliation of the 
CNT to the IWMA. The accusations against Besnard, who obviated the need for any 
such choice by offering his resignation, were partly based on the fact that he had 
redirected funds collected for the CNT to victims of counterrevolutionary repression in 
Europe.99 Besnard defended this action by asserting that it had been subject to a 
referendum of the IWMA and that he had received a letter of support from the Local 
Federation of Unions in Barcelona, asking of the Spanish delegation: ‘Is that what you 
call being allied to the opposition? And to an opposition that according to you does not 
exist?’. In fact, the Spanish delegates were far more aware of the extent of the anarchist 
opposition to the CNT leadership than were the foreign delegates to the Congress. 
Besnard admitted that: ‘I myself know of neither facts nor people that attest to the 
existence of an organised opposition… There is a diffuse and unorganised opposition, 
we might say. I do not know its importance or who is at its head.’100 As a delegate for 
the Dutch section, the Nederlands Syndicalistisch Vakverbond (Netherlands Syndicalist 
Trade Union Federation) put it, what was at issue for the international 
                                                 
98 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. Antona and Xena disingenuously attempted to 
imply that the internal opposition was not anarchist in character. The former, in denouncing Besnard, 
described it as ‘an opposition that is half external to the movement. We make it known to all those present 
that the communists, the dissident communists and the socialists are attempting to come to an accord 
within the CNT and it is criminal to favour such manoeuvres.’ The latter, meanwhile, declared that: ‘Even 
today, there is no opposition fraction among us. Nor is there an absolute unity of perspective; everything 
is argued over, and for some time we have seen that manoeuvres of a Marxist type have been undertaken 
to break our unity. The Trotskyists, amongst others, who do not have an organised movement in Spain, 
attempt to create one at our expense.’  
99 An account of this affair may be found in Manuel Azaretto, Las pendientes resbaladizas (los 
anarquistas en España (Montevideo: Germinal, 1939), pp. 153-5.  
100 Ibid. 
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anarchosyndicalist movement was not the existence of concrete links with the CNT’s 
internal opposition but ‘the fact… that the CNT is in opposition to the other sections 
and the principles of the IWMA itself. No section considers the conduct of the CNT to 
be correct.’ That being the case, the sections of the IWMA could do nothing more than 
hope that an internal opposition ‘might revive the CNT’ and cause it to ‘cease to be in 
conflict with all of our principles’.101  
It is clear therefore, that although the CNT’s international critics had published 
articles in Faro, and radical anarchists in Spain such as Julián Merino had invoked their 
positions in order to bolster their own struggle with the organisation’s comités 
superiores, such connections were limited. Nevertheless, at least one non-Spanish 
delegate in Paris did have first-hand knowledge of the Spanish libertarian movement’s 
internal opposition. This was the representative of the Chilean Confederación General 
de Trabajadores (General Confederation of Workers), who had attended several of the 
stormy plenums of the FAI that had taken place over the previous months. As such he 
was the particular target of the CNT delegation’s heavy-handed tactics at this Congress. 
The Chilean delegate had already complained of being insulted by the Spanish delegates 
outside of the Congress. Intervening with respect to the question of the internal 
opposition, he observed that ‘it [the opposition] is not the result of the activity of 
Besnard’ but was rather ‘a natural reaction against the ministerial activity taken on by 
the leadership of the CNT’. This prompted Rodríguez Vázquez to object to the 
continued discussion of the internal opposition to the CNT and threatened the Spanish 
delegation’s withdrawal should the Chilean delegate utter another word on the subject. 
At this point the latter stated his intention to leave on account of the CNT’s attitude 
towards him, causing a Dutch delegate to address the Spanish section with the words: 
                                                 
101 Ibid. This delegate was probably the veteran anarchosyndicalist and anti-militarist campaigner Albert 
De Jong. 
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‘You got what you wanted. You never listen to anyone.’102 That the Chilean delegate’s 
pronouncement, which amounted to little more than a banal statement of fact, could 
provoke such an angry response from the CNT is illustrative of the gulf between the 
foreign delegates’ understanding of the situation and the narrative that the Spanish 
delegation was presenting to the Congress. The Chilean delegate, as a witness to the 
existence of the opposition denied by the CNT, was a particular inconvenience in the 
context of this narrative. The National Secretary of the CNT went so far as to suggest 
that the May days provided evidence, not of an internal opposition within the Spanish 
libertarian movement, but of the nefarious role of the organisation’s international critics: 
‘The events of May 1937 were provoked by fascism, but with the unconscious aid of 
international anarchists, who have sown disorder, favoured the opposition, roused the 
uncontrollable elements etc.’103 
This combination of bullying tactics and rhetorical flights of fancy was a constant 
in the CNT delegation’s interactions with the other delegates, which proceeded from 
fundamentally different appreciations of the degree to which principles should be 
sacrificed in the name of anti-fascism, and the entirely different mindset that state 
collaboration had imposed upon the comités superiores. The commitments that the CNT 
had made in Spain could not but clash with the anti-militarist, intransigently 
internationalist stance extolled by several sections of the IWMA. A delegate from the 
German group DAS declared that: 
…the ‘International Anti-fascist Front’ can have no other meaning than 
that of a capitalist coalition of nations in support of the territorial status-
quo. We must not accept the principle of the Anglo-Franco-Russian 
Imperialist Front and make ourselves its agents… An alliance of the 
proletariat against the [coming] war, this is what we must attempt to 
develop instead of allowing ourselves to be dragged along by this 
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ideology of war extolled by the CNT and which brings about the 
liquidation of our tactics and our principles. We are not fatalists who 
would admit world war as a necessity before which we must bow 
down… The formation of an alliance of struggle against the war, this 
must be one of the principal tasks presented to this Congress… and there 
is no time to lose on the absurd terrain of the anti-fascist alliance… 
Enough of the literature on the tragedies of China, of Spain and of 
Russia! Our thinking must be inclined to action!104 
This intervention is of interest not only for its outright rejection of the 
compromises implied by statist antifascism but also in its identification of, and reaction 
against, the tendency to read the situation of Spain in terms of tragedy. As we have 
seen, this had become a commonplace in anarchist writing and public declarations with 
regard to Spain, but we cannot say whether the German delegation was aware of the 
extent to which its voluntarist rejection of the tragic reading of the Spanish revolution 
echoed the sentiments expressed by oppositional anarchists in the press and at Plenums 
in Spain.105 Following the German intervention, the Belgian delegate affirmed that ‘no 
nation or alliance of nations constitutes our enemy, properly speaking. Capital is our 
only enemy. We cannot take a single step along the dangerous path of making an 
alliance with one of the existing blocs or “axes.”’ The inevitability of an international 
armed conflict did not imply ‘that it is necessary to enrol the proletariat... [World war] 
would possibly mean the material ruin of our hopes, but if we were to adhere in advance 
to a “Sacred Union” in the coming “anti-fascist” war, we would ensure that this ruin 
would be aggravated by a moral disaster.’106 
                                                 
104 Ibid. 
105 Members of the DAS had been active in revolutionary and anti-fascist activity in Barcelona during 
1936 and 1937, and had faced repression due to the active role the group had played during the May days, 
following which most of the group’s members were either jailed or forced to leave Spain. See Chapter 
Three. On the increasing estrangement of the DAS from the CNT after May, see Carlos García and 
Harald Piotrowski, ‘Los emigrados antifascistas alemanes y la represión estalinista’ in Nelles et al., 
Antifascistas alemanes en Barcelona, pp. 371-6. 
106 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’.  
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Horacio M. Prieto, whose commitment to anti-fascist priorities had led to a 
revision of principles that would shortly see him openly advocate the formation of a 
libertarian political party, was so incensed by the preceding interventions that he 
admitted to not knowing ‘how I have managed to steel myself to listen to them… But if 
the German comrades had understood something of principles and of the necessity of 
sometimes altering them, fascism wouldn’t have succeeded [there]… Sacrosanct 
principles, in the midst of the current struggle, should pass onto a secondary plane.’ 
Prieto went on to express contempt for the IWMA, an organisation that enjoyed only 
nominal existence while ‘the attention of the world is on the CNT’. He concluded with a 
statement reminiscent of the bolshevisation of the Communist International in both its 
focus on organisational discipline and privileging of the experience of one national 
organisation: 
Every idea requires an organisation in order to conquer the world, not 
based on a sentimental whim, but forged in a single bloc and maintained 
by implacable sanctions on indiscipline. Down with the principles and 
theories that have failed and which lead us to new disasters! New 
procedures for new times! Regular army, collaboration with the 
government, renovation of all principles of economic harmony that we 
considered intangible, it is necessary to know how to discipline oneself, 
to satisfy the comrades of the UGT, the petite-bourgeoisie etc… We 
cannot acknowledge the objections of Sweden, of Holland or of Chile. 
Incomplete experiences prove nothing. Only our experience is 
meaningful.107 
Unsurprisingly, just as purists in Spain had questioned the prioritisation of 
organisation over ideas, Schapiro railed against this sacrifice of principle and the 
associated affirmation that ‘the ends justify the employment of any means’. He decried 
this ‘bolshevisation of anarchism’, something which had to be rejected ‘so that mistakes 
                                                 
107 Ibid. The intervention referred to here from the Swedish delegate was made by Albert Jensen, on 
behalf of the Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (Central Organisation of the Workers of Sweden). 
He had described the CNT as having taken on the role of ‘doctors for a sick state’. 
241 
 
do not become irreparable’.108 Schapiro considered one such mistake to be the alliance 
with the Communist Party that the CNT now urged upon its international sister 
organisations. For radical anarchists, ‘bolshevism’ had long been both a political insult 
and the greatest danger, both internal and external, to the anarchist movement. To make 
an open alliance with this current was, according to Schapiro, ‘not a mistake, but a 
crime… this tactic of alliances has enabled bolshevism to maintain and reinvent itself, 
when its counter-revolutionary role should have been everywhere pitilessly 
unmasked’.109 An example of this counter-revolutionary role was provided by the Dutch 
delegation to the Congress, who related the attempt of that section to create a 
Committee for the Defence of Red Spain that was attacked by the adherents of the Third 
International who claimed that ‘criticising democratic Spain was equivalent to working 
in Franco’s favour’. The delegate concluded:  
The antifascism of the Second and Third Internationals is a terrible 
danger… From my point of view, the Spanish proposition [to form 
alliances with other anti-fascist parties and organisations] is not 
debatable as such. Its spirit is the same as that of the Third International, 
which has killed not only our comrades, but all those who maintained a 
spark of the socialist ideal. 
Nevertheless, when the French delegation proposed that the Congress issue a 
declaration in solidarity with anarchist prisoners, including those in Spain and the 
Soviet Union, describing Bolshevism as ‘the most formidable expression of the political 
                                                 
108 Ibid.  
109 Ibid. In the second fortnight of December 1937, the Uruguayan anarcho-syndicalist publication 
Solidaridad published an article by Schapiro lamenting the support shown by Solidaridad Obrera for the 
Soviet Union and its foreign policy, accusing it of having become a ‘semi-official daily of the USSR’. See 
the English translation: Alexander Schapiro, ‘The USSR and the CNT: an unconscionable stance’, trans. 
by Paul Sharkey, Bulletin of the Kate Sharpley Library, 14 (1998) 
<http://www.katesharpleylibrary.net/pk0q0r> [accessed 14 May 2015]. 
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and social oppression of a people’, the CNT insisted on removing any such contentious 
content before the motion could be passed.110 
The Spanish delegation was able to block the anti-militarist and anti-Bolshevik 
proposals of the other sections by threatening to withdraw from the IWMA. The fact 
that the CNT dwarfed even the most numerically substantial of its sister organisations 
meant that any such move on its part would effectively sound the death knell of the 
international organisation. In any case, it was not the intention of the majority of 
delegates to publicly censure the CNT. Much like delegates to Moscow in the early days 
of the Third International, the global anarchist movement did not want to impose its 
own perspectives on the CNT, but rather to resist the generalisation of one national 
section’s experience in new, universally applicable criteria.111 As the delegate of the 
Dutch section put it: ‘We do not ask that the CNT renounce its policies in the face of its 
internal problems. But the circumstantial measures taken by the leaders of the 
committees and by the Plenums must not drag along the whole centre of gravity of our 
international organisation.’112 After all, what was the purpose of the IWMA if its role 
was not to be that of ‘supreme guardian of the autonomy of the international proletariat 
against statism and war’?113 Thus, the CNT’s insistence that the IWMA declare its 
‘solidarity and approval of the trajectory followed by the CNT’ was doomed to failure, 
                                                 
110 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. The CNT delegates displayed little concern for 
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even as its takeover of the General Secretariat was confirmed. As in Spain, so in Paris: 
the CNT leadership was able to maintain and strengthen its power, even to obstruct and 
marginalise its anarchist opponents, but it could not convince them. 
Conclusions 
 
In order to defend the integrity of their movement, radical anarchists in Spain had to 
defend the spaces in which they operated. The organisational space afforded by the 
libertarian movement’s federalism, which had guaranteed the autonomy of the affinity 
group and the Catalan JJLL, was defended against the centralising tendencies within the 
libertarian organisations. Also under permanent threat of closure were the physical 
spaces in which anarchist activity had developed in the Republican rearguard since July 
1936: ateneos, defence committee headquarters and rational schools. In the case of the 
last of these, libertarian concern was not devoted solely to the threat of eviction but 
toward constructing a space which could not be encroached upon by the militarised 
ideology of the Republican state. In spite of the shift that I have identified in this period, 
from questions of revolutionary strategy to questions of ideological preservation, even 
the most ‘purist’ of radical anarchists were therefore forced back to the practical 
question of how to preserve the revolutionary city against a creeping statist and 
capitalistic restoration. This struggle would continue into 1938, when the repertoire of 
resistance narrated in this chapter would be added to by the Mujeres Libres in their bid 
to prevent the Bank of Spain from evicting the ‘Casal de la dona treballadora’.114 The 
armed preservation of space by defence committees and affinity groups, however, had 
effectively been ended by the surrender of the ‘Los Escolapios’ building in September 
1937. 
                                                 
114 See ‘Informe sobre los incidentes surgidos con motivo de la imposición del Ministerio de Hacienda 
para que cediéramos el edificio del “Casal de la dona treballadora” al Banco de España’, CDMH, PS 
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Anarchist activity was immeasurably complicated in this period by the absorption 
of much of the libertarian movement into mechanisms of state control, through 
participation in the army and security forces, in nationalised or semi-nationalised 
industries and directly in administrative or governmental bodies. This accelerated what 
was recognised as the bolshevisation of the CNT-FAI, and led to the increasing 
bureaucratisation of these organisations, characterised by a proliferation of committees 
tasked with obstructing precisely the varieties of oppositional anarchism dealt with in 
this thesis. Thus, as we have seen in this and the previous chapter, the state closure of 
libertarian spaces was mediated by the libertarian movement itself, through bodies such 
as the CAP, whose representatives gave their tacit consent to the abandonment of 
defence committee headquarters and had oppositional newspapers shut down, refusing 
to countenance that such spaces could exist even beyond the borders of Spain. 
The principal cause of bolshevisation was the unfolding tragedy of the Spanish 
civil war, which shrouded every revolutionary setback in fatalism. In such an 
atmosphere, the commonplace response of radical anarchists, as we have seen 
throughout this chapter, was to affirm that ‘anarchism is not fatalist. It is the antithesis 
of Marxism.’115  In this context, in an article for Le Combat Syndicaliste reproduced in 
Faro and addressed ‘to the circumstantialists’, the anarchist Lucien Barbedette echoed 
García Oliver at the Madrid Congress of 1931 by raising the spectre of Lenin in order to 
criticise the ‘false security’ that the Marxist belief in a ‘fatal process’ gave the workers:  
Lenin threw himself into the fray with passion when the Russian debacle 
began; he demonstrated practically that the energy of a man plays a 
highly important role. Socialists and communists propagated their 
convictions without being passive spectators, intervening in the most 
important events of the epoch.116 
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But just as Lenin had gone from extolling the necessity of revolution to helping to 
stymie its liberating potential, so the Spanish ‘anarcho-bolsheviks’ of the pre-civil war 
period were by the end of 1937 amongst the greatest intimidators of the revolutionary 
conscience. 
So it was that Julián Merino found himself confronted by Xena and García Oliver 
in August 1937, the latter insinuating that he should be shot, after undertaking one more 
in a series of audacious revolutionary measures. While he was neither cowed nor 
inactive, Merino admitted to his disillusionment at the Plenum of October:  
I have read a letter addressed to the comrades from the Secretary [of the 
Barcelona FAI] who regrets that anarchism has become isolated, and I 
too am bitter that there isn’t a comrade to be found with the necessary 
perception and courage to defend the ideas.117  
For Merino, the limits to revolutionary transformation in July remained a source of 
frustration: ‘had we wanted to, we could have instituted our ideals on 19 July. 
Lamentably, we did not.’118 According to Albert Jensen, the Swedish delegate to the 
Paris Congress of the IWMA, the failure to adhere to its own programme had led the 
libertarian movement into a trap that might have been anticipated: 
It is a fact that with every social movement there is a moment in which 
capitalism willingly offers its government to its adversaries in order to 
protect its weakness using the same forces that threaten it, thus managing 
to separate them from the proletariat. The state had lost consciousness… 
The state was revived. Now it has passed onto the offensive. It has 
smashed its saviours.119 
José Xena, meanwhile, who had provided the only vote in favour of instituting 
anarchist ideals at the ad hoc Plenum held at the ‘Casa CNT-FAI’ in July 1936, 
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rejecting collaboration with the Central Committee of Anti-fascist Militias in Cataluña 
and advocating, alongside García Oliver, ‘going for everything’, had completely altered, 
not only his attitude to collaboration, but his appreciation of the revolutionary 
possibilities that the July days had offered. In reply to Jensen, he declared that:  
Had we wanted to make our own particular point of view triumphant it 
would have been necessary to eliminate, by force of arms, those who 
struggle together with us against fascism… The Swedish comrade thinks 
that in Spain, the revolution has not known how to conquer the state and, 
as a consequence, the state has conquered the revolution. We say that the 
revolution has not been realised, and it cannot, therefore, have been 
conquered… What we can say is that our participation in the 
Government has given it a revolutionary meaning: that with our 
collaboration a revolutionary government was constituted.120 
Xena thus re-posed the tragic dilemma that had supposedly faced the Spanish anarchists 
in July 1936 but which had left him unconvinced at the time: whether to sacrifice 
anarchist principles through collaboration or to impose a bloody anarchistic 
dictatorship, adding the significant caveat that this sacrifice of anarchist principles had 
not damaged the revolution but, on the contrary, had given the Republican government 
a ‘revolutionary meaning’. Such an interpretation illustrated the gulf between the 
comités superiores and the radical anarchists at the end of 1937.  
An alternative understanding was advanced by the purist Amador Franco. 
According to Franco, writing in Esfuerzo at the end of October, the problem of the 
Spanish revolution could not be solved by a Spanish Lenin, ‘the clichéd requirement of 
a man of iron will to direct the revolution’, still less a ‘revolutionary government’. The 
essence of the revolution was defined as ‘a struggle between authority and liberty. 
Between politics and the people. Between the organisations of labour and those of the 
State.’ If the revolution were to be anarchistic, it would imply ‘not a transfer of powers, 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
247 
 
but a total change in the way of life’. Franco conceived of the revolutionary process in 
the following terms: 
The expropriation of the bourgeoisie, the disappearance of commerce 
from our country and its replacement by free exchange, and the mutual 
understanding of the regions that make up the country through regional 
councils or other organs not subject to the law, but structured in grand 
Congresses of the producers through mutual agreement, the annulment of 
the State… Such are the tasks to fulfil in the revolutionary period.121 
This evocation of grand workers’ congresses as the fora through which social life 
could be organised echoed the programme put forward in 1934 by Valeriano Orobón 
Fernández, but was nonetheless highly innovative in the context of 1937 and in its 
recognition that a chief inadequacy of the Spanish revolution was precisely the absence 
of any such organisation outside of the unions through which workers could fraternise 
and advance an independent agenda.122 While the Junta advocated by the AAD might 
also have been intended to be read in this light, it is unlikely that radicals such as Franco 
did so, given the distrust that the ‘authoritarianism’ of the AAD had evoked among 
purists.123 Instead, we might see his vision of revolutionary change as an extension of 
the programmes that emerged as a result of maximalist interpretations of the 
socialisation campaign, discussed in Chapter Two. Franco’s analysis of the revolution’s 
limitations shows the persistence of the anarchist conscience, and further demonstrates 
that critical reflection on the revolutionary experience was not limited to the AAD in 
1937. While his analysis was innovative, meanwhile, his proposals for a change of 
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course within the libertarian movement would have been familiar to both the 
voluntarists and purists of that year:  
Only one option remains open to us: the reaffirmation of anarchism, that 
is if we still have time. To carry this out we need the unanimous will of 
everyone and the abandonment of ministerial scheming and 
‘circumstantialist’ tactics… We must take on all the responsibility of 
marching forward to new conceptions. We must be worthy of history and 
of our ideas.124 
The analysis contained in the publications of the Catalan JJLL in this period, and 
the fact that they provided a platform to both disaffected militants of the Spanish 
libertarian movement and veteran anarchist exiles abroad, are indicative of the strength 
of the libertarian culture in Cataluña, which was capable of renewing itself and whose 
militants applied their principles to a critique of the movement to which they belonged. 
The same conclusions are implied by the ongoing capacity of the defence committees to 
mobilise in Barcelona until at least the autumn of 1937. The resilience of these branches 
of the libertarian movement is remarkable given the scale of the task that confronted 
them. In the conclusion to this thesis I will analyse the resilience as well as the 
limitations of these oppositional anarchists who, resisting fatalism, were nevertheless 
unable to prevent the consummation of the Spanish tragedy.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, the radical opposition to state collaboration in the Spanish libertarian 
movement has been shown to be more coherent, more consistent, and broader than has 
been understood hitherto. What has also become clear over the course of this work, 
however, is the scale of the challenge that this opposition faced. This was not only, or 
even primarily, because of widespread support among anarchists and non-anarchists for 
the line of anti-fascist unity promoted by the comités superiores, but because of the 
depth and complexity of the process of state reconstruction that the libertarian 
movement had become implicated in. Governmental participation was only one aspect 
of a process that absorbed hundreds of activists into administrative tasks, while 
thousands more worked in industries under state control throughout the Republican 
territories. The initiatives arising from the activity of the CNT during the revolutionary 
interregnum of summer 1936, most notably the militia columns and the Barcelona war 
industries, were also brought under increasing control as the state consolidated itself. 
Furthermore, state reconstruction was an ideological process that exalted the Spanish 
nation and re-imposed sexist norms that had been challenged during the ‘short summer 
of anarchy’, and so in order to be truly consistent and thoroughgoing, radical opposition 
to the state had also to incorporate resistance to its reconstitution as a patriarchal and 
racial entity. 
In myriad ways, radical anarchists attempted to meet these challenges over the 
course of 1937, considering the process of state reconstruction to be reversible and 
inconsistent with their vision of anti-fascism as necessarily internationalist, anti-sexist 
and anti-capitalist, a revolutionary anti-fascism whose superiority to the anti-fascism of 
the state had been proven on the streets on 19 July. Their activity in the socialisation 
campaign, the armed revolutionary mobilisation of May 1937 and the attempts to 
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reinvigorate the FAI, alongside numerous cultural and educational endeavours, can all 
be seen to have affirmed this revolutionary and anti-statist project. Worthy of study in 
their own right, we have seen how these struggles also produced a revolutionary 
programme and rich theoretical reflections and insight that give the lie to traditional 
assertions as to the theoretical and programmatic weakness of the Spanish libertarian 
movement. We can only speculate that had the likes of Diego Franco Cazorla and Juan 
Santana Calero not been murdered by the Francoists then the mature reflections of two 
of radical anarchism’s most intriguing proponents might have been added to the 
invaluable voices of those libertarian survivors who attempted to define and defend the 
anarchist legacy over the decades that followed their defeat.  
Although the radicals were defeated this thesis has sought to take their perspective 
seriously. It is therefore necessary to consider reasons for their failure beyond the wider 
and intractable problems of the war and those posed by state reconstruction outlined 
above. In the first half of 1937, the slogan advanced by Ideas, ‘Socialisation and the 
people armed!’, had become the programmatic basis for concerted action on the part of 
wide sectors of the libertarian movement. The socialisation campaign granted the 
radicals the opportunity to enact projects that went beyond the mere assertion of union 
power and control, while calling for the extension of socialisation to the sphere of 
consumption helped to foster important connections between the defence committees, 
the Mujeres Libres grouping and the bread queues in Barcelona in the period preceding 
the May days. However, by relying on appeals to the UGT, it also revealed an important 
weakness: the continued division of the organised workers and the absence of the kind 
of extra-union body later envisaged by Amador Franco that could enact socialisation on 
the basis of a working-class democracy capable of superseding union discipline. 
Furthermore, many radicals were understandably suspicious of UGT members, 
particularly in the revolutionary strongholds of Cataluña and Aragón, and considered 
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the libertarian movement itself to be the guarantee of both the revolution and proletarian 
democracy. 
This consideration could manifest itself in both organisational patriotism and the 
purist refusal of alliances with non-anarchists. In spite of the commitment of the FJR to 
the revolutionary process, the appeals prior to and during the May days to the ‘authentic 
revolutionaries’ of every stripe, and the cases of a common understanding being reached 
between activists of the JJLL and the POUM during that revolutionary mobilisation, the 
purists of the JJLL scuppered the developing revolutionary unity between the youth 
organisations of the libertarian movement and the POUM at its Congress of May 1937. 
There, the aversion to ‘politics’ in purists such as Peirats and Franco was made to serve 
the political interests of the regional comités superiores, desperate to distance 
themselves from the dissident communists. Although the importance of the FJR and its 
dissolution should not be overstated, the abandonment of the POUM not only damaged 
the revolutionary integrity of the JJLL, it also revealed a preference for purist gestures 
over the political imperative of maximising the forces disposed to defend the revolution. 
As much was in evidence again in the late summer and autumn of 1937, when purists in 
the JJLL walked out of the Regional Congress of the FAI and later completely cut their 
ties with the specifically anarchist organisation, leaving the voluntarist radicals to stay 
and fight for the traditional structure and role of the FAI without their help. Even when 
the FAI in Barcelona split into the Local Federation and the Agrupación Anarquista de 
Barcelona, the affinity groups of the JJLL were absent from the Plenums of the former, 
resolutely radical, formation. 
By contrast to the occasionally wilful ingenuity of the JJLL, Julián Merino, 
Secretary of the Local Federation of Affinity Groups, is notable for having attempted to 
unite a fidelity to anarchist principles with a strategic vision for reviving the 
revolutionary purpose of the libertarian movement. Merino held a key post in an 
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important union and was involved with the defence committees at an organisational 
level. As a veteran of the struggle against treintismo during the Second Republic, 
however, it was logical that it should be through the local FAI that he attempted to 
commit Catalan anarchists to withdrawal from state collaboration. In the statements of 
the Local Federation of Affinity Groups, at Plenums and in the pages of Anarquía, 
Merino’s strategy was to unite the doctrinal preoccupations of the purists with the 
practical concerns of the voluntarists. This alliance of voluntarists and purists, effected 
at least in part through the efforts of Merino, was evident from the early spring to the 
summer of 1937, and it very nearly succeeded in reversing the collaborationist 
commitments of the Catalan FAI. Additionally, Merino was under no illusions about the 
need to utilise force in order to defend the revolution from the encroachments of the 
Republican state. Having played a key role in bringing about the armed revolutionary 
mobilisation of May, however, Merino did not break ranks to countermand the orders of 
the newly enlarged Regional Defence Committee to abandon the barricades. Likewise in 
August, Merino appears to have been forced to back away from unleashing a re-
enactment of that mobilisation in defence of the local centre of the Transport Workers’ 
Union. 
Merino stopped short of making himself a public figurehead for open revolt 
against the state when to do so would have meant breaking from the official 
organisations of the libertarian movement. In May 1937, when he helped to promote an 
anti-state mobilisation, he did so not in defiance of libertarian organisational norms, but 
according to the mandate that a Local Plenum of affinity groups, defence committees 
and delegates of the JJLL had granted in April. Organisational patriotism was not 
required to recognise that, in 1937 as before, the channels for the organisation of a 
revolutionary mobilisation were entirely internal to the libertarian movement. Merino 
worked, therefore, within the limits of organisational discipline, albeit pushing them as 
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far as they would go. It is also possible that his activity was limited by the comités 
superiores being party to information that could compromise Merino’s safety. Although 
it may be better not to speculate too far as to the causes for García Oliver’s insinuations 
when confronting Merino on 10 August, the knowledge of Merino’s key role in the May 
days – itself sufficient for a charge of treason - may have been enough to bring him to 
heel. One way or another, Merino found himself forming a part of the Executive 
Committee of the Libertarian Movement in Spain, formed on the initiative of García 
Oliver at the beginning of April 1938, a body that could be described without hyperbole 
as the culmination of everything that Merino had fought against for over a year 
previously.1 Days before the fall of Barcelona in January 1939, Merino was charged 
with organising remaining anarchists or anarchist sympathisers into defence batallions 
in the name of the FAI.2 In the event however, a suicidal, last-ditch defence of the city 
was not attempted, and Merino crossed the border into France with thousands of his 
fellow defeated comrades. He died in Venezuela in April 1977. 
As in the Russian case, those in Spain who had attempted to maintain their fidelity 
to the revolution and to what they considered to be its guiding principles found 
themselves in conflict with the leaders of the revolutionary organisations they belonged 
to and which were synonymous, even for such oppositionists, with both the 
revolutionary achievements and the principles that motivated them. Simon Pirani has 
analysed how workers in the Soviet Union came into conflict with the Bolshevik 
authorities due to grievances such as the control over supplies, the emergence of new 
privileged strata and the degeneration of democratic fora into bureaucratic rubber 
stamping operations. Suggestive parallels emerge with the Spanish case, Pirani himself 
noting that:  
                                                 
1 See, for example, ‘Informe del comité ejecutivo del movimiento libertario sobre la actitud de la 
federación local de JJLL de Barcelona y de su comité y sobre su posición con relación al movimiento 
libertario de Cataluña’, CDMH, PS Barcelona, 514/08. 
2 See La Vanguardia, 20 January 1939. 
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The common features in the Russian and Spanish cases were: a 
revolutionary breakthrough led to the formation of a government that 
ruled in the name of the working class; due to the limited scope of the 
breakthrough, alienated labour was reimposed; the state, even where it 
was rudimentary, and the workers’ organisations, were instrumental in 
this process; and even in the absence of a capitalist or other ruling class, 
that state became rapidly bureaucratised, and hierarchical social relations 
were soon reproduced. While many strands of utopianism were no doubt 
present, it also seems incontrovertible that, as a result of the civil war, 
the process of working class formation and development of workers’ 
consciousness were severely disrupted.3 
Certain tendencies towards bureaucratisation existed within the CNT prior to the 
revolution. However, like the Bolshevik Party in 1917, the CNT in 1936 was a 
heterogeneous organisation with marked regional variations and whose mid-level cadres 
could not be relied upon to follow the orders of the comités superiores. In spite of its 
‘organisation and mass support’ the CNT was not a ‘potential state’: as in Russia the 
mass support for this organisation was translated into a revolutionary process that was 
experienced as an ‘interregnum’ in which the state’s powers were greatly 
circumscribed.4 It was rather the interaction with and inability to overcome the pre-
existing institutions of the state during a period of civil war that converted the CNT into 
a hierarchical body, its comités superiores effectively remaining state functionaries even 
after their ejection from government, carrying out the essential task of imposing 
discipline on recalcitrant elements of their membership.    
State collaboration had been embarked upon through a series of ad hoc responses 
to urgent situations, beginning with the agreement of the Catalan CNT to participate in 
the CCMA. During this process, the democratic decision-making procedures of the 
                                                 
3 Pirani, The Russian Revolution in Retreat, p. 7. 
4 On this combination of organisation and support making the mass movements of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries ‘potential states’ see Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), pp. 92-5. 
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libertarian movement were often bypassed, in part because of the exigencies of the 
circumstances. This fact alone should give us pause when we consider the oft-repeated 
claim that the majority of the CNT’s membership agreed with the policy of state 
collaboration. The fact that radical opponents of this policy were able to enact a mass, 
armed mobilisation in Barcelona in May 1937, backed up by a universally observed 
general strike, provides further grounds for scepticism. While this thesis has not 
established that oppositional anarchists had majority support among the wider 
membership of the CNT, it has made a case for the continuing popular legitimacy of the 
radicals’ anti-state project in the face of state reconstruction. If with hindsight this 
project seems to have been doomed, it can be readily appreciated why this did not 
appear to be the case for contemporaries, given the extensive working-class sympathy 
for radical positions and the ongoing mobilising capacity of oppositional anarchists, 
demonstrated above all by the May days. 
We cannot say with certainty therefore that the majority of CNT members agreed 
with state collaboration, and several of the notables involved in wedding the CNT to 
this policy also displayed a consistently high-handed disregard for established 
libertarian norms regarding organisational democracy, not least Montseny, García 
Oliver, Rodríguez Vázquez and Martínez Prieto. It would nevertheless be an error to 
dwell on individual deficiencies in this regard. The privileging of the ‘old-guard, of 
absolute solidity’ that Schapiro had criticised Rodríguez Vázquez for defending at the 
Paris Congress was not, in fact, exclusive to the comités superiores. Complaints about 
the quality and ‘understanding’ of the wider membership of the libertarian organisations 
were common to radicals as well as their opponents, and neither sector trusted the 
arrivistes who had joined after 19 July.5 
                                                 
5 This concern, likewise, echoed the experience of the Bolsheviks. See Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in 
Power, p. 393. 
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Attention to procedure was not what divided the comités superiores from radical 
anarchists but rather their proximity to the state, and this was both an ideological and a 
circumstantial factor. The common acknowledgement of anti-statism as a defining 
feature of anarchism did not preclude ambiguity in this regard in both the theory and 
practice of the movement in Spain, which contained a republican influence. This could 
be seen in both a narrowly Spanish sense, as anarchists and republicans had shared in 
both the vicissitudes of exile and the debates and discussions of the ateneos, and also in 
the sense of a broader European Enlightenment tradition stretching back to the French 
revolution. This informed a strongly progressivist tone that reinforced the gradualism of 
the moderates and the defence of ‘democratic civilisation’ advocated by Montseny and 
echoed by Xena at the Paris Congress. There, Xena defended the anti-fascist alliance 
because of ‘what the fascist danger constitutes! It is not only a threat to the CNT-FAI! It 
has set out on the destruction of liberalism, of Marxism, of the workers’ movement in 
general and of all the democratic and republican traditions of the bourgeoisie!’.6 Their 
emphasis on the anti-civilisational nature of fascism was reminiscent of the 
characterisation in the infamous ‘Manifesto of the Sixteen’ of Germany’s action during 
the First World War as ‘a threat not only against our hopes of emancipation, but against 
all human evolution’.7 Neutrality in the First World War had helped create the 
conditions for the initial growth of the CNT, and also shielded the movement from the 
more traumatic associations that split revolutionary syndicalism in France and 
elsewhere, leaving organised anarchism abroad much smaller, but also more inured to 
the appeals of ‘democratic’ militarism. When these depleted currents of international 
anarchism met the representatives of the comités superiores in Paris in December 1937, 
they could not even find a common ground on which to debate the questions of the day, 
                                                 
6 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. 
7 The ‘Manifesto of the Sixteen’ was issued in 1916 and signed by fifteen prominent anarchists, including 
Pyotr Kropotkin, declaring support for the Allied war effort. See Christiaan Cornelissen et al., ‘The 
Manifesto of the Sixteen’ (1916), trans. by Shawn P. Wilbur (2011) <http://libertarian-
labyrinth.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/manifesto-of-sixteen-1916.html> [accessed 7 June 2016]. 
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Rodríguez Vázquez informing them that the presence of foreign anarchists in Spain was 
not required unless they came ‘with disciplined troops; that is to say, with military 
discipline, with a military conception and military commanders, because we do not need 
anything else’.8 
In his study of the ‘conscience of the Russian revolution’, Robert V. Daniels 
concluded that the opponents of the degeneration of the Bolshevik organisation and the 
revolutionary process were ‘westernised’ elements who had ‘assimilated basic western 
assumptions of socialism’.9 It is tempting to draw an inverse parallel with the Spanish 
case, where the ‘western’, ‘Menshevik’ option of ‘democratic’ collaboration was chosen 
over that of the ‘Bolshevik’ imposition of the revolution, and the opposition instead 
came from ‘anti-modern’ ideologues. Such an interpretation would fit neatly with that 
of some of the leading scholars of Spanish civil war history today.10 It will not suffice, 
however, not only because of its unappealing essentialism, but because the radical 
positions of both the Russian and Spanish ‘consciences’ were in fact strikingly similar. 
Both opposed ‘state capitalism’ and bureaucratisation and affirmed workers’ control of 
production and public order. Instead we might consider how questions of ideology were 
secondary to the process of state reconstruction itself. In both Russia and Spain, the 
reconstitution of the state proved incompatible with the consolidation and extension of 
revolutionary phenomena, while civil war, and the urgent assessment of priorities that it 
entailed, was the means by which the revolutionary organisations became, to a greater 
or lesser extent, agents of state reconstruction. The taking on of official responsibilities 
and the experience of wielding authority allowed pre-existing ideological 
inconsistencies and embryonic bureaucratisation to be accepted as necessary, while war 
gave their justification moral urgency. 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, p. 408. 
10 Helen Graham, for example, considers the May days to have represented ‘the CNT’s own “crisis of 
modernity”’: Graham, ‘The Barcelona May Days’, p. 523. 
258 
 
These processes meant that the organisational life of the CNT and the FAI was 
entirely transformed. The former became an important supplier of administrative and 
governmental personnel, and of directors of the war-time economy, while the latter 
effectively ceased to exist until reactivated by oppositionists in Barcelona in 1937, its 
Peninsular Committee forming an extension to the National Committee of the CNT. 
When Nemesio Galve, the CNT’s permanent representative to the IWMA, was censured 
by that body for simultaneously occupying a role in the press office of the Generalitat in 
Paris, he declared that: ‘If the CNT had applied this rule [of the incompatibility of 
syndicalist and governmental responsibilities], there would no longer be a single activist 
of any magnitude left in the CNT! All have been mandated, like myself, with a political 
posting.’11 As in the Russian case, the absorption of activists into administrative roles 
exacerbated the growing divorce between those members with official roles and the 
wider membership, from the ‘mid-level’ union and defence committee delegates 
down.12 So it was that the ‘Ministerial anarchists’ and their staff in Valencia were 
entirely taken aback by the May days, their speeches calling for a cease-fire serving to 
confirm the distance between themselves and those behind the barricades.  
The prominent figures in the story of anarchist collaboration with the state were 
neither traitors to their anarchist ideals nor entirely consistent in their understanding and 
application of their principles: they were contradictory men and women capable of 
either aiding or obstructing the revolutionary process. What is clear, however, is that 
once they had become a part of the state administration their activity and rhetoric 
became broadly consistent with the logic of state reconstruction. The more prominent 
oppositionists, by contrast, were drawn from among those mid-level activists outside of 
official positions and high-level organisational roles, their radicalism generally 
proportionate to their distance from the state. In this sense, attention to the ideological 
                                                 
11 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. 
12 On this phenomenon in Russia, see Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power, pp. 392-3. 
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dimension of anarchist state collaboration should be seen to complement rather than 
diminish an understanding of the significance of the enormous structural and 
circumstantial pressures brought to bear on the libertarian movement by war-time state 
reconstruction.  
As we have seen, from early in 1937, radical anarchists recognised that, in 
allowing the chief institutions of the state to survive, they ‘had left the greatest enemy 
of the revolution standing’, and prepared to make good this error in the revolutionary 
mobilisation of May 1937. Prior to and after those events, the radicals were also 
prepared to make the case for prioritising this kind of activity over the military 
commitments they had contracted. Between the radical willingness to forget ‘for a 
moment, that fascism is in Aragón’ and the commitment of the comités superiores to 
military discipline at the front and in the rear, however, lay widespread unease among 
activists that any disruption to the war effort leading to a fascist advance would be 
blamed upon the anarchist movement. How, then, could the revolution and the war be 
combined? For Alexander Schapiro, the question rested on a false premise: 
In reality, the idea of the ‘revolutionary war’ is a disastrous mistake, the 
same that led Kropotkin and his friends to the Sacred Union in 1914. 
There is no such thing as a revolutionary war. What is legitimate is the 
armed and combatant revolution, which has as its indispensable, essential 
base the economic transformation of society.13  
The ‘armed and combatant revolution’ envisaged by Schapiro provides an accurate 
description of the July days and the early advances of the militia columns prior to the 
commencement of trench warfare. Whether or not the war had become conventional it 
would certainly have drained the libertarian movement of energy and resources, but 
once the ‘armed and combatant revolution’ had surrendered to conventional military 
discipline the connection between the fighting and the social and economic 
                                                 
13 ‘Actas del Congreso de la AIT celebrado en París’. 
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transformation in the rearguard became harder to sustain. A conventional war appeared 
to demand a conventional state, and if the radicals were slow to articulate an alternative 
to this impasse, they were impeded at every turn by the acceptance of this logic by the 
comités superiores of the libertarian movement, who participated in the process of state 
reconstruction at all levels. 
For the radicals, anarchism was ‘the anti-state’, which implied re-organising 
society in such a way that its inhabitants might be more than the stuff of the factory, 
prison or barracks.14 In education and social care, anarchists attempted to apply this 
world-view in spite of the encroachments of an increasingly militarised state. Their 
struggle in these spheres has only been lightly touched on in this thesis, but further 
research would likely prove as illuminating for the study of both radical anarchism and 
the processes of state reconstruction as has the more broadly political focus of the 
present work. Likewise, further comparative work would be necessary to establish the 
extent to which the argument presented here, of state reconstruction as the essential 
dynamic by which both revolutionary energies are co-opted and revolutionary 
phenomena shut down, is more broadly applicable. As has been suggested, the example 
of the Russian revolution offers much potentially fruitful ground for comparison. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the particular characteristics of anarchism and the 
Spanish revolutionary experience gave rise to certain unique features that brought the 
conflict between the revolutionary conscience and the state into sharper relief than 
elsewhere. The breadth and complexity of radical anarchism in the Spanish revolution 
corresponded to the multi-faceted nature of state reconstruction. Through their 
opposition to every aspect of that process, from militarisation and the disarmament of 
the defence committees to the domestication of the revolutionary organisations and the 
imposition of nationalist and patriarchal norms, the radical anarchists were able to 
                                                 
14 Frente y Retaguardia, 1 September 1937. 
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affirm the broad parameters of the international anarchist tradition and demonstrated the 
richness and capacity for renewal of its Spanish variant.  
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Appendix: Recurring personages  
 
José Alberola 
A rationalist schoolteacher and member of the FAI, Alberola was a prominent critic of 
moderation in the CNT in the early years of the Second Republic. During the war he 
opposed government collaboration and resigned from his post on the Regional Defence 
Council of Aragón when it was reorganised in December 1936. He later worked as a 
teacher in Mexico, and was murdered in obscure circumstances in Mexico City in 1967. 
Jaime Balius 
A member of the editorial board of Solidaridad Obrera at the outset of the war, Balius 
would become increasingly critical of the process of state reconstruction over the course 
of 1936. A contributor to Ideas, the mouthpiece of the libertarian movement in Baix 
Llobregat, he would help found the AAD in March 1937. Following the May days he 
was subject to the rumour mongering of the comités superiores and the harassment of 
the authorities. After the war he contributed to the anarchist press in France and sought 
to defend the legacy of the AAD. 
Camillo Berneri 
Berneri was an Italian anarchist and anti-fascist exile who was living in Barcelona at the 
outbreak of the civil war. Highly sensitive to the danger of the Spanish libertarian 
movement being ‘bolshevised’, he expressed this fear both before and during the war. 
Berneri fought at the front in the summer of 1936 but was forced to return to Barcelona 
on medical grounds. There, he published critiques of state collaboration and the 
persecution of the POUM. He was murdered by Stalinists during the May days of 1937. 
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Diego Camacho 
A young anarchist active in the JJLL of Clot and in his local defence committee, during 
the war Camacho was a founder member of the Los Quijotes del Ideal affinity group, 
which criticised the policy of state collaboration from a purist perspective and produced 
the El Quijote review. Under the pseudonym of Abel Paz he would later become an 
important historian of Spanish anarchism. 
Buenaventura Durruti 
Durruti won fame as a ‘man of action’ alongside García Oliver, Francisco Ascaso and 
others in the years prior to the Second Republic. In the years that followed he supported 
the insurrectionary essays undertaken in the name of libertarian communism. During the 
war he led the Durruti Column and opposed the militarisation of the militia. He was 
killed in mysterious circumstances at the Madrid front in November 1936.  
Diego Franco Cazorla 
Better known by the pseudonym Amador Franco. Only 16 when the war began, Franco 
fought on the Aragón front and provided some of the more lucid and trenchant critiques 
of state collaboration. A member of the JJLL and the libertarian student organisation, 
the FECL, Franco was a regular contributor to the oppositional press. Following the war 
he remained active in the libertarian movement, frequently crossing from France into 
Spain on clandestine missions. In July 1946, on one such mission, he was arrested and 
executed.  
Baudilio Sinesio García Fernández 
Better known by the pseudonym Diego Abad de Santillán, García Fernández was a 
leading member of the FAI in the years immediately prior to the civil war and a 
representative of the organisation in the CCMA from July 1936. He was the leading 
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member of the Nervio affinity group, associated both prior to and during the war with 
the attempts to introduce greater centralisation and discipline into the libertarian 
movement. 
Juan García Oliver 
During the Second Republic, García Oliver was instrumental in the organisation of the 
Barcelona defence committees and a proponent of ‘revolutionary gymnastics’. From 
July 1936 he represented the CNT in the CCMA, and from November he was Minister 
of Justice in the Republican government. Following the ejection of the CNT from 
central government, García Oliver became Secretary of the CAP and sought to enforce 
internal discipline in the Catalan libertarian movement. 
José Manzana 
A former military officer, Manzana would eventually replace Durruti at the head of the 
Durruti Column and oversee the militarisation of the same. A member of the enlarged 
Regional Defence Committee that ordered the demobilisation that brought the May days 
to an end, Manzana was a controversial figure who has remained the subject of rumours 
regarding the death of Durruti. 
Horacio Martínez Prieto 
National Secretary of the CNT during the autumn of 1936 when the decision was taken 
to join the government of Largo Caballero, Prieto was forced out of this post during the 
scandal that was caused by the removal of the government from Madrid to Valencia. An 
intransigent defender of collaboration, in 1938 Prieto advocated the formation of a 
libertarian political party and continued to propagate his variety of libertarian 
‘possibilism’ after the war. 
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Julián Merino 
By the beginning of the war Merino was a veteran organiser and leading member of the 
Maritime Transport Workers’ Union. At the front he was involved in setting up the 
Regional Defence Council of Aragón and on returning to Barcelona he became 
Secretary of the Local Federation of Anarchist Affinity Groups. Instrumental in the 
libertarian mobilisation of the May days, he would continue to oppose government 
collaboration throughout 1937.  
Fidel Miró 
Regional Secretary of the JJLL until May 1937, Miró was a member of the Nervio 
affinity group before the war and a close associate of Abad De Santillán. Together with 
Alfredo Martínez, Miró defended revolutionary unity with the JCI. This brought him 
into conflict with purists in the JJLL, a conflict that would continue following his 
removal as Secretary, when he was elected General Secretary of the FIJL.  
Federica Montseny 
A member of the famous Urales family that produced the anarchist review La Revista 
Blanca, in the years prior to the war Montseny was a fierce critic of treintismo. From 
November 1936 to May 1937 she was Minister of Health in the central government, and 
following the ejection of the CNT became a prominent figure in the Peninsular 
Committee of the FAI. A defender of collaboration during the war, in exile she returned 
to orthodox anarchist positions and, alongside her partner Germinal Esgleas, played a 
controversial role in the splits and recriminations that benighted the Spanish libertarian 
movement. 
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José Peirats 
A seasoned activist and union organiser by the beginning of the war, Peirats would 
become one of the most prominent critics of government collaboration, first as an editor 
of Acracia in Lleida, and after May 1937 as a leading member of the Catalan JJLL. A 
committed anarchist throughout his life, Peirats would go on to become the most 
important anarchist historian of the CNT. 
Joan Peiró  
A prominent gradualist on the National Committee of the CNT at the outset of the 
Spanish Republic, Peiró would serve as Minister of Industry in the government of Largo 
Caballero from November 1936. Following the German invasion of France, Peiró was 
extradited at the request of the Spanish government in 1941. He was executed in 1942, 
having rejected overtures from the Francoists to co-operate with the regime’s vertical 
unions. 
Joan “Remi” 
The anonymous interviewee of Joan Casanovas Codina whose testimony is contained in 
the Fons Orals department of the AHCB. A member of his local defence committee and 
of the Patrullas de Control in the Barcelona suburb of Sants. 
Vicente Rodríguez 
The editor of Acracia alongside José Peirats, Rodríguez was a founder member of the 
Catalan JJLL and the libertarian student body, the FECL. A perceptive and coherent 
proponent of the purist critique of government collaboration and an assiduous 
contributor to the oppositional press, often under the pseudonym ‘Viroga’, Rodríguez 
died of tuberculosis in France in 1941. 
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Mariano Rodríguez Vázquez 
Rodríguez Vázquez was an autodidact and organiser in the Construction Workers’ 
Union of the CNT. Regional Secretary of the Catalan CNT at the outbreak of the war, 
he would become National Secretary following the removal of Martínez Prieto. A 
defender of collaboration and internal discipline, Rodríguez Vázquez died in France in 
June 1939, drowned in the Marne River. The circumstances of his death are considered 
suspicious because he was known to be a strong swimmer.  
Lucía Sánchez Saornil  
One of the founders of the Mujeres Libres grouping, Sánchez Saornil made a significant 
contribution to the development of anarchist theory in Spain. Her writings in the 
Mujeres Libres review also include some of the more trenchant critiques of 
collaboration and capitalist democracy to appear in the wartime anarchist press prior to 
the May days. Sánchez Saornil later became Secretary of the CNT’s international aid 
organisation, Solidaridad Internacional Antifascista, and appears to have become 
removed from the more radical wing of the organisation, joining the AAB in October 
1937. Nevertheless, she continued to insist on the independence and anarchist character 
of Mujeres Libres throughout the war, in spite of increasing pressure for it to merge 
with the Communist-led Antifascist Women’s Association. 
Juan Santana Calero 
A founder member of the FIJL in Málaga, Santana Calero represented this organisation 
in the Comité de Salud Pública after the defeat of the attempted coup in the city. An 
opponent of state collaboration, Santana Calero was a tireless writer and editor. After 
his arrival in Barcelona early in 1937, he contributed to Ideas, Esfuerzo (in both its 
incarnations) and Faro, amongst others. A member of the AAD as well as the Catalan 
JJLL, he was the subject of malicious rumours of cowardice, which, it has been 
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suggested, were the cause of his remaining in Spain after the war, where he died in a 
gun battle in 1939.  
Alexander Schapiro 
Schapiro was a veteran anarcho-syndicalist who had participated in the Russian 
revolution. Exiled from that country in 1922, Schapiro became active in the IWMA and, 
as its General Secretary, wrote a critical report on the CNT during the Second Republic. 
As a member of the CGT-SR in France, Schapiro became one of the more vocal critics 
of CNT policy over the course of 1937, both in the French anarchist press, and at 
Plenums of the IWMA.  
José Xena  
A rationalist teacher and member of the FAI, Xena provided the only vote against 
collaboration in the CCMA at the Catalan Regional Plenum of July 1936, as a delegate 
of the Baix Llobregat region. A contributor to Ideas, the mouthpiece of the libertarian 
movement in that region, Xena’s attitude to state collaboration appears to have been 
somewhat ambiguous prior to May 1937. On the one hand, he was involved in attempts 
to socialise the economy of L’Hospitalet; on the other, he briefly occupied the post of 
Mayor of the town. After the May days he became a defender of the policy of the 
comités superiores and insistent on the need for internal discipline. His activism 
continued in exile in Venezuela, where he founded a libertarian cultural centre and 
edited AIT, the mouthpiece of the Federación Obrera Regional Venezolana 
(Venezuelan Regional Workers’ Federation).  
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